Vol 5, No. 2 Fall 2004
John F. Bradford
Civil-Military Relations and Military Professionalism
Indonesian Civil-Military Relations
As parallel and co-dependent entities, Indonesia's civil government and military (TNI) defy many of the most basic precepts of conventional civil-military relations theory. By analyzing the unique Indonesian relationship between these two entities, this essay supplements conventional theory. Judging the TNI against three criteria-responsibility, expertise, and corporateness-reveals a potent, fiercely independent institution with a powerful sense of duty. However, TNI capabilities are undermined by a lack of expertise, a factionalized corporate body, and a membership which pursues excessive self-interest. Such analysis confirms that for democracy to thrive in Indonesia the TNI must "professionalize," but reform must be accompanied by the strengthening of civil institutions' abilities to both provide for the nation and protect the TNI's material and ideological interests.
Ever since its establishment in 1945, the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI), has played an exceptional role in Indonesian politics. Addressing the crowd assembled to celebrate the TNI's fiftieth birthday, the President of Indonesia, General Suharto, described the distinctive nature of the Indonesian military:
... the role played by [TNI] is different from those of other militaries?. There are no other armed forces in advanced countries that we could use for comparison. We have to develop our own doctrine, strategies, tactics, and techniques on the basis of our own ideals and experiences.
Although he overstates the uniqueness of the Indonesian military, Suharto correctly identified the atypicality of the TNI. In fact, the peculiarity of the TNI limits the utility of many of the standard assumptions normally made by students of civil-military relations, the field within political science and sociology that discusses how militaries relate to the political affairs of greater society. Therefore, those studying the TNI's contributions to modern Indonesia must first adapt their perspectives to examine it. This essay seeks to understand the TNI's institutional behavior by evaluating it as a professional organization. The point is not to determine whether or not the TNI is professional, but to judge the TNI against the three key professional criteria originally laid out by Samuel Huntington in his classic political science text, The Soldier and the State. These criteria are: responsibility, expertise, and corporateness. Looking at the TNI through these criteria reveals a strong, independent institution with a powerful sense of duty. However, the ability to fulfill its duty is undermined by a lack of expertise, factionalism, and the excessive pursuit of self-interest. Such an elucidation of the TNI's institutional behavior contributes to understanding its behavioral choices in the democratization process.
The analysis of civil-military relations began with classical scholars including Plato, Socrates, Asoka, Confucius, and Sun Tzu. The field has remained salient because the civil-military problematique is a simple paradox inherent to civilization: "The very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity" (Feaver, 1999: 314). Since World War II, standing militaries of post-colonial states have shown a significant propensity to intervene in political affairs. This has renewed attention to the field and contributed to a blossoming of the literature, especially that which applies specifically to the developing world.
Any examination of civil-military relations should start with a definition of terms, but the difficulty of formulating a precise definition of "military" has led contemporary thinkers to focus on identifying the attributes that they regard as central characteristics of militaries. Harold Lasswell describes the military as a body composed of men skilled in the "management of violence" (Huntington, 1957: 11). Morris Janowitz adds that militaries are official bureaucracies legitimized by the national state (Janowitz, 1977: 15). Samuel Huntington combines both of these concepts when he points out, "The skill of the [military] officer is the management of violence; his responsibility is the military security of his client, society," and, "The military profession exists to serve the state" (Huntington, 1957: 15, 73).
Like "military," the commonly used term "profession" is difficult to define. Social scientists have expended considerable efforts defining professions as a particular subset of vocations. In the opening pages of The Soldier and the State, Huntington offers a classic synthesis of this literature, "A profession is a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics." Those characteristics are expertise, responsibility, and corporateness (Huntington, 1957: 7-10).
The expertise of professionals lies in their possession of unique specialized skills which can only be acquired through extended education and experience. Unlike other crafts, which can be mastered by learning the techniques only as they exist in the present, professional knowledge must be intellectual in nature, build upon its own history, and be preserved in writing. Professions therefore require their own institutions to record, develop, and pass on knowledge. When the professional fields of practice and education are separated, contact between the two is maintained through meetings, conferences, journals, and the circulation of members between training and operational roles.
