

“The Rise and Fall of Bi-culturalism: Japanese American Identity and Festival Before World War II”

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April 22, 1999



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Introduction

“We welcome you all! Men and women of all races. Welcome to Little Tokio.” So read an invitation to the eighth annual Nisei Week festival, a celebration in which second generation Japanese Americans (Nisei) sought to convince the people of southern California of their eagerness to participate “in the building of this great country, to assume responsibility for its defense against all enemies and to safeguard its great institutions.” This was August 1940 and the world was “troubled with great turmoil.” “Where once was festivity in other lands, today their youths march in stiff uniforms, their minds and bodies weary with the burden of war.”¹ The first half of 1941 provided no relief as the fighting in Europe and East Asia threatened to engulf the United States as well. The crowd at that year’s Nisei Week was steered away from dressing in Japanese garb. “From the American point of view,” the leading vernacular newspaper asked, “how can one be expected to be impressed by any profession of loyalty via a ‘native Japanese kimono’? The two don’t jibe.”² The call for patriotic expression was especially evident in the festival’s parade. Old Glory replaced the “rising sun” flags so prevalent at earlier celebrations, while beauty contestants, draped in white evening gowns, floated through the streets of Little Tokyo perched beneath a replica of the capitol dome. A sedan resplendent with red, white, and blue streamers carried a flowered marquee that left the Nisei’s identity unambiguous. Displayed beneath the facsimile of a spread-winged dove were the words, “USA, Our Home.”³

In Nisei Week’s souvenir booklet, Los Angeles mayor Fletcher Bowren praised the festival organizers for making “true and loyal Americanism” the main theme of the 1941 celebration. He echoed this point in the opening speech to the last Nisei Week before America’s involvement in World War II. The mayor not only implored Japanese Americans to show their patriotism, but reassured them that “...we know you are loyal.”⁴ But after the bombing of Pearl Harbor and America’s declaration of war on Japan, the mayor did not hesitate to call for the mass evacuation of Japanese Americans from the West Coast. Swayed by the alarmist rhetoric of western defense commander General John L. Dewitt and California’s young attorney general Earl Warren, Bowren came to utterly distrust Japanese Americans and did not think twice about denying Constitutional rights.⁵ In early February 1942, he warned a radio audience about this racial menace: “Right here in our own city are those who may spring into action at an appointed time in accordance with a prearranged plan wherein each of our little brown brothers will know his part in the event of any possible attempted invasion or air raid.”⁶ In the middle of the month, despite no evidence of Japanese American treachery, President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, sanctioning the internment of 110,000 American citizens and permanent residents. By May over 33,000 Japanese Americans had been forcibly removed from southern California, and with their departure ended a chapter in Nisei Week history.

This essay examines the origins, goals, and practice of the Nisei Week festival in the crucial decade before World War II. As the largest on-going Japanese celebration of its day, Nisei Week was a critical venue for re-articulating the dominant meanings of race.⁷ Its spectacles, performances, festive contests, and celebratory speeches were festive, yet serious responses to the anti-Japanese sentiment that constrained and always threatened to doom the ethnic community. In 1934 the leadership of Japanese immigrants (Issei) entrusted the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), an unproven group of second generation businessmen and professionals, to design a festival that would present a harmonious blending of East and West. By joining Japanese dance, music, and cultural and martial arts exhibits with a parade, beauty pageant, and other American traditions, the young JACLers

portrayed the Nisei as exotic, yet safe Americans, willing to use their bi-cultural identity to advance relations between the United States and Japan. But the growing rift between the two nations, exacerbated by Japan's aggressions in China, put the political costs of this bi-culturalism at odds with its benefits as a marketing device for the Depression-weary enclave. As war loomed in the Pacific, Nisei Week's leaders retreated to the seemingly safe-harbor of American patriotism. The internment order, however, was a clear indication that the festival, and the JACL's larger loyalty campaign, failed to assuage the general mistrust of Japanese Americans.

Yet what failed in the short term, turned out after World War II to provide the basis for the group's redemption. The defense for the internment crumbled as word spread about the gallant soldiers in the Army's all-Nisei fighting battalion, and, further, as research revealed that the architects of internment, including FDR, elected to ignore intelligence reports predicting the overwhelming majority of Japanese Americans would remain loyal to the United States should war with Japan erupt. In 1954 mayor Bowren himself was impressed with the "fortitude of the Japanese people" in suffering "great injustices."⁸ By the passage of legislation in 1988, in which Congress authorized payment of reparations to the living survivors of the internment camps, it was commonplace for a new generation of Americans less sure about the righteousness of government action, especially pertaining to racial minorities, to see the internment as resulting from race-based hysteria and discrimination.⁹

Less known to the public was the revisionism that went on largely within Japanese American circles. Here the subjects of attack were not merely government officials, but the Nisei leaders who had pledged the ethnic group's full cooperation with the internment order, and who had worked closely with military and government administrators to Americanize the group. Beginning in the late 1960s, Asian American activists and scholars condemned the JACL's intimate relationship with the government. They saw this as an extreme act of self-hatred, an unnatural rejection of one's culture and identity in order to assimilate into white America. Their criticism reflected the critique of American society developed by Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael, and other proponents of a reinvigorated black nationalism. "The crucial question facing us today," historian Yuji Ichioka asserted, "is not that of integration." Rather, it was how to establish a lasting autonomy from white America.¹⁰ Since then the study of Japanese Americans, like the course of social history in general, has searched to uncover evidence of agency within structures of domination. To this end, the Nisei's bi-culturalism in the 1930s has been viewed as a moment of self-determination, promising, though ultimately failing, to supplant JACL's all-Americanism.¹¹

