

Japan: Harmony by Accident?

TAKU ISHIKAWA

Introduction: Taking the Asian Lead in MD

Japan has been, at least seemingly, the most enthusiastic supporter of the American ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme, with the probable exception only of Israel.¹ Tokyo started joint technical research for the Navy Theater Wide, presently known as the Sea-based Midcourse Defense or as the Aegis missile defence programme, with the US in 1999. In December 2003 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's cabinet decided to introduce the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) and the Sea-based Midcourse. In July 2005, the *Diet* passed a bill to provide a legal framework for operating a missile defence (MD) system.² While several other states, such as Australia and India,³ recently have come to show some interest in MD cooperation with the United States, no states except for Japan, Germany and Italy have decided to introduce anti-missile systems yet.⁴

Nevertheless, few public debates on MD have occurred in Japan. Of course, because of the basic decision to introduce anti-missile systems, there have been quite a few articles on this issue, discussing both the pros and cons, many of which have indicated the necessity of an 'open discussion' or a 'national debate' on MD.⁵ However, the Japanese government was able to make a deployment decision without facing serious opposition. Moreover, the decision itself did not bring about intense discussion, even though it has been widely pointed out that the introduction of anti-missile systems in Japan would have important implications for the future of the country's security.

Why has there been no substantial discussion on such an important issue? What enabled the Koizumi cabinet to make a deployment decision without generating any strong opposition or fierce controversy? Does the absence of intense discussion mean that the Japanese public did not play any important role in the decision-making process? This paper examines these questions, assuming that answering them will most likely lead to solving another puzzle, that is: why has Japan been among the allies taking the lead in MD cooperation with the United States?

The first section of this paper briefly describes the development of Japanese–American cooperation on BMD, in which we can find one of the answers to the questions above. The second section focuses on the strategic environment in which Japan is located, describing the evolution of real and potential threats to Japan in the post-Cold War era, and the following section examines how the broad range of non-proliferation measures, whose importance has increased in the new strategic environment, tend to be valued vis-à-vis MD in Japan. In the last section, the topic of how Japan's identity has been transformed in the changing environment and the implication of such changes on missile defence are analysed. By so doing, we can explore some other answers to the questions above as well, including the aspect of how Japan's MD has been constructed.

Stimuli to Development

Collaboration on MD, in a broad sense, between the two countries dates from the mid-1980s, when Washington asked its allies to cooperate on its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) programme.⁶ After deliberation, and with much hesitation, the Japanese government decided to initiate limited cooperation primarily at a private level. Thus, the Western Pacific Missile Defence Architecture Study (WESTPAC) started in 1989, with private corporations, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, as Japanese participants.

The WESTPAC continued until 1993 when cooperation between Tokyo and Washington became more official. In May 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced the decision to reorganize the ballistic missile defence programme, and came up with the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) initiative. It aimed not only at the protection of American allies and friends, but also to protect American forces abroad from short- or medium-range missiles as a major pillar of the new BMD programme.⁷ Then, in September, Aspin visited Japan and requested Tokyo to participate in this project. However, since Japan was not ready to take any drastic step towards development and possible deployment at this point,⁸ the Japan Defence Agency agreed only to set up a bilateral working group. The Japanese–American TMD Working Group was established in December, in order to study how to cooperate in this area. Its bilateral study was established in September 1994, in order to conduct more intensive research on technological aspects.

Subsequently, according to Gordon R. Mitchell, 'U.S. corporations and defense officials lobbied heavily for Japan to endorse the TMD concept and pursue collaborative missile defense projects'. Whether or not 'such back room lobbying' served as a constraint on public discussion on BMD in Japan as Mitchell suggests,⁹ the Defence Agency was able to conduct feasibility studies without attracting much attention from the public, although it

was undeniably motivated by Washington's pressure. In mid-1996, the Defence Agency initiated fairly large-scale simulation research, and concluded presumably by early 1997 that a combination of the Navy Theater Wide and the PAC-3 would be the best option for the country. This was equivalent to one of the four deployment options which the US had presented to Japan in June 1994,¹⁰ and the simulation research largely depended on the data and information provided by the United States.¹¹

Thus, the Defence Agency's inclination towards the Navy Theater Wide and PAC-3 option was largely urged by Washington. However, at the same time, for the Agency, it was a path that could serve as a delaying tactic. The Navy Theater Wide was the newest and most sophisticated among the four major TMD programmes, including the PAC-3, the Theater High Altitude Area Defense, and the Navy Area Defense. Hence the Navy Theater Wide and PAC-3 option was supposed to enable Japan to gain several more years for deliberation about development or deployment. It is also noteworthy that the Navy Theater Wide programme left greater room for technological cooperation than the other systems.

Nonetheless, the Defence Agency had to remain cautious throughout 1997, primarily due to strong concerns within the government about the financial burden.¹² The Defence Agency successfully deferred making any further commitment even without resorting to the 'delaying tactic' officially. While it kept talking with the US, the agency tried to make a consensus within its own bureaucracy and then the government as a whole. By late spring of 1998, the Defence Agency got ready, and began to consider when and how to announce its decision to intensify BMD cooperation with the United States. An important question was whether to announce it before or after Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to Japan scheduled in autumn.¹³

The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea's (DPRK) launch of a Taepodong missile over Japanese territory on 31 August 1998 paved the way. Within less than a month, Japan agreed with the US to initiate joint technical research on the Navy Theater Wide. The Japanese government also decided to launch an early warning satellite, despite initial US opposition. At this point, a curious incident happened: almost no attention was paid to the PAC-3. Suddenly, the term TMD, used especially in the Japanese media, became almost equivalent to Navy Theater Wide. Thus, the onset of bilateral joint research on the Navy Theater Wide in the following year contributed to covering up the fact that Tokyo would have to make a decision to introduce the PAC-3 sooner or later, probably before the joint research entered the development phase.

As a result, no serious discussion took place on the necessity and adequacy of deploying the PAC-3, which had been originally developed primarily as an anti-Scud system, until the Defence Agency decided to introduce the Patriot as well as the Aegis systems in 2003. Almost no one questioned either the

efficacy of the PAC-3 against North Korea's Nodong missile with a longer range than Scud missiles, or the concept of layered defence, whose importance had been emphasized not only by the US side but also by the Defence Agency. This was despite the fact that the PAC-3, in charge of lower-tier intercepts, could cover a far smaller area than could the Navy Theater Wide.

Besides, once the joint technical research had begun, the media coverage of TMD per se decreased further, probably because most stories about the joint research were too technical, many considered that the Navy Theater Wide programme was still in its infancy and hence no further step would be taken in the near future, and public attention was clearly attracted to the legislation to support the new Japanese–American Defense Guidelines agreed in September 1997,¹⁴ and then, albeit to a lesser degree, to the US National Missile Defense (NMD) programmes instead.

With regard to the guidelines legislation, the notorious concept of 'areas surrounding Japan' in particular caused a nationwide debate in Japan. Until then, Tokyo had been able to send its Self-defence Forces abroad only to participate in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, under the 1992 International Peace Co-operation Law, but the passage of the Defense Guidelines bills in May 1999 enabled Japan to play certain military roles, though strictly limited to non-combatant ones, in support of US forces responding to contingencies in the surrounding areas. And this is why the new guidelines and the guidelines bills stirred up fierce controversy.