As professionals maintain a monopoly on vital expertise, they also have a responsibility to practice their skills in order to benefit society. When they fail to meet this responsibility they can no longer practice within that profession. Furthermore, because those skills are so valuable, pure economics cannot determine the professional's compensation for service. Rather than desire for economic gain, a sense of service and duty to community must provide the primary motive for entering and practicing a profession. Finally, the profession itself must develop an ethos for fulfilling its responsibility and dealing with its clients.
Corporateness is the third criteria for professionalism. All members of a profession must imagine themselves as part of a single community sharing a collective sense of responsibility, mutual educational experiences, and the bond of common labor. The community manifests itself as a professional organization which is responsible for regulating the profession. Being a member of the organization is a criterion for being a member of the profession. Thus, the organization has the power and responsibility to decide who can join the profession, enforce collective responsibility, and purge those who fail to meet their professional responsibility.
Building on this conception of professionalism, Huntington argues that the military does its best work as an "expert advisor" on security matters and therefore military officers are most effective when completely apolitical. He states, "Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism" (Huntington, 1957: 71). Thus Huntington argues that military professionalism is not directly linked to military intervention in civilian politics, but that the most important causes of military intervention are the political and institutional structure of society (Huntington, 1968: 194).
Huntington's argument provides the standard reference for what military historian Eliot Cohen calls the "normal view" of civil-military relations (Cohen, 2002: 226-34). However, Huntington's views also provoked a variety of criticisms. Readers of civil-military relations literature quickly become aware that "most of what has been written since has been an explicit or implicit response to his argument" (Feaver, 1999: 212). S.E. Finer argues that militaries are motivated to involve themselves in politics primarily to support their organizational ideology or interests (1962: 32-60). Morris Janowitz adds that professional soldiers are by necessity political because to be effective they must not only master the art of managing violence, but also be able to argue their cases within the civil context and deal with the ambiguous politico-military nature of the security environment (Sarkesian, 1984: 156). In addition, Eric Nordlinger tells us that "the armed forces of all countries exert considerable political influence," and argues that studying the political sociology of an officer corps gives valuable clues as to the role it will elect to play in policymaking (1977: 3, 31). While acknowledging that the social structure of a state cannot be ignored, these authors agree that the professional characteristics of a military also have a great deal of influence on its political behavior (Berghahn, 1981: 73-5). In fact, these authors clearly demonstrate that professionalism does not necessarily serve to constrain the political role of a military. In fact profession may, under certain circumstances, do the opposite, that is, encourage militaries to intervene. Therefore it is important to not only measure but also to analyze a military's professionalism in order to predict its likely political behavior.
Specialists of Southeast Asia draw on both Huntington and his critics when discussing civil-military relations in the region. Harold Crouch demonstrates that military involvement in politics stems from both the internal characteristics of the military institution and the external environment in which it operates (1985: 288). Similarly, Ulf Sundhaussen looks at characteristics both internal and external to the military when naming the preconditions for a military's withdrawal from politics: 1) internal consensus within the military, 2) safeguards for military interests, and 3) strong civil governance (1985: pp. 274-5). Bilveer Singh builds upon these authors' work to demonstrate that contemporary civil-military relations discourse draws on baseline assumptions regarding political structures inherent to Western nation-states that may not always be present in the developing world. Therefore, Singh argues that the models available in this discourse are generally ineffective for understanding developing states. He insists that the political role of a military must be evaluated in terms of the country's historical development, national traditions, and military doctrine (2001: 43-5).