The story of Nisei Week confirms the importance of the Nisei's bi-cultural identity in the decade before World War II. But it challenges the claim that this contradicted the acculturation to American ideals and standards of living that JACLers epitomized. As we shall see, the leaders of Nisei Week, even after they abandoned the hope of bridging the Pacific, maintained an abiding commitment to the retention of ethnic bonds. How could the JACLers promote ethnic retention, while at the same time embracing the values and culture of the larger society? The importance here is to distinguish between the plodding, inexorable, shared process of cultural change – be it assimilation or ethnic retention – and the individualized, situational, politically sensitive rhetoric of identity. Confusing culture with the useful fictions of identity blurs the line between the affective affinities of a group and the instrumental interests of its leaders.¹² The JACLers' retreat from bi-culturalism in the late 1930s was prompted by external concerns and had nothing to do with their long-standing acceptance of American norms, values, and lifestyles.

It is my contention that formations of culture and identity, although both historically contingent, are

fundamentally independent of each other. Ethnic identity is not an artifact of culture to possess, or of which to be dispossessed; it is, rather, a game of politics and ideology in which players spin self-definitions of a group. The question is not whether the Nisei wanted to have an ethnic identity, but how, and by whom, this construct was defined and deployed. Additionally, what did the notion of a Japanese American collectivity mean to different people at various historical moments? Why did some meanings have more authority than others? And how were these ethnic orthodoxies enacted, enforced, and resisted within the ethnic community?¹³

What I argue in this essay is that Nisei Week in the 1930s and early 1940s was a vehicle not merely for self-determination, but also for who among Japanese Americans determined the ethnic self. Initially, the festival was used to stoke the vitality of the ethnic enclave. The JACLers relied on bi-culturalism to appeal to Japanese Americans and whites to “buy in Little Tokio.” Later they switched to Americanism in an attempt to shield the ethnic community from a resurging nativist assault. To them, Americanism was simply an expedient means to stave off external attacks and thus to continue enforcing the ethnic solidarity so essential to the future of the immigrant economy. What was paramount with either an Americanist or bi-cultural identity was an exceptional degree of social control and uniformity of opinion among Japanese Americans. Nisei Week’s leaders crafted notions of ethnic identity that authenticated their vision of the ethnic community by masking the group’s heterogeneity of opinion and its inequality of social privilege—particularly along the lines of generation, class, ideology, and gender. Because there were no official legislatures through which ethnic identity could be created, nor any authorities who could enforce such a disposition, Nisei Week became a critical means to promote and police group boundaries.

Succeeding Immigrants

Nowhere were internal differences within Little Tokyo more apparent than in the origins of the Nisei Week festival. In early March 1934, a delegation from a leading organization of Japanese immigrants, *Nanka Shoko Kaigishi*, met with JACLers to discuss plans for a week-long festival designed to showcase the second generation and to increase its patronage of Little Tokyo businesses. Meanwhile, Nanka’s rival, the Japanese Association of Los Angeles, announced its intention to hold a similar celebration and proceeded to court the second generation leaders to its side. As Summer arrived, neither Issei group abandoned its claim on the proposed festival scheduled for that August.¹⁴ The JACLers withheld support from either party, insisting that “Nisei Week will be in cooperation with, and not under the jurisdiction of any organization in Lil’ Tokio....”¹⁵ Like children caught between feuding parents, they stood outside community politics by ignoring the competition between the immigrant groups. The young leaders made known their desire to remain neutral in the dispute to avoid soiling their “pure” and “altruistic” motives. They disapproved of the “factionalism” and “selfishness” displayed by the Issei, asserting that their generation “cannot afford to risk being the political football of petty strife among the elders.”¹⁶

Such a high-handed response normally was a hazardous proposition in a community where age and deference were so positively correlated. But the early 1930s saw the immigrant generation increasingly insecure about their economic and political footing in southern California. The Issei’s horizontally and vertically integrated network of farms, wholesale houses, and produce retailers that claimed a virtual monopoly on the regional

market for berries, lettuce, celery, and tomatoes was no longer experiencing the rapid growth and prosperity it did in the 1920s. Likewise, the Issei's quest for acceptance from white America had stalled during the Depression. The Supreme Court's ruling in 1922 upholding their ineligibility for American citizenship was a major setback. But even worse was the Congressional legislation two years later establishing restrictive immigration quotas for European nations yet closed the door entirely to immigrants from Japan. The one-two punch of discrimination led the Issei leadership to ask the second generation for help in maintaining their entrepreneurial niche. The old guard needed the Nisei, a fact that pushed the battling Issei organizations to resolve their conflict and allow an ostensibly independent JACL to run Nisei Week.

Yet the image of Issei dependence on their American-born children is misleading. Despite American citizenship and acculturation, the Nisei faced the same social barriers as their parents: white America reduced both generations to the common denominator of race. Most employers did not hire either generation, major labor unions denied them membership, and occupational licensing laws made it difficult for them to compete on equal terms with white-owned businesses. The Nisei were fortunate simply to achieve their parents' economic position. Even college graduates faced racial barriers that derailed their professional fulfillment and forced them back to the restricted world of the ethnic enclave. On the eve of World War II the majority of the Nisei were working in the ethnic enclave's primary sectors: agricultural production, retail enterprise, and domestic service. While Issei leaders looked to them to calm anti-Japanese antipathy in white America, the Nisei relied upon the older generation for employment opportunities within the enclave.¹⁷ There was a co-dependence rooted not just in blood, but the competitive advantages and collective pitfalls of racial segregation.