Keeping up with the Bush Administration

In contrast, the absence of intense debate on BMD continued, as if nothing had been going on between Japan and the US concerning this issue, until the George W. Bush administration began to push hard for the development and deployment of a robust anti-missile system. Some Japanese sceptics and critics of MD then began to express renewed concerns over Washington's utmost determination to implement its plans. President Bush's speech to the National Defense University on May 2001 raised more anxieties. Many sceptics and critics considered that the removal of the distinction between 'theatre' and 'national' would increase the possibility for Japan's BMD to be more integrated into the US system, thereby increasing the danger of 'entrapment'. They also renewed a concern that Japan's participation in the American MD programme might conflict with the Constitution, which banned the exercise of the right to collective self-defence according to the present official interpretation, or lead to the violation of the three principles on arms export, which virtually prohibit any arms delivery.¹⁵

Even the Japanese government seemed dismayed by the new MD plan outlined by President Bush, and then further accelerated by the events of

September 11 despite the barely existing connection between MD and terrorism. The growing perplexity in Japan was clearly reflected in Defence Agency Director General Gen Nakatani's emphasis on Japan's 'own initiative' in operating such a system.¹⁶ However, the changes in the American programme did not affect Tokyo's interest in cooperation after all. As an American analyst put it, while trying to 'avoid addressing the collective defense issue arising out of the changed US missile defense strategy', Japanese officials 'concentrated on protecting Japan's option to acquire a BMD capability'.¹⁷ Here as well, the form of 'joint technical research', which was separated from acquisition or deployment, according to the Defence Agency,¹⁸ served the Japanese government's purpose of maintaining the missile defence cooperation with the United States.

The Bush administration's withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, announced in December 2001 and coming into effect in June 2002, meant that the US deployment decision was imminent, and hence that Tokyo would soon have to decide to go beyond the research phase. The Japanese government might have faced stronger domestic opposition if North Korea had not admitted the abduction of some Japanese citizens during Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang in September 2002, and if it had not admitted running a secret nuclear programme the following month. Defence Agency Director General Shigeru Ishiba soon started to mention the possibility of moving on to the development phase, while the US was reportedly pressing Japan to do so.¹⁹ And then, in December 2002, on the same day as the Bush administration decided to begin deployment of a set of MD capabilities in 2004, Japan and the US agreed to acknowledge 'the need to continue current U.S.-Japan cooperative research on ballistic missile defense technologies and to *intensify* consultation and cooperation on missile defense'.²⁰

By that time, Washington had begun deployment of the PAC-3, and in the Gulf War of 2003, this weapon was used for the first time. Almost as a matter of course, American pressure on Japan to introduce this system increased. Ishiba soon began to suggest fielding the PAC-3,²¹ which had been almost forgotten in the MD discourse in Japan as described above. Before long, a consensus emerged within the Defence Agency, urged on by the US, that Japan should introduce not only the PAC-3 but also the Sea-based Midcourse, regardless of the course of the joint technical research on the Navy Theater Wide, which had been proven to be a more advanced type of the Sea-based Midcourse.²² Thus, by the summer of 2003, the Defence Agency set out an intention to include a budget for the Patriot and the Aegis systems in its estimated budget request for 2004, which was scheduled to be issued in late August.

Although the budget was reduced to some extent in the subsequent negotiations with the Ministry of Finance,²³ which was very critical of any increase

in defence spending, the Koizumi cabinet authorized the introduction of the two systems, as well as the continuation of the joint technical research in December.²⁴ The Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda issued a statement that read:

The Government of Japan, recognizing that rapid progress on the relevant technologies of BMD has recently been made and that technological feasibility of BMD system is high, and noting that BMD system is suitable for our exclusively defensive national defense policy, decided to introduce the multi-layered defense system based on the Aegis BMD system and Patriot PAC-3...²⁵

Fukuda also said that since it would 'be operated based on Japan's independent judgment', and would not be used for defending third countries, the MD system would 'not raise any problems with regard to the issue of the right of collective self-defense', but he suggested that there would still remain some legal issues to tackle in terms of operating the system. While the examination of the legal aspects continued within the government throughout 2004, the intermittent consultations with the US after the deployment decision conceivably focused more on the development aspects. In December 2004, the Koizumi cabinet approved the new National Defence Programme Outline, which not only emphasized the importance of MD as well as the alliance with the US, but also 'took the unprecedented step of mentioning China as a potential threat'.²⁶ At the same time the government announced that the three arms export principles would not be applied to possible joint development and production of MD systems with the United States.²⁷

A few days later, Tokyo and Washington exchanged diplomatic notes, and then signed a Memorandum of Understanding, calling for a framework of comprehensive cooperation on BMD. According to Defence Agency Director General Yoshinori Ohno, this agreement makes the further exchange of diplomatic notes unnecessary when Japan decides to promote the joint technical study to the development phase²⁸ – the move Washington has long wanted.²⁹ Then in August 2005, without waiting for cabinet approval, the Defence Agency reflected its intention to proceed with this move in its budget request for the next fiscal year.³⁰ In the meantime, Ohno announced that Japan and the United States had agreed to license production of PAC-3 by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.³¹

With regard to the legal issues, the Koizumi cabinet approved a bill to revise laws concerning the operation of a BMD system in February 2005. The bill passed by the *Diet* aims at simplifying the procedures of intercepting incoming missiles. Though not related to MD directly, the government enacted contingency legislation consecutively in 2003 and 2004, which signified that 'Japanese security policy has entered a new phase', according to a

newspaper editorial critical of the legislation.³² It is definite that Japan has been advancing steadily towards its own 'new strategic framework', closely interwoven with the American version of course, in which MD would occupy an important position, as described in the new National Defence Programme Outline.

A Transformed Strategic Environment

As seen in the previous section, the Japanese government has been gradually expanding MD cooperation with the US – sometimes reluctantly and grudgingly, sometimes rather positively. Although this trend has been considerably promoted by American pressure, it is undeniable that certain changes in Japan's strategic environment as well have pushed Tokyo towards the pro-MD stance.

First of all, North Korea has kept providing Japan with incentives, and excuses as well. The start of the Japanese–American TMD Working Group was largely prompted, and justified at the same time, by the North Korean launch of the Nodong missile in May 1993. This launch was carried out as part of the brinkmanship which North Korea engaged in during the first nuclear crisis. Though its nuclear development was frozen, at least ostensibly, by the US–DPRK Agreed Framework of 1994, Pyongyang's missile development apparently continued. This crisis, together with the Nodong launch, enhanced the value of MD within Japanese defence policy as a whole.³³

Likewise, North Korea launched the Taepodong missile in 1998 while it was holding high-level talks with Washington, which was followed by the Japanese–American agreement of September 1998 to begin joint research on the Navy Theater Wide. Although, as previously mentioned, it did not cause the government's decision in itself, the Taepodong launch served to minimize public opposition and facilitate the Defence Agency in emphasizing the North Korean missile threat,³⁴ and hence promoted the decision.

Kim Jong Il's admission of the abductions and the way the North Koreans dealt with this issue created strong resentment among the Japanese public,³⁵ probably contrary to North Korea's expectations.³⁶ The second nuclear crisis, which broke out shortly after Koizumi and Kim signed the Pyongyang Declaration of September 2002, fuelled anti-North Korean feelings in Japan. Young politicians of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party soon took an initiative to equip Tokyo with leverage against Pyongyang, preparing bills enabling the government to impose economic sanctions on North Korea. For many of those who supported such a hard-line stance, MD could be a useful 'leverage'. Of course, for many Japanese, missile defence was more than just that. Now that the abductions by the North Koreans proved to be true after a quarter century of denial and neglect, the North Korean threat

was now widely believed to be real, and one which Japan should address immediately. For many, BMD seemed to be an effective answer.

Missile defence critics in Japan, many of whom had been rather 'soft' on North Korea, lost their persuasiveness considerably, due to their 'criminal record' of underestimating the North Korean threat, or of denying the existence of the abduction issue, which they had consistently called 'fabrication'. This contributed considerably to the absence of intense public debate.