The Indonesian case defies much of the conventional civil-military discourse at its most fundamental level. Contrary to the civil-military problematique which assumes that military organizations are legitimized by states, the TNI believes it was created by the people directly and regards itself as an institution separate from the state. This argument is not unreasonable since it can be credibly argued that the Indonesian military created and legitimatized the state, rather than vice versa. Since the TNI has independently weathered various regime changes, one can even imagine the TNI's survival in the wake of a total collapse of the Indonesian civil government. For example, in 1945 when militant youths, unsatisfied with the progress of civilian negotiations with the Dutch government, kidnapped the nationalist leaders and forced them to declare Indonesian independence. Soon afterwards various militant groups organized themselves into the TNI and elected its leaders without consulting the civilian leadership. According to their own teaching of history, the TNI formed because the Republican Government refused to raise an army to fight the returning Dutch colonial officials. The military then became the most adamant supporter of the revolutionary cause. Throughout the revolution it barred civilian initiatives for negotiated settlements with the Dutch and continued to fight even when the civilian leaders allowed themselves to be captured in 1948. As a result of these experiences, the TNI has not only always been highly distrustful of the civilian elite, but has also considered itself the true creator of sovereign Indonesia.
To argue that the Indonesian state is more a construct of the TNI than the TNI a construct of the state is not to say that the Indonesian state lacks its own intrinsic legitimacy. Although both underpinned and constrained by the TNI's ability to use coercive force, the state also has it own institutional independence. Most significantly, it represents the national population, holds the bulk of Indonesia's de jure authority, and receives the recognition of the world community. Furthermore, the TNI voluntarily surrendered a portion of its own autonomy to the state by acceding to the 1945 Constitution's principles of presidential control (Chapter III, Article 10) and the rule of law over defense (Chapter XII, Article 30).
Following independence, the TNI continued to fulfill its political function. Although during certain periods it has disinvolved itself from practical politics and left policymaking primarily to the civilians, the TNI has always at a minimum played the role of "guardian," guaranteeing that Indonesia continues to function as a unitary Pancasila state (Kingsbury, 2003: 6, 10 and Crouch, 1998: 27). Pancasila is the ideological basis of the Indonesian state which includes among its core principles the "Belief in the One and Only God," and the "Unity of Indonesia." "Belief in the One and Only God," also embodied in Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution, ensures that all Indonesians must be religious, but leaves flexibility for religious minorities to practice their faiths among an Islamic majority. The "Unity of Indonesia" demands both territorial sovereignty and the equal treatment of ethnic groups as enshrined in the slogan, Bhinneka Tunggal lka, or "Unity in Diversity" (Anwar, 1999: 201). As guarantor of the Pancasila state, the TNI not only responds to threats, but independently decides what constitutes a security threat. To this end, the TNI has not only sought to counter external threats and separatist movements, but also delimits the boundaries for government reform. Most importantly, the military opposes any government plans that threaten to break up the state's sovereign territory or disrupt the ethnic and religious balance embodied by Pancasila.
In the post-Suharto era, the popular outcry of anti-militarism and the TNI's voluntary reforms have served to strengthen the civil government and have removed TNI officers from the parliament and other fields of practical politics. These reforms, however, have neither curtailed the TNI's independence nor eliminated its socio-political function. Although the TNI has given civilians great latitude to institute reforms, it remains distrustful of the civilian elite. Events such as the 2001 impeachment of President Abdurrahman Wahid have only reinforced the impression that civilian leadership may not be up to the task of leading Indonesia. Furthermore, the 2002 constitutional amendments reinforce the TNI's guardian role by tasking it with "defending, protecting and preserving the unity and sovereignty of the State." But this amendment never defined the body which should identify threats, leaving military commanders greater latitude in determining when and how it should act to fulfill its constitutionally sanctioned role as defender of Indonesia's Pancasila Democracy.
Indonesian history dictates that the military and the civil government must be seen as parallel entities, inextricably linked and co-dependent, but also unable to fully subvert one another (Kingsbury, 2003: 7). "Normal view" civil-military relations theory seeks to determine the circumstances under which militaries interfere in affairs of the state. In the case of Indonesia, it is just as pertinent to determine the circumstances under which the state will exercise greater control over the military and the affairs which the TNI views as within its own domain such as promotion policies, business activities, and training standards. In order to understand this relationship it is a useful exercise to examine the TNI's institutional behavior and the template of "professionalism." However, given the difficulties of applying the conventional models of military sociology to the TNI, it is also necessary to evaluate the TNI against the three baseline characteristics of professionalism-expertise, responsibility, and corporateness-that are appropriate standards for evaluating any vocation, rather than the more specific criteria found in the literature discussing "military professionalism."