The JACL itself reflected the inescapable nature of inter-generational ties. The organization was founded in 1930 with representatives from Japanese American communities throughout the West Coast, and by 1936 had expanded from eight original chapters to thirty-eight, with national headquarters in San Francisco. The JACLers received strong support from the Issei and fought for causes benefiting both generations. "The early devices of the rising Nisei organization," claimed Togo Tanaka, a member as well as historian of the Los Angeles chapter, "were in many instances mild imitations of the Issei."¹⁸ But the JACLers were significantly different from their own generation; they were overwhelmingly male despite equal numbers of Nisei women in Los Angeles, and were about a decade older than the majority of their peers. Moreover, they were almost twice as likely to have attended college and to be in management positions than most of the Nisei men their age. Thus the organization was made up of the second generation elite, lawyers, dentists, medical doctors, and entrepreneurs who relied upon the ethnic enclave for their businesses and practices, and therefore had vested interests in enhancing and protecting Little Tokyo.¹⁹

The exceptional status of the JACLers was doubly true for the organization's leaders. Consider the success story of Kay (Keiichi) Sugahara, the first president of the Los Angeles chapter. Born in 1909, Sugahara was thirteen when he and his younger siblings were orphaned. "I was saved from total despair," he remembered in 1983, "by a university student from Japan...who encouraged me to read Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and other classic Russian writers." To help provide for his brother and sister, Sugahara worked at a fruitstand from junior high through his years at the University of California, Los Angeles. In 1932, as a UCLA senior, the young Sugahara teamed with white partners to launch the first customs brokerage firm in Little Tokyo. As someone who could bridge American and Japanese cultures, he capitalized on the needs of businesses importing goods from Japan. The success of this venture, he claimed, made him a millionaire before the age of thirty.²⁰

Togo Tanaka graduated Phi Beta Kappa from UCLA a few years after Sugahara. Born in 1916, he moved with his parents from Portland, Oregon to Los Angeles as an infant. He recalled that his mother was friendly towards white Americans, while his father, whom he called a “racial chauvinist,” kept his distance. As he grew up, Tanaka himself had no illusions about racial prejudice but had dreams of moving beyond it. In 1934 he became the associate editor of the English section of the Kashu Mainichi newspaper, but soon moved on to the leading Japanese daily in Southern California, the Rafu Shimpo. Through his regular column, Tanaka provided the Nisei with a perspective on the political events of the day. As a journalist, JACL publicity director, and later its unofficial historian, he communicated the views of Japanese Americans to the broader public.²¹

Sugahara and Tanaka seemed to fit the classic mold of American ethnic leadership: their achievements brought them acclaim within the group, but, more importantly, made them acceptable to white America.²² Such persons, social-psychologist Kurt Lewin argues, were poised to flee the ethnic community. In his study of the Jewish community in the United States, Lewin found that ethnic leaders, especially from the second generation, were preoccupied with being accepted by mainstream society. They avoided “too close a contact with those sections of the underprivileged group which are not acceptable to the majority,” and approached leadership roles as both a “substitute for gaining status in the majority” and as a stepping stone to assimilation.²³ The established perception of the JACL’s history confirms Lewin’s observations. Roger Daniels, a leading historian of Japanese America, describes the JACL’s national leadership in the 1930s as “America-oriented” and “on a collision course with the organizations of the older generation.” He contends that the JACLers’ “Americanized ideology” revealed that its members’ true loyalties lay outside Little Tokyo and not with the Issei old guard.²⁴

But the history of the Los Angeles JACL questions the extent to which this impression of the organization’s national leadership holds at the chapter level. The JACLers in Los Angeles did not have the luxury of sustaining an entrenched generation gap. They may have wanted to leave the immigrant community, but until the opportunity arose, they neither separated themselves from it nor openly contested the authority of the Issei leadership.²⁵ Their mission was to ensure that Little Tokyo continued to thrive and prosper. The onset of the Great Depression made this task even more imperative. One researcher found that prices for Japanese American crops dropped considerably throughout the 1930s, a clear indication that the Japanese enclave, although legally and socially quarantined, was not immune to the business cycle’s fluctuation.²⁶ To make matters worse, Little Tokyo merchants and professionals feared that the second generation had developed consumption tastes that lured them outside the enclave, particularly to department stores whose economies of scale allowed them to undercut small businesses. Enclave merchants criticized those Nisei whom he thought were embarrassed to wear clothing made in Japan, while bemoaning the loss of an estimated half a million dollars a year that could be spent by Nisei shoppers.²⁷

How would the merchants ensure that successive generations of Japanese Americans “buy in Lil” Tokyo”? This was the question that spearheaded the formation of the Nisei Week festival and that convinced the Issei leadership to place the JACL in charge of the event. Sei Fujii, Issei publisher and self-appointed advisor to the second generation, challenged the young leaders “to show their old folks how much of an asset they are instead of being [a] burden as they used to be.”²⁸ The JACLers, for their part, welcomed the chance to lead what they called the “greatest civic project undertaken by a second generation group.”²⁹ Nisei Week was their rite of passage into the ethnic leadership. Never before had Little Tokyo been turned on its head with the Nisei—albeit temporarily—in command. Businesses stocked merchandise, hired clerks, and held sales that catered primarily to the

younger generation. Nisei ministers conducted services in English for both Buddhist and Christian congregations. Most of all, the second generation was the center of attention at a series of special events and contests. The first Nisei Week festival in 1934 featured more traditional folk (ondo) dancing, as well as an American-styled parade, fashion show, essay and poster contests, and street dance. Later festivities grew to include a second fashion show, a beauty contest, hobby and baby shows, and exhibitions of traditional Japanese arts, such as flower arrangement (ikebana) and tea ceremony.