Thus, the decision to deploy the Patriot and the Aegis systems would have been more difficult without a somewhat bizarre and rapidly unfolding chain of events since Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang. It is important to note that the PAC-3 was already available in the US, however ineffective it might be against the Nodong.³⁷ Even though the Defence Agency's decision to introduce the PAC-3 was urged by strong American pressure,³⁸ the fact that this technology existed already in the United States supposedly helped justify the decision to introduce the Patriot in Japan, considering the very real existence of the North Korean threat.³⁹

The second factor behind Japan's involvement in MD is China. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union enabled Beijing to look southward, which made its theatre missiles more threatening to Japan. Together with the increase in its military capabilities sustained by its rapid economic growth, the Chinese nuclear tests, conducted every year since 1992, invoked caution and resentment in Japan.

The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–96, in which China conducted missile launch exercises, further fuelled Japan's wariness of the 'rising China' and its nuclear and missile threat. It is undeniable that the crisis, which reached its peak in March 1996, had a considerable effect on the revision of the Japanese–American Defense Guidelines, although Masahiro Akiyama, who served as Director General of the Bureau of Defence Policy and then as Administrative Vice Minister of the Defence Agency from 1995 to 1997, tried to play down its impact.⁴⁰ It was agreed to revise the guidelines in April 1996, when Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton signed the Japan–US Joint Declaration on Security. The declaration also stated that the two countries would 'continue to cooperate in the ongoing study on ballistic missile defense'.⁴¹ Although Tokyo does not intend to use its MD capabilities to defend Taiwan, the crisis further fuelled Japan's wariness over China, and hence reinforced the recognition within the government of the necessity to proceed with BMD cooperation with the United States.

Jiang Zemin's visit to Japan in November 1998 had different but considerably significant impacts on the country's MD policy, as well as on public attitudes towards it. His emphasis on the history question clearly provoked anti-Chinese feelings among the Japanese public.⁴² By that time,

many Japanese had already been satiated with demands from Asian nations for an apology for wartime atrocities. More recently, however, a slight majority of the public seems to be satiated in turn with Prime Minister Koizumi's persistence in visiting Yasukuni Shrine, which has strained relations with China and South Korea.⁴³ As Kiichi Fujiwara of the University of Tokyo contends, such demands have stimulated the recent rise of 'narrative of a nation' in Japan, which tends to justify Japan's wartime policies, and the growth of nationalism among the Japanese public.⁴⁴ In the same vein, Jiang's adherence to the history question fuelled Japanese nationalism, and thereby facilitated the initiation of joint technical research on missile defence in the following year.

A Japanese analyst argued that the Chinese leadership learned a lesson from this experience, and subsequently toned down its rhetoric on the history question. And, she contends, the shift in China's Japan policy, together with some other factors, led Beijing to tone down its anti-MD rhetoric as well.⁴⁵ The Chinese opposition to missile defence reached its peak probably by the summer of 2000, when Clinton was scheduled to make a decision on National Missile Defense (NMD) deployment. Yet, by the time Bush announced the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, it subsided significantly. Bush's deployment decision did not invite strong opposition from China or from others. Somewhat ironically, the absence of a worldwide anti-MD coalition, which could be found when Clinton postponed NMD deployment,⁴⁶ reduced the persuasiveness of critics, who had emphasized the dangers of China's reaction and a regional arms race, and thereby facilitated the Japanese government's deployment decision to some extent.

Jiang's visit supposedly had another effect. His firm stance on the history question was, at least to some extent, based on his confidence derived from improved relations with the US, and the credit China had earned for maintaining the value of the yuan in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. On the contrary, the fact that Clinton made no stopover in Japan during his visit to China in July 1998, together with the fact that he joined Jiang in criticizing Tokyo's economic policies, made many Japanese more concerned about 'Japan-passing' by the US. Jiang's somewhat high-handed attitude presumably fuelled this concern, which in turn urged Japan to try to be a 'dependable ally' of the US. Although the Bush administration's pro-Japan stance mitigated the concern more or less, many Japanese have come to be more conscious about a potential rivalry with China over courting the US, as well as having influence in East Asia.⁴⁷ This growing mentality seems to have contributed to a more recent discrepancy called 'Japan-surpassing'.⁴⁸

In sum, the changes in Japan's strategic environment, briefly described above, have promoted the country's involvement in MD in one way or another, and what is called 'the redefinition of the Japanese-American alliance'

in a broad sense. Above all, growing recognition of the North Korean threat and anti-North Korean feelings among the public and hence the politicians – together with the bureaucrats, albeit to a lesser degree presumably – seem to have helped advance Japan's BMD policy. For the bureaucrats, especially civilians in the Defence Agency and certain segments of the Foreign Ministry, who gradually became more interested in advancing MD cooperation with the US, the public's growing recognition of the North Korean threat must have been a gift. And they seem to have succeeded in making full use of it. It is true that the bureaucrats, who had been thought to dominate Japanese politics for a long time, have seen a decline in their power and status in many ways,⁴⁹ but, in the case of BMD policy, the public, urged by the North Korean threat, seems to have somewhat coincidentally or unintentionally helped the bureaucrats to play a leading role. Persisting nationalism among conservative politicians has also benefited the bureaucracy.

Besides, it should be noted that redefining the Japanese–American alliance and proceeding with BMD have not been independent of each other. Both have been reflecting a shift to a deterrence posture that stresses denial rather than punishment,⁵⁰ and this shift was necessitated by the emergence of the post-Cold War strategic environment, in which 'rogue states' came to be considered the primary threat.⁵¹ The shift, actively led by the US, has not merely involved Japan, but rather taken place as part of the transformation of American global strategy. The New Strategic Concept adopted by NATO can be seen as one of the instances, too. Nonetheless, the European allies are fortunately fairly distant from the 'rogues', while Japan is so proximate to one of them, namely North Korea. Presumably this phenomenon has been reflected in a difference between Europe and East Asia in the degree to which the shift, including MD cooperation with the US, has advanced.⁵² Japan's new National Defence Programme Outline and 'the common strategic objectives' agreed upon between Japan and the US in February 2005, which expressed strong concern over emerging China, not to mention the North Korean threat,⁵³ seem to indicate further acceleration of the shift.⁵⁴

Promoting Regional Restraint?

The growing recognition of the threat of 'rogue states', one of whose characteristics is often said to be seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles,⁵⁵ together with the collapse of the Soviet Union as a nuclear superpower, has made non-proliferation of those weapons one of the most important items on the agenda for the international community in the post-Cold War era. Declaring disarmament and non-proliferation as 'one of the important pillars of its foreign policy',⁵⁶ Japan has made various efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. For instance, it has submitted draft resolutions on

nuclear disarmament to the UN General Assembly every year since 1994, and thereby provided a basis for the unanimously adopted Final Document of the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, in which ‘an “unequivocal undertaking” by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons’ was agreed on.⁵⁷ Japan has also tried to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the conclusion of a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty.

With regard to ballistic missiles, Japan has striven to strengthen the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), especially in terms of the inclusion of non-member states,⁵⁸ and made ‘a very positive contribution’ to the adoption of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.⁵⁹ Although a Foreign Ministry official suggested that the North Korean Taepodong launch prompted the negotiation of the Hague Code,⁶⁰ the Japanese government does not seem to consider such non-proliferation measures a possible alternative to MD. As missile defence proponents in Japan often emphasize,⁶¹ it is not proliferation by North Korea or China that directly threatens Japan, but their actual arsenal of missiles and WMD. In this sense, it seems that non-proliferation measures are hardly believed to be a substitute for MD.

This is not to say, however, that Japan has made no diplomatic efforts to curtail or restrict the missile capabilities of North Korea or China. One of the goals of Koizumi’s first visit to Pyongyang was to attain North Korea’s commitment to continuing the freeze on missile tests, for example. Tokyo has also kept asking Beijing to promote the transparency of its armaments both bilaterally and multilaterally.