The TNI's social responsibility is clearly enshrined in ideology, doctrine, and propaganda. Unlike officers in the professional militaries of the West, whose burdens are limited to the management of violence in order to guarantee security, TNI doctrine clearly gives its members the additional responsibility of serving the nation as a manager and guide with regard to socio-political affairs. Although the level of its direct involvement in political affairs has varied over time and is currently relatively low, the TNI has consistently considered itself to be the guardian of national unity, development, and cohesion. Takashi Shiraishi describes this belief as the TNI's "self-image as the irreplaceable backbone of the nation" (Shiraishi, 1999: 74).
The concept that the TNI holds both security and socio-political functions dates to the war for independence period when the guerilla resistance blurred the distinction between military and political roles. The doctrine was later formally enunciated by Army Chief of Staff General Abdul Haris Nasution in 1958 when he developed the concept of the "middle way" arguing that the TNI was neither an "instrument of government" nor a military regime, but an independent force responsible to and a part of the people. In 1965, the "middle way" evolved into the doctrine of "Dual Function" which affirmed that the TNI should function both as a "military force" and as a "social-political force" and placed military officers in prominent government positions including the cabinet, parliament, the bureaucracy, and regional administration.
In August 1998, Dual Function was officially replaced with the "New Paradigm" which removed the TNI from its direct role in politics and shifted the TNI's focus towards external defense and the preservation of unity. The New Paradigm reforms have been a mixed success. The TNI has given up its seats in the parliament, severed its direct ties with the Golkar political party, removed most references to social-political roles from its doctrine, and espoused an apolitical stance. However, the reforms have neither diminished the political influence of the territorial commanders nor reduced the involvement of the TNI in local affairs (Kingsbury, 2003: 173). For example, the TNI retains its territorial development role that includes improving social conditions and can involve the mending of domestic ethnic and religious divides. In any case, even if it were to be fully implemented, the New Paradigm is not synonymous with a complete disengagement of the military from politics or submission to unquestioned civilian control. The TNI continues to affirm its professional responsibility to actively defend the unitary Pancasila state against all threats and instill patriotism in the Indonesian citizenry.
The TNI ideological commitment to national unity is clearly exemplified by its Sapta Marga or Seven Oaths of the Armed Forces, a creed which has not been modified in the democratic era. The first two oaths are, "We are citizens of the unitary Republic of Indonesia that pivots on Pancasila" and "We are Indonesian patriots, supporters and defenders of the National Ideology, that have responsibility and cannot know surrender." By design, the wording gives the TNI an uncompromiseable responsibility to counter any attacks on the unitary Pancasila state, including those posed by civilian leaders (Jenkins, 1984: 10). In the post-Suharto era, continued adherence to Pancasila was demonstrated by the TNI's 1998 proposal that the political parties include loyalty to Pancasila as central to their platforms (Mietzner, 1999: 93).
The civil government does not provide the TNI with adequate resources necessary for even its most basic functions. Although a lack of transparency makes the shortage difficult to quantify, it is estimated that the official defense budget covers less than one-third of the TNI's operational expenses. Official salaries are small for officers and, for junior enlisted men, insufficient for basic sustenance (Rebasa and Haseman, 2002: 71). Therefore, in order to sustain itself and fulfill its responsibilities, the TNI is expected by the civil government to acquire resources independently of the state financial system. In fact, since the military took control of Dutch-owned enterprises in 1957, business management has been central to the TNI's role and ethos (Crouch, 1988: 358-9).
TNI officers assigned to the management of state enterprises have been directed to divert profits to the military. Furthermore, TNI-managed cooperatives and foundations function at both the national and command levels to supplement operational and personnel costs not covered by the official budget. Many individual officers are also involved in private businesses which rely on either military resources or the coercive power which is associated with the military in order to sustain profitability. Although such activities are often technically illegal, they are commonplace. At all levels there is relatively little distinction between public and private funds. Regardless of the sources of funding, officers consider both conducting operations and providing for the families of their soldiers as part of their professional responsibility.