Buy Cultural

A surge of advertising was the first sign that Nisei Week was about to begin. Little Tokyo merchants flooded the vernacular press with sales announcements and redesigned display windows to appeal specifically to the second generation. In 1934 one retailer assured that such preparations were done “All for the Satisfaction of the Nisei!” The JACLers crafted Nisei Week to boost sales in Little Tokyo by enticing the second generation away from “American” department stores. T. Roku Sugahara, brother of JACL president Kay Sugahara, promised his generation that Little Tokyo stores would have the lowest prices and highest quality Japanese and American merchandise. Just in case competitive prices and products were not enough, the JACLers linked enclave purchases with Nisei Week participation. Admission to festival events required receipts from Little Tokyo stores, and by the late 1930s, purchasing merchandise enabled shoppers to cast votes for their favorite beauty contestants. Some enthusiasts postponed buying expensive items like refrigerators until the festival so they could stuff the ballot boxes with their votes for Nisei Week Queen.³⁰

But the JACLers knew that even the most successful gimmick ended with Nisei Week. In order to secure year-round patronage, they strove to give the second generation a stake in the future of the immigrant enclave. The logic was straight-forward: If the Nisei benefited materially from Little Tokyo, they would have more reason to shop there. The most compelling incentive Issei merchants could offer the younger generation was employment. While free to patronize white-owned businesses, Nisei usually could not work for them, and Little Tokyo retailers made matters worse by refusing to hire many Nisei for sales positions because of their inability to meet the needs of Japanese-speaking clientele. Festival organizers established an employment bureau to persuade the enclave merchants that Nisei salespersons would boost their businesses by attracting second generation shoppers. In 1934 the bureau claimed to have placed thirty-five workers in just three days, and although their jobs, like the sales and the beauty pageant, typically ended with Nisei Week, the employment agency attained a permanent place in Little Tokyo.³¹

The strongest appeals for Nisei patronage invoked bonds of ethnicity. According to Roku Sugahara, Little Tokyo offered a more pleasant shopping experience than the stores outside its protective borders. It makes for “a better understanding, a feeling of freedom and congeniality, and friendliness” because the “seller knows the background and characteristics of the buyer much better.”³² The winner of the Nisei Week essay contest in 1938 also viewed Little Tokyo as an ethnic sanctuary. Answering the question “Why I should buy in Little Tokyo,” he listed the enclave’s unique benefits for Nisei customers:

Japanese can serve Japanese people with good taste. They know what type of clothing or merchandise would be best suited, whereas an American firm naturally would not. And, too, they are

inclined to be more personal and understanding, as there are no barriers of speech or race. This results in friendly, sociable business tactics, and not cold ruthless negotiations.³³

Festival leaders used ethnicity as both carrot and stick to attract Nisei shoppers. While they played up the “natural” affinities among Japanese Americans, they also stressed the obligations that such ties entailed. “If the Nisei expect to see Lil’ Tokio exist and rise out of its present depression,” the Rafu Shimpo commanded, “they must cooperate and help build Lil’ Tokio by putting some funds into the businesses” and “buy all necessities at Japanese stores and only buy those things which are not carried in Lil’ Tokio at American stores.” The result of “this extensive trading,” explained the 1938 essay contest winner, “will be a closer union of our race – drawn together by the cohesive force of economic and social dependency.” Roku Sugahara’s do-or-die scenario best characterized the invocation of group obligation: “It all depends on the [N]isei, whether they will aid in strengthening our economic foundation or will stand idly by while it crumbles into oblivion.”³⁴

Despite these appeals, Nisei Week leaders were aware of the pitfalls to attracting second generation customers. They knew that many in the second generation avoided the ethnic enclave to shop at stores that were more convenient, affordable, and provided better service.³⁵ Carl Kondo, the runner-up in the Nisei Week essay contest in 1935, criticized the “buy in Lil’ Tokio” campaign, warning that Little Tokyo should not rely on Nisei consumption because its mom-and-pop establishments could not compete with the department stores in nearby downtown Los Angeles. Moreover, Kondo argued that the Nisei were too influenced by American culture to be interested in Japanese merchandise or to be swayed by invocations of racial responsibilities. Finally, an editorial in the Kashu Mainichi noted that this form of ethnic insularity was not only unfeasible, but “un-American.” The author insisted that during the Depression, Japanese Americans needed to pump money into the broader economy rather than hoard it among themselves.³⁶

These shortcomings of the “buy in Lil’ Tokio” campaign were partly made up by the windfall of white tourism. To the delight of Little Tokyo merchants, Nisei Week drew shoppers from beyond the ethnic community. The rise of Japan as a world power and the expansion of America’s Far East trade piqued the general public’s interest in the island nation. Such attention, the essayist Carl Kondo suggested, compelled Little Tokyo merchants to cater to the tastes of white Americans. Kondo believed that marketing Japanese culture and artifacts offered the best hope for the economic stability of Little Tokyo. The Kashu Mainichi also championed the benefits of the tourist market. It pointed with envy to Chinatown and the Mexican-inspired Olvera Street as two of Los Angeles’s successful ethnic attractions and concluded that the problem with Japan-town was that “one cannot immediately feel the foreign atmosphere or distinction upon entering Lil’ Tokyo.”³⁷

Nisei Week proved the optimal occasion to dress up Little Tokyo for white consumption. Here the oriental-styled street displays, decorations, music, dance, and fashions assumed dual meanings. What stood as symbols of ethnic pride for Japanese Americans were also exotic enticements for outsiders. The kimono, in particular, attracted so much interest that Nisei Week leaders in 1936 added a second fashion show, where these Japanese garments were modeled exclusively for white Americans. The festival booklet billed the event as “an exhibition of Japanese pajamas and lounging clothes” with refreshments served by “petite Japanese maidens in picturesque kimonos.” The JACLers invited hundreds of “leading women in Los Angeles society” and selected kimono styles that would “appeal particularly to American women.”³⁸