However, rather than letting diplomatic measures proceed, the Japanese government seems to expect missile defence to promote arms control, as Director General for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs of the Foreign Ministry Yukiya Amano says, MD ‘would theoretically reduce the effectiveness of nuclear missiles, and hence has a potential to promote nuclear disarmament and contribute to non-proliferation’. It should be noted that a high-ranking official involved in Japan’s arms control and non-proliferation policy clearly rejects a prevalent criticism that MD will bring about an arms race.⁶² Considering that formerly it was the officials in the Defence Agency and in the Foreign Ministry in charge of security relations with the United States, as well as pro-MD politicians and analysts, who tended to refute such a criticism, it seems that they have succeeded in gaining a consensus within the government to a considerable degree.⁶³

Besides, such a consensus is shared to some extent by the Democratic Party of Japan, the largest opposition party in the *Diet*, which also supports MD.⁶⁴ For example, Akihisa Nagashima of the Democratic Party, a member of the House of Representatives, suggests that MD could be used as political

and diplomatic leverage to change China's pattern of behaviour to a less threatening one.⁶⁵ The fact that both the ruling coalition and the Democratic Party support missile defence, as well as the fact that the government tends to prefer MD to diplomacy, clearly reflects Japan's changing identity, which will be discussed in the next section.

A Defensive Identity

Michael J. Green, one of the leading American experts on Japan, precisely points out recent changes in Tokyo's foreign policy, which 'do represent a pronounced departure from the past',⁶⁶ as well as some strong continuities. The continuities, according to Green, are as follows: the centrality of the US; the primacy of economic tools; constraints on the use of force; and no alternate strategic vision. 'Within these areas of continuity', Green argues that since the end of the Cold War the following changes have been taking place, which represent Japan's changing identity: a greater focus on balance of power; growing realism, frayed idealism; a higher sensitivity to security; a more determined push for 'independent' foreign policy; a focus on Asia; as well as a more fluid foreign policy-making process.

Japan's increasing involvement with MD seems to reflect most of these continuities and changes. At least in part, it intends to strengthen the alliance with the US. Although BMD does not represent the primacy of economic tools – as far as it is considered 'purely defensive', as the government has reiterated – it can be justified rather easily even under the strong constraints on the use of force. With regard to 'no alternate strategic vision', Green explains, no political leader has articulated a 'clear alternative to the current doctrine of Japanese foreign policy', and adds that 'there has been no political mandate for bolder reformulation of Japan's world role'.⁶⁷ Japan's commitment to missile defence is no exception to this tendency, in that it has been largely a reaction to Washington's initiative, and Tokyo has presented no vision of a new world order or renovated foreign policy with MD. Some proponents in Japan, however, seem to tacitly expect missile defence to be a political tool for overcoming some constitutional and other legal and political constraints on Japan's foreign and security policy.⁶⁸

Another continuity, one might add, is persistent anti-nuclearism among the public. While many analysts, mostly non-Japanese, have written on Japan's nuclear option lately, the government's contention that missile defence is 'purely defensive' seems to have appealed to the Japanese public; this implies that MD is 'unlike a nuclear deterrent'.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, a few Japanese analysts have taken the view that the country should not give up a future nuclear option for still unproven or ineffective MD, while it is facing increasing missile and nuclear threats.⁷⁰ This position is held by a small minority

only. But the case for some sort of offensive deterrent, such as ballistic and cruise missiles, has been made more often even in the *Diet*.⁷¹ Public support for such an argument seems to have grown to a certain degree. However, 'purely defensive' MD may be more acceptable – or 'less worse' perhaps – to many Japanese than a conventional offensive deterrent, let alone a nuclear one.

On the other hand, Japan's policy seems to reflect the changes more remarkably. Missile defence can be taken as a means to balance North Korea, and potentially China, even though it is intended to outbalance them in their eyes. To balance a threat is, needless to say, a typical realist prescription. It is debatable whether missile defence will enhance Japan's 'independence', or 'subordination' to the United States as some MD proponents seem concerned.⁷² Nor can it be said whether or not it reflects 'a more fluid foreign policy-making process'. What is clear is that Japan's involvement in this programme clearly reflects its higher sensitivity to security and relative power relations especially in Asia.

Thus, these changes, which can be rephrased as 'a major shift in the attitudes of the Japanese about their country and its defense',⁷³ have promoted Tokyo's increasing commitment to MD to a considerable extent. And since they represent Japan's changing identity as mentioned above, those changes have inevitably reflected, and been reflected by, changes in the public attitudes towards foreign and security policy issues, though the importance of the roles played by the executives is difficult to deny.

To be sure, however, when the early indications of changes in Japan's identity began to emerge little by little in the 1980s, they were by no means widely supported by the public. For example, in 1985, when Yasuhiro Nakasone's cabinet was campaigning for an increase in defence spending above the established ceiling of one per cent of the gross national product, 58 per cent were opposed to it according to a poll, and 56 per cent felt concerned about Nakasone's defence policy.⁷⁴ Then in 1987, as much as 61 per cent disapproved of the removal of the one per cent ceiling carried out by the Nakasone administration.⁷⁵

However, after the end of the Cold War, and the 1991 Gulf War in particular, in which Japan was accused of its 'checkbook diplomacy', such divisions between the government and the public, and feelings of strong anti-militarism among the public, began to be mitigated. Japan started to step towards the status of what politician Ichiro Ozawa called a 'normal country', which it has been steadily approaching since the mid-1990s according to Shin'ichi Kitaoka of the University of Tokyo.⁷⁶ Although this change has not led to a revision of the Constitution, which strongly restricts the overseas activities of the Self-defence Forces, the public has become increasingly inclined to think that Japan should take on greater international responsibility.⁷⁷

The rise of the North Korean threat, together with the rise of China, seems to have significantly lessened the discrepancy between the government and the public. As a result, as a poll taken in May 2004 indicates, a 67.4 per cent majority has a good or a relatively good impression of the Self-defence Forces, and as many as 75.3 per cent think that the public's impression of the Self-defence Forces has been improved in the past 50 years. And it should be noted that 29.4 per cent answered that it 'has contributed to national defence'. This is a remarkable change, considering the fact that only 36 per cent had a good impression of the Self-defence Forces in 1984, or that those having a bad impression decreased by 15 per cent in these 20 years.⁷⁸ More and more Japanese, albeit gradually and somewhat cautiously, have become attracted to the idea of a 'normal country', as indicated by the fact that a majority recently came to support the dispatch of the Self-defence Forces to Iraq, which marks the first time Japan has sent its troops to an actual combat area since the Second World War.⁷⁹

A diminished discrepancy between the government and the public can be also identified in terms of MD. As Figure 1 shows, a large majority of the Japanese public now seems considerably supportive of missile defence, or at least accepts its necessity. This is also a remarkable change, considering that, according to a poll taken in 1985, only 11 per cent of those polled supported the Strategic Defense Initiative, while 23 per cent opposed it and 66 per cent did not know a great deal, if anything, about the programme.⁸⁰

Although it is highly questionable if those supporting MD are aware of its costs and risks, the fairly strong support among the public is presumably sustained by spreading concerns about the North Korean threat. According to a poll taken in March 2003, a 60.7 per cent majority strongly felt insecure about Pyongyang's missile launch and nuclear development, and 31.1 per cent felt insecure to some extent.⁸¹ In another poll taken in December 1999, 86.7 per cent expressed the same concern. Besides, 78.6 per cent of all the respondents thought that a threat to Japan would likely emerge from the Korean Peninsula, and 25.1 per cent thought that it would come from China/Taiwan as well.⁸² Thus, the polls clearly indicate that the fear of the North Korean threat among the Japanese public, which was increased by the Taepodong launch, has been further fuelled by the DPRK's admission of the abductions, and the covert nuclear programme.⁸³

To be sure, as indicated by the fact that the role the Japanese public most strongly expects the Self-defence Forces to play is 'relief activities in a large-scale disaster', the continuities stated above can be identified persistently in the Japanese public's attitudes. However, it is also undeniable that they have been changing, albeit gradually, in accordance with the altering strategic environment.⁸⁴ And these changes have most likely promoted and sustained the government's BMD policy. Together with the largely

FIGURE 1
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR BMD

Q1: Do you take it for granted that the Self-defence Forces put emphasis on missile defence in accordance with changes in Japan's security environment?