Business activities are not only necessary for the TNI to fulfill its responsibilities, but have also been legalized by the state and are generally accepted by society. Therefore, although they are out of bounds for the professional militaries of the West, properly managing these businesses in support of the military's role and mission is a legitimate part of the TNI's professional responsibility. The more difficult question to assess is the appropriate volume of resources which are diverted for personal use by members of the military. If the soldiers are in fact free to determine their own salaries, then at what point do those salaries become excessive and undermine professionalism?
Although TNI officers are ideologically and legally bound to fulfill a social responsibility, many officers use their position in furtherance of their personal political or economic interests. In order to evaluate the ramifications of such activity on the TNI's professionalism it is not enough to evaluate behavior against either Indonesian legal codes or against the norms of Western societies. Instead, behavior must be judged in terms of its support of or interference with the fulfillment of responsibility to society.
Western cultures tend to draw clear lines between individuals' professional and private lives, and there is a clear sense of legitimate and illegitimate uses of power derived from a vocation. However these delineations are vague or non-existent in Indonesian culture, particularly among the Javanese to whom power is not seen as being derived, but as simply "being" (Anderson, 1990: 22). As powerful individuals always have access to that mystical force which is power, little distinction can be drawn between that person's "occupational" and "personal" life. Such concepts are clearly reflected within the TNI where distinctions between both public and private duty and personal and military resources are weak. Furthermore, the traditional patronage system expects those with power to accumulate personal wealth not only to provide for their subordinates, but also to demonstrate the extent of their power (Crouch, 1979: 571-9).
These concepts do not absolve TNI officers from responsibility or condone behavior which is detrimental to society. Since Indonesian ethical behavior is that which provides for both personal interest and the interests of society as a whole, behavior which results in excessive personal profit to the distress of others is unacceptable (Magnis-Suseno, 1977: 220-4). Considering the social expectation for TNI officers to accumulate wealth, "excess" is the best standard with which to measure the pursuit of self-interest against the officers' professionalism. As it is a relative term, exactly what constitutes "excess" is difficult to define, but a general consensus exists within TNI that during the New Order the accumulation of excessive wealth became commonplace. In comparison, members of the contemporary military elite seem far more concerned with the negative ramifications of unrestricted pursuit of self-interest at the expense of society and have taken steps to constrain its members. Despite these efforts, excessive pursuit of personal gain continues to plague the professionalism of the TNI.
Professional Responsibility: Summary TNI doctrine and ideology clearly define social responsibility which includes significant security, socio-political, and business roles. Although such responsibility goes beyond the parameters of conventional military professionalism, it does fulfill the professional criteria. Furthermore, professional education, doctrine, and ideology have imbued the TNI leadership with a strong sense of duty. However, professionalism is clearly undermined by TNI actions motivated by self-interest especially when excessive behavior harms society. The underlying importance for Indonesian civil-military relations is the fact that members of the TNI is strongly motivated to preserve the well being of both itself and of Indonesia society as a whole, because members of the TNI believe that their personal well-being and that of Indonesia as a unitary state are equally rooted in Pancasila.
TNI officers are drawn from three educational streams, but regardless of the recruitment path, all TNI officers receive an intense period of initial training that not only focuses on academic and technical subjects but emphasizes socio-political indoctrination and institutional cohesion. The most important of these is the military academy in Magelang. The cadets study not only military skills, but also receive a broad-based education originally modeled on the curriculum of the U.S. Military Academy, to which large doses of Indonesia-specific socio-political indoctrination have been added (Evans, 1989: 39). After initial education, officer careers rotate between professional work and training. Continued training is an important factor in advancement and the officers with whom I have spoken estimate that about twenty percent of successful careers are spent training. Some of these training programs focus on technical skills while others offer more broadly based professional education focused on enabling the officer to deal with greater responsibility. Such professional courses include the branch basic officer courses, company commander courses, Staff and Command School (SESKO), and the National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas).