Enclave merchants also proposed that Nisei women wear kimonos while serving as tour guides who

provided a “night of adventure to Americans in Little Tokyo.” The hostesses were to greet tourists as they entered the enclave, answer questions about Japanese culture, including flower arrangements and tea ceremony, and assist them in purchasing merchandise. Nisei Week leaders in 1940 redesigned the festival booklet to increase the enclave’s tourist appeal. A glossy full-page advertisement especially greeted white Americans. “WELCOME TO LITTLE TOKYO” appeared in orientalized script inserted within a photograph of the community’s main thorough-fare. The night scene featured a group of well-groomed, entertainment-seeking white Americans chaperoned by four smiling, kimono-clad women. Fluorescent Little Tokyo storefronts, particularly the Fuji theater’s elaborate neon marquee, in front of which the group stood, radiated an energy and enthusiasm that seemed to overwhelm the tourists. The smiling Japanese women reflected the enclave’s warmth and hospitality, while the flood of bright lights and signs symbolized its entrepreneurial vigor – a shopper’s paradise.³⁹

Rite to be Japanese

Nisei Week, however, was more than an occasion to dress-up Little Tokyo in order to drum up business. The festival was an indispensable piece of a larger endeavor to promote a greater understanding of Japanese history and culture. Nisei Week’s leaders, schooled as they were in the methods of modern business, knew that they could not simply change Little Tokyo for the consumer: they had to change the consumer for Little Tokyo. The thrust of their attention centered on the Nisei, since, as the festival leaders confirmed in 1939, the second generation remained the “sole salvation for the preservation of Japanese town.” But it was not just the Nisei’s purchasing power that concerned them. What was equally important, the leaders concluded, was “that right steps are taken to create [N]isei ‘community consciousness.’”⁴⁰

Central to this consciousness was an appreciation for Japanese traditions, especially the folk dancing of the ondo. This ritual, which had deep religious and cultural meanings in Japan, was totally unfamiliar to the Nisei Week leaders. That the ondo would become the centerpiece of the festival surprised Kay Sugahara, who admitted that the JACLers originally had conceived of Nisei Week as a sort of Japanese Mardi Gras. Thus the ondo relied upon the talents of increasingly rare Nisei like Yoshiko Mori who were more interested in Japanese traditions than Western entertainment. Born in Sacramento in 1920, Mori, in her early teens, convinced her parents to move to Los Angeles where she would be better able to pursue Japanese dance. She studied Kabuki dancing in Japan after graduating from high school, and then returned to the ethnic community, where she taught a large number of volunteers to perform the ondo at the Nisei Week finale. Mori agreed to the task not only to share her love of Japanese dance, but to encourage her generation to learn about their ancestral culture. She maintained that Japanese dancing counteracted the Nisei’s Americanization by teaching them to be more graceful, considerate of others, and respectful to their “higher-ups.”⁴¹

The Nisei Week leaders also used ondo dancing to increase the younger generation’s awareness of their parents’ hardships. Chiye Nagano, the festival’s ondo choreographer, selected routines with themes that centered upon issues of hard labor and martial strife. The idea of the ondo, Nagano explained, was to encourage the community to laugh at the realities of immigrant life, and, thus, to release the stresses of its work-a-day world. Nagano’s own life mirrored her art. Trained at a revered classical dance school in Japan, she returned to Los Angeles where, to her dismay, the traditions of Noh and Kabuki were far from worshipped. With her mother’s

guidance, she started a business as one of the first Nisei to teach Japanese dance in the ethnic community. But not even these earnings could please her father, who bemoaned the fact that she had no brothers. Nisei Week was a chance to show him that she could be as good as a son, and to make this unmistakably clear, she dressed in men's clothes and pretended to be his missing heir. Nagano believed that it was imperative for her generation to relieve the tensions between parents and children. To bridge this generation gap, she designed the ondo to attract as many Issei and Nisei participants as possible; she simplified the dance steps, held practices after work hours, and paid no attention as to how the performers were dressed. The goal was to unite Japanese Americans in the celebration of old Japan.⁴²

In this way the ondo became a key symbol of Issei-Nisei solidarity. While outsiders may have seen it as a mirror of Japanese culture, ethnic leaders considered it an example of generational cooperation. Issei leader Sei Fujii was struck by the communal spirit exhibited at the ondo practice sessions. He loved "the atmosphere that existed there" because everyone felt "just like one family." He expressed these same sentiments a few weeks later at the conclusion of the ondo finale, when he gazed with delight at the young Nisei girls dancing with hoary Issei men.⁴³ The ondo finale also moved a Nisei columnist to comment upon the bonds between the generations. He noted that the Issei's enthusiasm for dancing enabled the Nisei to "see a very amusing side to this older generation." "It is no wonder that they try to keep a stiff upper lip with all the traditions of Japan to live up to..., [b]ut down deep they are apparently the same rhythm loving frivolous bunch of individuals that we much deplored second generation are." The author went on to expose the mystique of Issei authority. He told his fellow Nisei that given the opportunity, "These respected elders of ours...can make better monkeys and spectacles of themselves than we." His ultimate message underscored not only the Issei's humanity (placing them on a par with their children), but their vulnerability as aliens in a foreign land.⁴⁴