Agree	Relatively Agree	Relatively Disagree	Disagree	No Answer
44.6%	24.4%	11.0%	14.7%	5.2%

Q2: To which activities in the following do you think the Self-defence Forces should attach importance? (You may choose more than one.)

Relief activities in a large-scale disaster at home and abroad	1.0%
International peace co-operation activities, such as United Nations peacekeeping operations	3.8%
Deterring invasion by other states	5.1%
Responding to terrorism and guerrilla activities	3.1%
Responding to unidentified and spy vessel	5.7%
Relief and transport of the Japanese from a foreign country in conflict	3.9%
Responding to a missile attack	7.9%

Source: 'Jicintai Rikai Chakujitu ni Shinka'. *Yomiuri Shimbun*. 3 June 2004.

non-partisan support for BMD in the *Diet*, this explains, at least to some extent, why almost no serious debate on this matter has occurred. As Green argues, the changes in Japan's identity 'are occurring *not* because of a great national debate, but instead because of a growing consensus

among a new generation that Japan must assert its own identity in international society'.⁸⁵

Conclusions

The preceding discussions suggest that it is not that the government or, more precisely, the bureaucracy has been leading Japan's BMD policy *despite* public opposition, but rather *with* relatively silent support from the public. The public has been by no means inattentive, but rather played an important role as what James N. Rosenau calls increasingly 'skilful citizens'.⁸⁶ Yet they have done so almost without a profound understanding of BMD as a means of responding to their strongly perceived threats.

To be sure, increasingly 'skilful citizens' do not necessarily promote the rise of the 'multi-centric world', in Rosenau's words, *vis-à-vis* the traditional 'state-centric world'. As the title of Alexander E. Wendt's famous article suggests, 'skilful citizens' of a state, realizing that their state is faced with an increasing military threat, can press their government to lean towards 'balancing', which may lead in turn to a more 'state-centric' international structure characterized by 'power politics'.⁸⁷ As Green argues:

While the nation-state has declined in importance with the rise of regionalism in Europe, in Japan (and in most of Asia, for that matter) the nation-state is finally arriving – just as economic malaise and Chinese hubris raise questions about Japan's weight and security in the international system.⁸⁸

It can be said that a large majority of the Japanese public has 'skilfully' comprehended the changes in Japan's strategic environment, and has come to consider missile defence one of the useful or necessary means to address the challenges and the risks Japan is to face in the changing environment. This is why the public has increasingly warmed up to this issue. To be sure, Japan's policy started to a large extent as a rather passive response to American pressure. Yet, the criticism concerning Japanese subordination to the US, voiced for instance with respect to Iraq, can hardly be applied to its MD politics. Besides, such an argument that missile defence is 'purely defensive' and hence compatible with the Constitution seems to have convinced the public to a considerable degree, somewhat surprisingly perhaps. Even for those who are negative about offensive deterrents, missile defence could appear to be a suitable tool for counterbalancing. Such recognition and understanding shared by the public has facilitated the government's increasing involvement.

What made the government's eventual deployment decision possible, without bringing about intense discussion or fierce controversy, is after all

the North Korean threat, as former Defence Director Ishiba, in his recent book, suggests that a growing sense of crisis among the Japanese public has owed considerably to 'Mr. Kim Jong Il'.⁸⁹ The abduction issue seems particularly important. As a Japanese analyst observes, it 'has become highly politicized, so much so that compromise is regarded as political suicide for both politicians and journalists. The Japanese public has come to support a hard-line approach toward North Korea similar to that of the Bush administration'.⁹⁰ And such an atmosphere was clearly behind the fairly large public support for the Koizumi cabinet's decision to send the Self-defence Forces to Iraq, which would have been literally out of question even a decade ago, let alone before 1992 when Japan, after one of the fiercest nationwide debates, made it possible for the first time in its postwar history to send its forces abroad for non-combatant functions only. Whether to call it 'skilful' or not, the Japanese public, indignant at North Korea, gave one last push, although this is not to deny that the Japanese government, especially the bureaucrats, took advantage of the public's resentment.

Thus, although in general the bureaucrats' power and prestige have recently decreased, and decentralization has been one of the goals of ongoing political reform, as far as its MD policy is concerned, Japan has been functioning largely as a highly centralized democracy led by the bureaucracy, the rather traditional Japanese style of democracy, thanks to the virtual absence of substantial debate in the *Diet*. Opposition to MD was in effect nullified by the initiative of the executive branch, the strong support of a large majority in Parliament, and above all the increasing public support for counterbalancing.

In this sense, it is important that the decision-making process on BMD has been taking place in parallel with the transformation of Japan's identity. In this transition the country has been moving away from being a traditional civilian power, characterized by the exclusive dependence on economic tools and the centrality of the UN as a forum for peaceful negotiation and multilateral cooperation. Many Japanese have meanwhile recognized how important it is to strengthen the alliance with the US in their security environment, and for that purpose Japan must take its share, including expanded military roles. Economic tools alone are not considered to be enough any longer and should be backed by military forces as a credible deterrent. These principles have guided Japanese security policy for a long time, but the government found it difficult to admit this openly. Besides, the security environment allowed Japan to remain a minor player in the military area even after its 'economic miracle'.

Now that the situation has changed considerably, the government can more easily persuade the public that it is in Japan's national interest to do what Washington expects. The role of alliance – or the pressure of the US as Japan's only ally, to be more precise – undeniably affected Tokyo's missile defence policy, as mentioned above. Yet the executive branch has

effectively taken advantage of the changed atmosphere. Within the bureaucracy, the Defence Agency has played a significant role. One of the agency's expectations has been that MD could serve as a motor for the Japanese arms industry that has been in a difficult situation. The military companies have indeed lobbied for MD. In this sense, the so-called Military-Industrial Complex is by no means negligible.

Nonetheless, the industry and certain politicians, as well as bureaucrats, would have faced more difficulties in expanding Japan's commitment to missile defence if it had not been for the silent support of the public, signifying the transformation of Japan's identity. And public support, especially in 2003 when the government decided to introduce BMD, seems to have been largely stimulated by the abduction problem, rather than the North Korean missile or nuclear threat. This again illustrates how determined present decisions are by past events.