SESKO administers one of the TNI's most important training courses and the one best known to foreign observers. During the reformation period, the SESKO curriculum was revised to reflect the TNI's withdrawal from politics and courses now emphasize the non-participatory role of the TNI. However, the curriculum continues to place heavy emphasis on indoctrination and loyalty to the Pancasila ideology and still includes course work which is more socio-political than security-orientated in nature. Furthermore, unrealistically high standards for assignments dealing with technical subjects coupled with a tradition of leniency with regard to plagiarism ensure that many students do not master even the basics of the material assigned. In contrast to the academic work, building solidarity is an important part of the curriculum which includes daily formation, student confinement to barracks except on weekends, and core course goals which include "attitude development." The result is a program which, in contrast to the school of a Western professional military, focuses less on purely military subjects than on activities designed to "reinforce solidarity and loyalty to the institution and nation" (Rebasa and Haseman, 2002: 59).
The TNI's security responsibility includes both external and internal defense. The TNI's conventional warfare expertise is difficult to assess empirically, because Indonesia has not come into military conflict with another state for nearly thirty years and does not face either a short- or mid-term threat from a foreign adversary. However, foreign military observers and open source intelligence reports agree that the TNI is ill-prepared to defend Indonesia against any significant external threat, not only because it lacks the resources, equipment, and organization to effectively fight a foreign military, but because it also lacks the expertise to do so.
In contrast, the TNI has been much more active in countering internal security threats and much of its doctrine and training focuses on this mission. The TNI has demonstrated great ability to gather intelligence on internal threats and to use that information at the operational level (Lowry, 1996: 147-78). However, much criticism is leveled at TNI repression as being unnecessarily brutal and thus strategically counterproductive. Indeed, while the TNI has proven itself expert at administering violence to put down rebellions, it lacks the civil-military ability necessary to build the stable social structures needed to ultimately resolve conflict (Lowry, 1996: 180). While the blame for recurrent instability in certain areas must be shared by the civil government, this lack of TNI expertise helps explain why so many internal threats continue to linger and reemerge whenever immediate pressure is removed. Policy Expertise
As a socio-political force committed to the modernization and development of a unified Indonesia, the TNI has been relatively successful. Indeed it has been the periods when the military has been the most involved in government that Indonesia has progressed most rapidly. During the New Order, the TNI not only ensured the stability necessary to attract foreign investment, but provided leaders to the cabinet, parliament, bureaucracy, and all levels of regional administration. During this period, members of the TNI, working alongside their civilian counterparts, achieved considerable success. Hal Hill writes,
... public administration and economic management of a poor, ethnically diverse archipelagic state such as Indonesia is a daunting task, and the essential recipe is one in which the government has got its policies "right" more often than it has not, and has displayed political will to take tough and unpopular decisions when necessary (Hill, 1994: 55).
During the New Order, real per capita income trebled, industrial output increased tenfold, rice yields improved, poverty and infant mortality showed significant declines, and transportation and education opportunities increased for every social stratum (Hill, 1994: 56-61, 105-14). However, it cannot be assumed that it was necessarily TNI expertise which fostered these achievements. Instead, credit is due to foreign investment, to Indonesia's vast natural resources, and to civilian technocrats. The TNI's contribution came in its provision of stability, its setting of boundaries for acceptable political and economic programs, and its permitting those programs to be designed and implemented by the experts. The TNI has realized its policymaking shortcomings and leaders cite those shortcomings as key motivators behind their withdrawal from practical politics and the handover of public functions to those with greater expertise. Rather than improving their skills in order to fulfill their social responsibility, the TNI is professionalizing by narrowing its role to those areas where it has, or hopes to develop, greater expertise.
Although TNI officers are expected to administer military-owned businesses as a part of their official duties, few officers have significant expertise in business affairs. Business topics are given minimal attention in professional education; instead officers are expected to learn on the job. Many military businesses have generated substantial profits (despite terrible mismanagement and corruption) by capitalizing on opportunities to exploit Indonesia's abundant resources, fortuitous government licensing opportunities, and the ability to coerce suppliers, buyers, and competitors (Liem, 2002: 220). As an example of such an operation, one military officer interviewed operates an import business that has secured lucrative contracts supplying alcohol to several large Bali resorts. Without commenting on a particular firm, one bar manager explained to the author that he generally selects suppliers not based on cost or service, but in order to avoid "unfortunate ramifications."