The Nisei Week leaders also sought to unite the generations in the knowledge of Japanese history. For example, the festival's parade in 1935 featured children in various costumes that characterized Japan's historical periods, from its mythic creation in 600 BC to the present era of the Taisho emperor. But Nisei Week's most pronounced construction of memory focused on the Issei as pioneers in the United States. The JACLers initiated Pioneer Night in 1935 to commemorate the earliest Japanese immigrants "who came to this country and who toiled and went through many hardships." This event feted those Issei who had resided for over forty years on the mainland of the United States by celebrating their rugged spirit with an afternoon tea followed by a banquet at a local Japanese restaurant.⁴⁵ The Nisei were urged to honor their parents because they had traveled so far "to create a future for their children in the land of the free." The Rafu Shimpo expressed its gratitude to the Issei for remaining in the United States despite the "oppression from the hakujin [whites persons] and the depression of the times." This ability to survive, the Nisei Week booklet noted in 1940, must not be lost on the second generation, for they too were pioneers because they also faced "unkind prejudices." Thus the booklet maintained that only by uniting with their parents in "a spirit of mutual understanding and affection" could the Nisei hope to overcome the handicap of race.⁴⁶

Nisei Week's leaders, however, said nothing about issues of class within the ethnic community. It was common among Japanese Americans to carry on the pro-business ideology of the Issei old guard and to portray labor organizers and other left-leaning activists as anathema to the group's social prestige and respectability. In his study of social groupings among Japanese Americans, James Sakoda reported that a slight interest in trade unionism was sufficient for a person to be branded an "aka" (red). According to him, these "so-called radicals and

communists, who did not maintain the middle-class ideology, were considered “unacceptables” and hence “ostracized by the community.” So too were the Issei migrant workers who “lived in hotels, boarding houses, and labor camps and usually did not participate in the activities of the community.”⁴⁷ Nisei Week hid these “unacceptables” behind a facade of entrepreneurial success. Its leaders totally ignored the suggestions of the leftist newspaper Doho, which thought that Pioneer Night should highlight the rampant exploitation of Japanese immigrants and that the festival leaders should squarely address troubling issues “of Nisei labor, of dual citizenship, of anti-alien legislation, of vocational problems, [and] of unity of [N]isei organizations.”⁴⁸ Calling itself the only Nisei progressive publication, Doho emerged in 1938 to challenge the “reactionary elements” in the local Japanese American community. It labeled Sei Fujii, the publisher of the Kashu Mainichi, a “jingoist” because of his support for Japan’s military leadership and branded Fred Tayama, the 1940 JACL President, a “labor-baiter.” Tayama, reportedly one of the most successful Nisei entrepreneurs in Little Tokyo who kept a standing golf date with the Japanese Consul General, owned a chain of restaurants (“U.S. Cafes”) that Doho accused of subjecting workers to “sweat shop conditions.” The newspaper backed labor organizers who set up picket lines in front of Tayama’s businesses. But the JACL President prevailed in court by winning an injunction against the picketers; he opposed labor unions and dismissed Doho as a Communist rag: “Just the fact that it singles you out for attack,” he said, “means you’re all right.”⁴⁹

Nisei Week’s screen of success was best captured by the parade floats in 1936 that revealed different parts of the enclave’s agricultural economy. A gargantuan celery stalk symbolized the bountiful harvests in Venice, California; horticulturists from the San Gabriel Valley adorned their float with bouquets of flowers; Orange County farmers decorated their tractors and other farm implements, while the wholesalers at Los Angeles’s central produce market displayed a huge mural showing a thriving business environment. Yet, revealingly, the entrepreneurial spirit of the floats ignored the significance of labor to the ethnic enclave. There was no credit given to those who worked the celery fields in Venice or picked flowers in San Gabriel. Likewise, there was no mention of those who loaded the produce at the central market or lost their jobs in Orange County to innovations in farm vehicles. The workers, or their advocates, in the ethnic enclave played no official role in Nisei Week.⁵⁰

This could not be said for the largest outgroup within Little Tokyo: women. Japanese Americans maintained a rigid sexual division of labor that was especially familiar to America’s immigrant communities. Anthropologist Sylvia Yanagisako observed that women in the ethnic group were responsible for “things inside the home” (*uchi no koto*), while the men tended to “things outdoors” (*soto no koto*). But Nisei Week was a rare moment when women were encouraged to leave the domestic sphere to participate in the community’s public life. The festival leaders depended upon women to organize the ondo and fashion shows, and the beauty pageant contestants were relied upon not only to attract shoppers to Little Tokyo through merchandise voting, but to represent the community at official receptions. These women greeted local politicians, the Japanese Consul General, and served as goodwill ambassadors among the various organizations within the ethnic community. This opportunity to “bring the Japanese people together” was what motivated one admittedly shy nineteen-year-old, to enter the beauty contest. She and her parents, who were merchants in Little Tokyo, saw the contest not as a beauty pageant, but as a way for young women to get involved in issues of great concern to the ethnic community.⁵¹

As it turned out, however, the significance of the beauty contestants was primarily symbolic. Their role

was to epitomize a bi-cultural identity that instilled ethnic solidarity in Japanese Americans, while communicating ethnic fantasies to the outside world.⁵² The JACL president in 1938 declared that the ideal candidate blended “the quiet charm of the Japanese wom[a]n with the more lively personality of the American girl.” The Rafu Shimpo expounded that “[s]he must be able to wear a kimono and walk with zori [slippers] on as well as look radiant in a white evening gown.” The Nisei Week queen in 1940 reportedly epitomized the hybrid of East and West, and according to the Kashu Mainichi “represented the best of [N]isei womanhood.” The newspaper reported that she went to sewing school three nights a week, took koto lessons two nights, studied Japanese language one night, and worked a full-time job as a secretary for a Japanese doctor. The queen “knows her Japanese manners as well as American etiquette.” Industrious, cultured, and community-minded, she was, more importantly, humble. “Her winning modesty doesn’t permit her to talk very much about herself. She would rather listen to you.”⁵³