NOTES

1. Israel has been developing the Arrow anti-tactical missile system and the Tactical High Energy Laser system cooperatively with the US. See the contribution of Reuven Pedatzur in this issue.
2. 'Defense Chief Given Missile-Intercept Role', *The Japan Times*, 23 July 2005. For the outline of the bill see also 'Rapid Missile Defense Response Set', *The Japan Times*, 9 Feb. 2005; 'Missile Defense and Civilian Control', *The Japan Times*, 19 Feb. 2005.
3. See the contribution of Rajesh Rajagopalan in this issue.
4. Entering the development phase has been widely considered the same as a deployment decision in Japan, because Japan has never failed to deploy any military equipment co-developed with the US. See on the development of the US-German-Italian Medium Extended Air Defense System the contribution of Bernd W. Kubbig and Axel Nitsche on Germany in this issue.
5. Yoichi Funabashi, 'Tokyo's Temperance', *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer 2000), pp.137-9; Hideaki Kaneda, *Dandō Misairu Bōei Nyūmon* (Tokyo: Kaya Shobō, 2003), pp.6-7.
6. For the development of Japan-US BMD cooperation, see Takashi Kawakami and Ken Jimbo, 'Dandō Misairu Bōei to Nichibeī Dōmei', in Satoshi Morimoto (ed.), *Misairu Bōei: Atarashii Kokusai Anzenhoshō no Kōzu* (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyūjo, 2002), pp.263-72; Ken Jimbo, 'A Japanese Perspective on Missile Defense and Strategic Coordination', *The Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp.57-8; Michael Swaine, Rachel Swanger and Takashi Kawakami, *Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001), pp.29-32; Masamitsu Yamashita, Susumu Takai and Shuichiro Iwata, *TMD: Sen'iki Dandō Misairu Bōei* (Tokyo: TBS Britannica, 1994), pp.201-22.
7. Another, albeit minor, pillar was National Missile Defense (NMD). Some Japanese, especially government officials, preferred to use the term BMD rather than TMD, since what the US called TMD equals a national MD for Japan because of its comparatively small territorial size.
8. Although WESTPAC had been in effect dealing with TMD in its later years (Yamashita, Takai and Iwata, *TMD*, pp.117-22 [note 6]), Japanese defence industries were very cautious at this point about making a drastic step that might damage their commercial interests, primarily because this official request of Aspin's followed an informal one made in spring 1993 as part of the 'Perry Initiative', which would be renamed 'Technology-for-Technology

- Initiative' later. See Michael J. Green, *Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp.139–42. Besides, the Japanese government was concerned that there were so many problems, legal, financial, political and diplomatic, to overcome.
9. Gordon R. Mitchell, 'Japan-U.S. Missile Defense Collaboration: Rhetorically Delicious, Deceptively Dangerous', *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter 2001), p.86.
 10. Paul Beaver, 'Japan Weighs up Missile Defense Options', *Jane's Defense Weekly*, Vol. 22, No. 6 (Aug. 1994), p.21; see also Steven A. Hildreth and Jason D. Ellis, 'Allied Support for Theater Missile Defense', *Orbis*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp.108–11.
 11. Interviews with Japan Defence Agency officials, 1997–98.
 12. 'Bei no Dandō Misairu Bōei Kōsō Sanka Handan Miokuri', *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 3 June 1997.
 13. Interview with a Japan Defence Agency official, 1998.
 14. For the debate over the new guidelines, Barbara Wanner, *Debate on Guidelines Bills and Japan's Defense Role Picks up Steam*, JEI Report No. 15 (Washington, DC: Japan Economic Institute, 16 April 1999), pp.1–14; Tsuneo Akaha, 'Beyond Self Defense: Japan's Elusive Security Role Under the New Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation', *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Nov. 1998), pp.461–83.
 15. Originally the principles, established in 1962, were to prohibit arms exports to certain countries, and then in 1976 they came to be applied to any arms exports to any countries, including even such purely defensive equipment as helmets. In 1983, Japan made it possible to transfer limited military technologies only to the US.
 16. Nakatani reportedly said to Secretary of Defence Donald H. Rumsfeld: 'If Japan is to own a missile defense system, it should be used to protect Japan's territory and be operated by Japan on its own initiative.' Quoted in 'Missile Defense Would be Solo', *The Japan Times*, 24 June 2001; see also Masahiko Hisae, *9.11 to Nihon Gaikō* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2002), pp.157–60.
 17. Richard P. Cronin, *Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects*, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 2002), p.11; see also, Hisae, *9.11* (note 16) pp.164–7.
 18. For example, the Agency stated in its White Paper: 'Generally, the implementation of technical research and development and deployment of equipment passes through the three steps of "research and study", "development" and "mass production and deployment". This cooperative technical research is at the level of "research and study" to further ensure the technical possibilities of BMD, etc. The transition toward the development stage and the transition toward the deployment stage are judged separately after an extensive examination.' *Defense of Japan 2001 White Paper (Summary)*, chap. 4, sec. 4 <www.jda.go.jp/e/pab/wp2001/yoyaku/by1304040000.htm>.
 19. Axel Berkofsky, 'US Turns up Missile Defense Pressure on Japan', *Asia Times Online*, 19 Nov. 2002, <www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/DK19Dh01.html>.
 20. Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, *Joint Statement*, 16 Dec. 2002, <www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0212.html>, emphasis added.
 21. 'Ishiba Won't Rule Out Upgrade for Patriot Defense System', *The Japan Times*, 5 April 2003.
 22. 'Japan Urged to Adopt U.S. Missile Defense', *The Japan Times*, 14 June 2003.
 23. The Defence Agency's request of 142 billion yen (\$1,290 million) was reduced to 107 billion yen (\$972 million) approximately, partially due to the considerable rise of the yen in the preceding few months. See 'Misairu Bōei Rainendo Yosan 900-1000 Okuen wo Keijō', *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 16 Dec. 2003.
 24. The cabinet decided that the joint research would remain at the research phase.
 25. *Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary*, 19 Dec. 2003 <www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2003/1219danwa_e.html>.
 26. Dan Blumenthal, 'The Revival of U.S.-Japan Alliance', *Asian Outlook* (Feb./March 2005), p.3. For the implications of the new Programme Outline within the context of the Japan-US alliance, see also, Hiroshi Nakanishi, 'Tenkanki ni okeru Nichibei Kankei no Tenbō', *Kaigai Jijo*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (March 2005), pp.17–30; Koji Murata, 'Nichibei