Although TNI officers possess complex skills which are developed in specialized institutions, these institutions also devote extraordinary resources to strengthening feelings of duty and loyalty, limiting the emphasis on building technical expertise. As a result, TNI expertise is often insufficient to fulfill its social responsibilities. Its ability to protect Indonesia from external threat is limited and it has demonstrated little ability to achieve lasting victories when facing domestic unrest. Although skilled at repression, the TNI lacks the know-how needed to "win the peace." As a policymaking body, the TNI contributed to the New Order economic successes, but its current leaders realize that its lack of expertise and poor public relations inhibit its effectiveness in the public sector. The TNI's recognition of these shortcomings has played a major role in its post-New Order decisions to disengage from practical politics and focus on improving its war-making abilities, especially those related to external defense.
TNI officers form a highly independent body and conceive of themselves as being united by common experience, work, responsibility, and outlook. Although formally accepting of the role of the President as the Commander-in-Chief under the terms of the 1945 Constitution, the institutional culture is highly distrustful of civilian leadership and regards itself as accountable to the people and Pancasila ideology rather than to the civilian government. During the "17 October Affair" of 1952, the army prominently demonstrated its opposition to what it viewed to be civilian interference in the military's internal affairs. The clearest example of the TNI institutional independence and its capability to develop its own agenda in the post-Suharto period was the 1999 East Timor crisis. Although the President had decided that a referendum should decide the future of the territory, members of the TNI acted in accordance with their ideology to preserve the unity of the state. Rather than challenge the President directly, they sought to undermine his decision by instigating tremendous amounts of violence in the region. Since then, TNI resistance to civil government initiatives has been less profound. For example, when President Wahid removed General Wiranto from power, he openly resisted, but did not resort to force and the subsequent 74-officer reshuffle was grudgingly accepted.
Factionalism has plagued the TNI since its foundation as an assemblage of militant groups each with its own interests and ideology. In the Sukarno era, the factions looked to align themselves with sources of power outside the military when under threat. Later, under the strong leadership of Suharto, the factional struggles were kept within the military and external structures had little power to lend. However, in the late-Suharto era a deep split in the military emerged as factions were able to call upon ties to the Suharto family and political Islam for assistance. Following the fall of Suharto, the ouster of General Prabowo and dispersion of his faction stabilized the organization, but the TNI's chain-of-command remains weak and "rogue elements" continue to operate. This factionalism is exacerbated by a number of factors including the competition of politicians for supporters drawn from the TNI ranks, financial incentives to use covert force, the TNI's internal patronage system, and competing business interests. Factionalism in the TNI undermines professionalism by contributing to corporate inability to adequately maintain professional standards among its members.
Despite the TNI's strong institutionalism and independent nature, the TNI inadequately fulfills the standards of professionalism because it insufficiently polices itself. The excessive corruption and patronage which are prevalent throughout the TNI are not just tolerated but often intrinsically endorsed by the corporate body. Unprofessional activities such as the payment of bribes for assignments are widespread. For example, recruits pay more than twenty million rupiah to enter the military, believing that the financial rewards of a military career will easily repay the "investment." Similarly, officers seek out patrons to place them in "wet" versus "dry" regions where business possibilities and profit are better. Even very serious transgressions of professional responsibility, including refusal to obey orders, planning mutinies, and using force against civilians without authorization, rarely earn punishment greater that demotion or transfer to positions with limited political influence or poor financial opportunities. Failure to punish officers involved in the most heinous of crimes is most clearly exemplified by the fact that no officers have been formally punished for their roles in orchestrating the September 1999 violence in East Timor. In fact, many of those involved have continued to rise through the ranks. For example, Human Rights Watch notes that Major-General Mahidin Simbolon, promoted in 2001 to Regional Commander for Papua, played an significant role in the creation and direction of militias responsible for multiple attacks on civilians (Human Rights Watch: 2004).