If the festival queen had been encouraged to talk, she might have agreed with others who criticized the role of women during Nisei Week. Sandra Sekai, Nisei Week queen in 1938, wanted to be more than a pretty symbol. She was born and raised in Los Angeles and had attended UCLA briefly before her father decided that college was unnecessary for women. Like many in her generation, she found job opportunities only within the ethnic community, and even there had to beat out hundreds of applicants for a secretarial position. Sekai entered the beauty contest with the encouragement of a JACL member and was enthusiastic about promoting “goodwill between different types of Japanese.” Yet her surprise at being named “Queen of the Nisei” soon turned to frustration, as she resented taking orders from the festival leaders and regretted the lack of opportunity to voice her own opinions. “They ordered us,” she remembered, “and we just followed.”⁵⁴ A Rafu Shimpo columnist was also uncomfortable with the position of women in the festival. She suggested the introduction of a cake and pie baking contest to increase women’s involvement in the festival, and also decried the need for more leadership roles for women in both Nisei Week and the concurrent JACL convention that took place in 1938. But well aware of the sexual division of labor within the Japanese American community, the writer predicted that women’s participation in both Nisei Week and the JACL convention “will be overshadowed by male-domination.”⁵⁵ Her cynicism was not unfounded. While women had been crucial to Nisei Week as volunteers, performers, and dangled as bait for consumers, they were excluded from the highest levels of decision-making.⁵⁶

The JACLers made this clear in one of the funnier moments at Nisei Week. The festival’s talent revue in 1936 featured a routine when the JACL’s leading men dressed as women. They appeared as “anvil-footed, muscle-bound Romeos in women’s garb” in a skit, known as the “florodora sextet,” which parodied a scene from an 1890s Broadway hit famous for its idealization of feminine beauty.⁵⁷ Patrick Okura, one of the florodora members, explained that the JACLers initially recruited women for the routine, but thought that an all-male cast would prove more entertaining. A graduate of UCLA and one of the first Nisei to successfully challenge the segregationist hiring practices by the City of Los Angeles, Okura was somewhat of a star in his own right. The florodora act, he noted, was a “big hit” that the JACLers would remember as a trial by humiliation that bonded the Nisei leaders. But the cross-dressing revealed more than the JACLers sense of humor and status as the Nisei elite. The success of the performance, Okura confirmed, was founded upon the community’s understanding of gender difference: men in Little Tokyo were not supposed to behave like women unless this was done in the realm of play. Thus the JACLers reproduced the spheres that separated men and women in Little Tokyo, and once again ignored Doho’s leftist perspective, which blamed these traditional gender distinctions for relegating

women to the “lowest and hardest work” in Little Tokyo.⁵⁸

The Inverted World

Nisei Week was an unprecedented moment when, under the guise of play, Little Tokyo's social order was turned upside-down. Some of its inversions, such as the florodora routine, were playful means to re-enact the traditional world of the immigrant old guard. But Nisei Week was more than a filial commitment to Little Tokyo's Japanese foundations. Anthropologist John J. MacAloon explains that festivals are occasions in which we not only “reflect upon and define ourselves [and] dramatize our collective myths and history,” but they are also moments when we “present ourselves with alternatives...and change in some ways while remaining the same in others.”⁵⁹ Indeed, the JACLers interpreted the premise of Nisei Week—children leading parents—as an opportunity to change the ethnic community by creating a vision of its Americanization. While they could appreciate the Issei experience and learn Japanese rituals, their cultural orientation remained decidedly American. Neither racial segregation, nor the animosity that perpetuated it, discouraged their attachment to Western norms of behavior.

The instability of US-Japan relations only increased the JACL's commitment to Americanization. Western nations became alarmed as Japan expanded its empire into Korea and then Northern China. The League of Nations, with the support of the United States, condemned Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931, causing the Asian power to pull out of the international organization and to grow increasingly defensive about its territorial claims. The United States was particularly concerned about the threat Japanese colonialism posed to its markets and trade throughout Asia. This conflict between the two nations generated new anti-Japanese fears that had direct repercussions for Japanese Americans. The most ardent foe of the ethnic community in Los Angeles was Lail Thomas Kane, the self-proclaimed leader of a crusade to exclude Japanese Americans from commercial fishing. Kane testified to the House Special Committee on Un-American Activities in 1934 that Japanese American fishermen were prepared to lay mines and torpedo American vessels should US-Japan relations disintegrate into war. He gained support from the American Legion and drafted state legislation to support his cause. Although his anti-fishing bills never left committee, Kane's campaign placed the ethnic community in the limelight of suspicion.⁶⁰

To defuse these fears, the JACLers used Nisei Week to underscore the community's adaptation to American culture. The 1936 talent show, for instance, displayed Nisei Week's American influences by featuring—in addition to the “florodora” routine—a waltz ensemble, tap and Spanish dances, songs from the current hit parade, and “for the first time in Little Tokyo” a chorus line of Nisei women. The festival's carnival also would have been familiar to white Americans, notwithstanding the smell of teriyaki and the sea of Japanese faces. Scores of Nisei social, athletic, and religious organizations raised money for a community center where they all could gather and coordinate their activities. They sold snacks, hosted games, and emulated the festivities found at county fairs and church bazaars.⁶¹ But the appropriation of American rituals, Nisei Week leaders realized, did not mean that the majority of the Nisei wanted to blend indiscriminately with mainstream society. James Sakoda, in his study of Japanese American “patterns of adjustment,” identified what he called the “Nisei world.” Sakoda claimed that before World War II many Nisei, especially those who took part in ethnic organizations, athletic teams, and

community events, preferred to “keep to themselves” and to avoid both the Issei and those outside Little Tokyo. They built their own universe – complete with styles of dancing, dating, dressing, and language – that paralleled, yet rarely intersected with, white America. “The identification,” Sakoda clarified, “was with American ways, but not with Caucasians.”⁶²