- Dōmei: Kokueki to Seido no Saranaru Kyōyū ni Mukete', *Gaiko Forum*, No. 200 (March 2005), pp.32–7.
27. *Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary*, 19 Dec. 2003 (note 25).
 28. Ohno said that it would be enough to add a protocol. See 'Chōkan Kaiken Gaiyō', 17 Dec. 2004, <www.jda.go.jp/j/kisha/2004/12/17.pdf>.
 29. 'U.S. Wants Japan to Help Develop Updated Missiles', *The Japan Times*, 11 Jan. 2005.
 30. 'Defense Agency Wants 5 Trillion Yen', *The Japan Times*, 1 Sept. 2005. The US Department of Defense calls BMD cooperation with Japan the Japanese Cooperative Program.
 31. 'Ohno Chōkan Kaiken Gaiyō', 19 July 2005, <www.jda.go.jp/j/kisha/2005/07/19.htm>; see also 'MHI to Get License to Produce PAC-3 Interceptor Missiles', *The Japan Times*, 20 July 2005.
 32. 'New Defense Laws Best Unused', *The Japan Times*, 16 June 2004.
 33. For instance, the report of the Advisory Group on Defence Issues, called the Higuchi Report, submitted to Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in August 1994, emphasized the importance of BMD. This report became famous for its emphasis on multilateralism, causing strong caution in Washington. It may be less known that the report stressed the importance of cooperating with the US, concerning BMD. See Advisory Group on Defense Issues, *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century* (12 Aug. 1994), as translated in Appendix A, in Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green (eds), *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1994), p.52.
 34. In the 1999 edition of the defence white paper, the Japan Defence Agency changed the range of the Nodong from 1,000 km to 1,300 km, stating that 'almost all areas of Japan could be within its range'. It also read that 'it can be judged that North Korea is likely deploying' Nodong missiles. See *Bōei Hakusho*, 1999, chap. 3, sec. 2, <http://jda-clearing.jda.go.jp/hakusho_data/1999/honmon/main/at1101030200.htm>.
 35. To be sure, anti-North Korean feelings in Japan had fairly intensified by the time Koizumi visited Pyongyang. For instance, when Japan Coast Guard vessels sank an unidentified vessel in a firefight in December 2001, which later proved to be a North Korean spy ship, the Japanese public hardly denounced this 'use of force'. Instead, many Japanese pressed the government to utilize this incident as leverage to solve the abduction issue.
 36. It is widely speculated in Japan that North Korea tried in vain to settle the matter by sending five abductees back to Japan with their families taken as hostages, and unwillingly providing allegedly forged death certificates, the remains of a male abductee which later proved to be a female's, and other allegedly false information. Such insincerity and imprudence by North Korea made the Japanese public indignant.
 37. As stated above, the PAC-3 was used in the 2003 Gulf War, 'but a complete analysis of its effectiveness is not yet available'. Amy L. Freedman and Robert C. Gray, 'The Implications of Missile Defense for Northeast Asia', *Orbis*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 2004), p.339. For a cautious view, see Wade Boese, 'Patriot Scorecard Mixed: PAC-3 Use Limited', *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (May 2003), <www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_05/pac3_may03.asp>. With regard to Standard Missile (SM)-3, the interceptor of Sea-based Midcourse which Japan is to deploy, a recent article points out that SM-3 will be most likely unable to reach the trajectory of the Nodong ('Nihon no Misairu Bōei Shisutemu ha "Nodon" ni Todokanai', *Shūkan Ekonomisuto*, Vol. 82, No. 22 [13 April 2004], pp.46–8), but no debate has occurred.
 38. A former Defence Agency official recently told the author that the Agency initially had no intention to introduce the PAC-3.
 39. However, the Defence Agency does not necessarily seem to be in rush to start actual deployment of PAC-3 systems. This supposedly suggests that the deployment decision might have been urged by pressure from Japanese defence industries as well as the US.
 40. Masahiro Akiyama, *Nichibei no Senryakutaiwa ga Hajimatta: Anpo Saiteigi no Butai Ura* (Tokyo: Aki Shobō, 2002), pp.242–3. He says: 'Although I do not think there was no effect, it was not an immediate reason for the agreement to revise the guidelines.' On the contrary, Michael J. Green suggests that the crisis facilitated the Japanese government's decision

- to initiate the revision. See Michael J. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp.89–90.
41. *Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century*, 17 April 1996 <www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/sengen_.htm>.
 42. For a detailed analysis on this issue, see Masahiko Sasajima, 'Japan's Domestic Politics and China Policymaking', in Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson (eds), *An Alliance for Engagement: Building Cooperation in Security Relations with China* (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2002), pp.96–9.
 43. On 15 August 2005, the 60th anniversary of the end of the war in the Pacific, Koizumi did not visit the shrine dedicated to the souls of Japanese military casualties, including convicted Class-A war criminals of the Second World War. Instead, the Prime Minister issued another apology for wartime atrocities and stressed the importance of regional cooperation with neighbouring countries for future peace and stability, explicitly mentioning China and South Korea. See *Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi*, 15 Aug. 2005, <www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2005/08/15danwa_e.html>. This can be seen as a reflection of changing public attitudes, considering that the Lower House election was scheduled for mid-September. 'For Koizumi, Yasukuni Risks Far Outweigh Benefits' *The Japan Times*, 16 Aug. 2005.
 44. Kiichi Fujiwara, *Sensō wo Kioku Suru: Hiroshima, Horokōsuto to Genzai* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2001), pp.143–96.
 45. Kori Urayama, 'China Debates Missile Defence', *Survival*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Summer 2004), pp.131–2; see also Sasajima, 'Japan's Domestic Politics' (note 42) pp.99–101.
 46. Taku Ishikawa, 'Nichi-Bei-Chū Kankei to Dandō Misairu Bōei: "Kokka Anzenhoshō" heno Kōtai?', *Kaigai Jijo Kenkyūjo Hōkoku*, No. 35 (March 2001), pp.174–5.
 47. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism* (note 40) pp.103–105.
 48. Yoichi Funabashi, 'From Japan Bashing to Japan Surpassing', *International Herald Tribune/Asahi Shimbun*, 30 March 2004.
 49. Atsushi Kusano of Keio University ascribes this change largely to the roles played by the coalition governments since 1993, when the '1955 system' characterized by the Liberal Democratic Party's monopoly of power collapsed. See Atsushi Kusano, *Renritsu Seiken* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 1999), esp. part. 3.
 50. For the distinction between 'deterrence by denial' and 'deterrence by punishment', see Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975 [1961]), pp.14–6; see also Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1989), pp.112, 444n; McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), pp.543–83.
 51. Taku Ishikawa, 'Reisengo no Yokushi Taisei to Dandō Misairu Bōei', in Satoshi Morimoto (ed.), *Misairu Bōei: Atarashii Kokusai Anzenhoshō no Kōzu* (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyūjo, 2002), pp.207–31; id., 'Nichi-Bei-Chū Kankei to Dandō Misairu Bōei' (note 46), pp.169–85.
 52. Israel's BMD policy can be explained by the same token. See the contribution of Reuven Pedatzur in this issue. Like Israel, South Korea and Taiwan have faced a proximate threat with ballistic missiles. Consequently both have shown interests in BMD, and American forces in South Korea have already introduced the PAC-3. However, they are too close to their respective missile threat to be defended by any missile shield effectively. For this point, see, for instance, Michael D. Swaine with Loren H. Runyon, 'Ballistic Missiles and Missile Defense in Asia', *NBR Analysis*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (June 2002), pp.63–9.
 53. *Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee*, 19 Feb. 2005 <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/42490.htm>.
 54. The shift has been accelerated since September 11. For a view that suggests that the pre-emptive doctrine, often regarded as 'a sign of the collapse of the logic and policy of deterrence', is an extension of the shift. Galia Press-Barnathan, 'The War against Iraq and International Order: From Bull to Bush', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2004), pp.195–212.