The TNI exhibits a far stronger sense of corporate community than is required for a group to be considered a profession. In fact, the TNI officer corps' strong sense of group identity polarizes its members apart from civil society. The TNI is so fiercely independent of civil authority that professional self-regulation is the only effective mechanism for protecting the public from the excesses of military units or individuals. However, control over membership and the mechanisms to police its members and to ensure that they fulfill their professional responsibilities are weak. The high degree of factionalism and the limited actions taken to control corruption and misbehavior among officers seriously undermines accountability.
Utilizing the three criteria of professionalism as a template to examine the TNI as an institution reveals a powerful, fiercely independent, but factionalized body with little expertise in military fields other than brutal repression. TNI officers have a strong sense of duty, but institutional checks on their misuse of power are weak. In the democratic era, officers have demonstrated their desire to withdraw from policymaking and practical politics, but this withdrawal should not be confused with transformation into an apolitical body. The TNI still sees itself as the guardian of Indonesia as a unitary Pancasila state and will likely intervene to counter any perceived attack on Indonesia.
Commentators on Indonesian politics frequently mention the need for the TNI to "professionalize" as a part of the reform process. A more professional military would have greater corporate cohesion, improved military expertise, and behave less out of self-interest and more out of its sense of social responsibility. This would mean less corruption and less abuse of its powers, but it would also make the TNI increasingly likely to intervene directly in politics if it perceives the unitary Pancasila state as being under threat.
If true democracy is to succeed in Indonesia, it will not be enough for the TNI to professionalize; it will also have to accept a position truly subservient to the state. For this to happen, not only must the TNI sustain its internal desire to reform, but civilian leaders must demonstrate that they have the capability to preserve the strength of Indonesia, provide for the needs of the people, and protect the military's interests. The TNI has a genuine desire to reform itself, but will only give up its mantle of guardian of the state if it believes another body is ready and able to fulfill that responsibility.
 As quoted by Jakarta Post, 6 Oct 1995, p. 1.
 The official English translation of the Indonesian Constitution is available from the Indonesian foreign ministry website http://www.deplu.go.id/
 A classic example of a document reflecting such doctrine is the booklet The Indonesian Military as a Social Force and Principles of Policy in the Framework of Protecting and Improving the Integration of the Military with the People, Department of Defense and Security, 1979.
 More recent publications such as Rebasa and Haseman, 2002 and Kingsbury, 2003 have described similar self-images. Personal interviews with TNI officers, Indonesian civilian leaders, and closely involved foreign observers conducted in Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Washington D.C. and Singapore between March 2002 and July 2004, confirm that these observations remain valid today.
 New Paradigm doctrine usually emphasizes the importance of external defense. However, given the scale of military operations in regions such as Papua, Maluku, and Aceh, demonstrate firm retention of national unity function.
 Interviews with TNI officers and foreign TNI observers, Yogyakarta, Bandung, Jakarta, Washington D.C., and Singapore, 2002-2004.
 "Kami warga Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia yang bersendikan Pancasila. Kami Patriot Indonesia, pendukung serta pembela Ideologi Negara, yang bertanggung jawab dan tidak mengenal menyerah."
 For example, in the East Java village of Karangploso, military trucks are used to haul the produce of a private quarry to market for resale. Personal observation, August 2002.
 The interviews were numerous and included ones with a training officer stationed in East Java (November 1995) and SESKO students (Aug 2002).
 TNI graduates from SESKO describe lengthy assignments which they believed they had neither the understanding of the material nor the time necessary to complete. As a result, they report having either plagiarized the work of a previous student or paid individuals from outside of the school to complete it for them.
 See for example, see Lowry, 1996, pp. 222-4 and "The Indonesian Military as a Social Force and Principles of Policy in the Framework of Protecting and Improving the Integration of the Military with the People " Indonesian Armed Forces, GlobalSecurity.org. Available: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia/abri.htm 3.
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