55. Raymond Tanter, *Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1998), p.40.
56. Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed.), *Japan's Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy* (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs), p.24.
57. *Ibid.*, p.39; see also, Seiichiro Noboru, '2000 nen NPT Unyō Kentō Kaigi wo Furikaeru', *Gaiko Forum*, No. 145 (Sept. 2000), pp.34–9.
58. Nobuyasu Abe, 'Misairu Fukakusan Doryoku no Kongo no Hōkōsei', *Kokusai Mondai*, No. 461 (Aug. 1998), pp.37–8.
59. Ichiro Ogasawara, 'Tairyō Hakai Heiki no Kakusan to Nihon no Seisaku', *Kokusai Mondai*, No. 529 (April 2004), p.76.
60. *Ibid.*, p.76; see also Directorate General, *Japan's Disarmament* (note 56) p.194.
61. Kaneda, *Dandō Misairu* (note 5) p.227; Noboru Hoshuyama, 'Kaku Kakusan Bōshi to TMD Dōnyū', *Voice*, No. 250 (Oct. 1998), pp.134–42. The recent volume of the Defence Agency's public relations magazine carries a comic story on BMD. This story emphasizes the limitation of the MTCR and the Hague Code, saying: 'The point is these rules are not treaties but nothing more than political agreements'. 'Yoku Wakaru BMD', *Securitarian*, No. 544 (March 2004), p.12. It is not certain if by such an argument the public, supposedly aware that North Korea has been a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, would be convinced.
62. Yukiya Amano, 'Nihon ga Dekirukoto 6tsu no Teian', *Gaiko Forum*, No. 182 (Sept. 2003), p.31.
63. Of course, there still remain some slightly more cautious views in the government. For instance, the Foreign Ministry states that the Japanese government 'hopes that the missile defense issue will be dealt with in a manner conducive to the improvement of international security environment, including in the areas of arms control and disarmament'. *Japan's Position on the Missile Defense Plan*, <www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq1.html>, although this document was posted on the website while Makiko Tanaka was Foreign Minister, who sometimes criticized missile defence.
64. The party emphasizes that BMD accords with Japan's spirit of a strictly defensive policy. See 'Dandō Misairu Bōei no Dōnyū ni Tsuite', 19 Dec. 2003, <www.dpj.or.jp/seisaku/gaiko/BOX_GK0132.html>.
65. Akihisa Nagashima, *Nichibei Dōmei no Atarashii Sekkeizu* (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 2002), p.180.
66. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism* (note 40) pp.4–5.
67. *Ibid.*, p.5.
68. For example, Fumio Kyuma of the Liberal Democratic Party, a former Defence Agency Director General and an influential 'defence *zoku*' (*zoku* means politicians with special influence in a specific policy area), said at a symposium held in Washington that within his party there was a growing call to reconsider the three arms export principles, raising Japan's commitment to BMD as a primary reason. Takashi Nishioka of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries followed suit, expressing a strong fear that it would be very difficult to maintain the level of Japan's defence technology without relaxing the three principles. Fukushima Nukaga, also a former Defence Agency Director General, emphasized the need to reconsider the ban on exercising the right to collective self-defence, concerning the Self-defence Forces' peace keeping and humanitarian activities overseas. See 'Buki Yushutsu', *Mainichi Shimbun*, 7 May 2004. The whole event can be viewed on the website of the Heritage Foundation, <www.heritage.org/Press/Events/ev050504a.cfm>.
69. Of course, government officials and politicians do not explicitly mention this implication, but some pro-BMD analysts do suggest that missile defence can be a useful substitute for a nuclear deterrent. Kaneda, *Dandō Misairu* (note 5) p.226–9.
70. Nisohachi Hyodo, 'TMD Gensō kara Mezameyo!: Nihon no "Kakubusō" Hōki de Warau no ha Dareka', *Seiron*, No. 368 (March 2003), pp.134–42.
71. For instance, Yoshihisa Hurukawa of the Liberal Democratic Party recently indicated the need for missiles with conventional warheads in a Lower House committee. *Anzenhoshō Inikai*

- Kaigiroku*, 12 May 2005, <www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/001516220050512010.htm>.
72. Seiji Maehara of the Democratic Party expressed a fear of losing autonomy especially in terms of intelligence. 'Fuanteika suru Sekai to Atarashii Kyōi', *Chūō Kōron*, Vol. 119, No. 10 (Oct. 2004), p.57. This explains partly, why some nationalists, such as Shintaro Ishihara, favour Japan's own development of BMD, and why the Defence Agency Director General Nakatani tended to stress Japan's 'own initiative', as previously mentioned. Hisae, 9.11 (note 16) pp.157–67; Masahiro Matsumura, *Nichibei Dōmei to Gunji Gijutsu* (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1999), pp.79–87. Yet, there is a view that Japan has successfully met its needs through 'subordination'. Edward J. Lincoln, 'Japan: Using Power Narrowly', *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Winter 2003–04), pp.111–27.
 73. Eugene A. Matthews, 'Japan's New Nationalism', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 6 (Nov./Dec. 2003), p.74. This article seems to underestimate the fact that such a shift has been occurring under the persistent constraints derived from the continuities mentioned above. Somewhat by contrast, Thomas U. Berger's analysis of Japan's strategic culture seems to overemphasize the continuities, anti-militarism in particular. See Berger, 'Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp.317–56. Christopher P. Twomey perhaps precisely presents a more complicated view. While it has engaged in balancing, Japan has been and will likely be 'circumscribed', due to the enduring effect of 'socialization' against an assertive foreign policy, which is likely to lead to more audacious balancing: Twomey, 'Japan, a Circumscribed Balancer: Building on Defensive Realism to Make Predictions about East Asian Security', *Security Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Summer 2000), pp.167–205. Akihiro Sadō aptly points out that the quest for autonomy has been constrained by the centrality of the US. See Sadō, "'Jishu Gaikō" wo Towareru Nihon', in Tomoyuki Kojima and Isami Takeda (eds), *Higashi Ajia no Anzenhoshō* (Tokyo: Nansōsha, 2002), pp.123–31. Thus, the degree and the velocity of the shift in the attitudes of the Japanese should not be overemphasized, though the shift is undeniably taking place.
 74. 'Kahansū ga Kenen no Bōei Seisaku', *Asahi Shimbun*, 17 March 1985.
 75. 'Jimin Shijisō ga "Rihan"', *Asahi Shimbun*, 14 March 1987.
 76. Shin'ichi Kitaoka, '*Futsū no Kuni*' he (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2000). He attributes this change largely to the end of the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War. See *Nihon no Aidentiti*, Coordinated by Ken'ichi Ito (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Fōramu, 1999), p.236.
 77. To be sure, Ozawa's idea of 'normal country' did not require a constitutional revision. He argued – and still does – that even under the present Constitution, the Self-defence Forces would be able to engage in military operations as long as the UN authorized those actions. See Ichiro Ozawa, *Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994), esp. part 2.
 78. 'Jieitai Rikai Chakujitu ni Shinka', *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 3 June 2004.
 79. At first, a 70 per cent majority was opposed to the dispatch, but by the beginning of 2004 a majority came to support it, according to various polls.
 80. 'SDI Hyōka ni Mayoī', *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 29 April 1985.
 81. 'Naikaku, Seitō Shijiritsu Chōsa Kekka', *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 25 March 2003.
 82. 'Nichibei Kyōdō Yoron Chōsa', *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 19 Dec. 1999.
 83. The strong resentment of the DPRK, rather than the fear of it, among the public can be found in a poll started in April 2003 on the Internet, according to which 41.2 per cent think that Japan should have nuclear weapons to counter the North Korean threat. See *Japan Today*, <www.japantoday.com/e/?content=vote&id=137>. However, this should not be overemphasized, as an analyst argues: 'Despite growing domestic sentiment to amend the constitution, the nuclear option for Japan would be extremely unlikely unless the security commitments made under the American-Japan treaty were somehow to lose credibility.' Peter Van Ness, 'Hegemony, Not Anarchy: Why China and Japan are Not Balancing US Unipolar Power', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2002), p.139; see also Andrew L. Oros, 'Godzilla's Return: The New Nuclear Politics in an Insecure Japan', in

- Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson (eds), *Japan's Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), pp.49–63; Mataka Kamiya, 'Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon', *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter 2002–03), pp.63–75.
84. The changes have been indicated in several publications. See Yuichi Hasegawa (ed.), *Nihon Gaikō no Identity* (Tokyo: Nansōsha, 2004), esp. pp.179–206, 241–79; Mel Gurtov, *Pacific Asia? Prospects for Security and Cooperation in East Asia* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), pp.141–60; Stuart Harris and Richard N. Cooper, 'The U.S.-Japan Alliance', in Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb (eds), *America's Asian Alliances* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), pp.54–5.
 85. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism* (note 40) p.6 (emphasis in original).
 86. For this concept, see James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Continuity and Change* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), esp. pp.210–42, 333–87; James N. Rosenau and W. Michael Fagen, 'A New Dynamism in World Politics: Increasingly Skillful Individuals', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Dec. 1997), pp.655–86.
 87. Alexander E. Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp.391–425.
 88. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism* (note 40) p.34.
 89. Shigeru Ishiba, *Kokubō* (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2005), p.31. He uses '*sama*', sarcastically of course, which is probably a more formal courtesy title in Japanese than 'Mr' might sound.
 90. Katsu Furukawa, *Japan's View of the Korea Crisis*, 25 Feb. 2003, <www.cns.miis.edu/research/korea/jpndprk.htm>.