The JACLers, who often did identify with whites, sought to break up this ethnic exclusiveness since their idea of bi-culturalism was to connect Little Tokyo with the American mainstream. The *Rafu Shimpo* chided the Nisei for being reluctant to socialize across the racial divide. The newspaper bemoaned their tendency “to resign themselves within their own group and peer out into the American community and say: ‘It can’t be done. They won’t treat you right—they’re prejudiced.’”⁶³ The Nisei Week leaders maintained that the second generation’s “clannishness” hurt the festival’s appeal. One leader complained that despite the glamour of Nisei Week “it may still appear to be a ‘private affair’ of the [N]isei in Lil’ Tokio.”⁶⁴ Another leader assured the Nisei that the exemplary behavior of whites at Nisei Week proved that they were willing to accept Japanese Americans as equals. “Their good natured mingling and joshing with the crowds and their genuine admiration for the Japanese arts showed their capacity for tolerance and appreciation. Many came to see what they could see; some went back with a deeper understanding of the Japanese as human beings rather than as a ‘peril.’”⁶⁵

Even more troubling than the Nisei’s inability to get along with whites was their inability to get along with each other. Nisei Week, as a designated space of play, encouraged excessive and exaggerated forms of behavior that resulted in violent clashes between groups within the ethnic community. This permissiveness, folklorist Roger Abrahams maintains, is what makes festivals potentially subversive: They “bring us together in celebration but let each of us ‘do our own thing,’ write our script of progress within the events,” and thus these “mad moments in the margins of time continue to provide us with models of revolution...”⁶⁶ The strongest evidence of this sort of subversiveness at Nisei Week were groups of delinquent youth known as “rowdies.” James Sakoda described them as failing “to maintain the social codes of the Nisei group.” They spurned work, marriage, and community responsibilities, and identified with people of “lower social status” such as Blacks and Filipinos. Yet the rowdies did not remain aloof from Japanese Americans; they came in gangs and often disrupted community events. What distinguished them at Nisei Week was their penchant for “aggressive behavior,” such as the brawl that erupted at the festival’s street dance in 1938.⁶⁷

Isami Arifuku Waugh, in her analysis of rowdies in Los Angeles, found that their behavior reflected the brutalities of daily life in Little Tokyo. One of her informants explained that he joined a Nisei gang as protection against the black and Mexican gangs who preyed upon unsuspecting Japanese Americans. But the more common reason for becoming a rowdy centered on the proliferation of Nisei social clubs and athletic teams. Waugh explains that these were established by a white school teacher who, in the tradition of Jane Addams and the settlement house movement, sought to bring Nisei youth off the streets and train them in the manners, customs, and activities of mainstream America. Yet, ironically, the clubs and teams that she created to mold good behavior became the basis for gang affiliation, with disagreements over sporting contests often erupting into violence. Another of Waugh’s informants recalled that the teacher cum social reformer “would go into a deep depression” every time she heard about the trouble that “her boys” caused.⁶⁸

The Nisei Week leaders also acknowledged their inability to control “rowdyism.” One publicly regretted the fact that “past Nisei Weeks have had the undeserved blotch of not being prepared to control those infantile groups whose malicious boisterousness have been of much annoyance....” In 1940 the rowdies were instructed

that the “girls will respect you for being gentlemanly,” because Nisei Week “is the time to have FUN but not for hell-raising, picking fights and drunkenness.” A year later in 1941 the Nisei Week leaders warned “rowdy individuals or purported gangs” that twenty police officers accompanied by a squad of a hundred judo experts would be patrolling the festival” and anyone caught fighting “will be taken into custody and prosecuted.” But the rowdies were not to be intimidated; that year the Kashu Mainichi reported that Nisei Week claimed four fights, two visitors injured, six Nisei on police suspects list, and arrests of peace disturbers.⁶⁹

While rowdies were a serious concern in Little Tokyo, youth delinquency was never the problem that it was in other ghetto communities. A study conducted in the early 1930s found that the percentage of juvenile delinquents among Japanese and Chinese Americans in Los Angeles was considerably less than in any other ethnic or racial population, including native-born whites.⁷⁰ The most serious crime committed by the rowdies was to jeopardize the JACLers public relations campaign. In her criticism of “gate crashers” in Little Tokyo, Rafu Shimpo editor Louise Suski warned that rowdies “have become so bold that they even attend without invitation a social held in a private home” and would curse and yell at a white American “who refused to admit them to a particular hall because their names weren’t on the list.” The idea of youngsters getting their way through threats and intimidation was anathema to Suski’s model of the “self-made man.” Her immigrant father after all had suffered devastating hardships, including losing the family possessions in the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, to earn a medical degree and become a leading figure in Little Tokyo. The younger Suski herself was no less of an autodidact, having to taught herself the craft of print journalism as the first editor of the ethnic community’s newly established Nisei press. While she was embarrassed by the rowdies’ behavior, her mentioning that the ticket-taker was white exposed the racial stakes of community delinquency. The main significance of the “gate crashers,” Suski maintained, “was that they reflected poorly on all Japanese Americans” and that “Any good that the other [N]isei have built up, these youths are knocking down and tearing away by their actions and language.”⁷¹

The JACLers’ response to the rowdies was to disassociate them from the ethnic community. The Nisei leaders described the disaffected youth not only as abominations, but aberrations in an otherwise upstanding community. The gang fight at the Nisei Week street dance in 1938 so upset the current JACL president that he warned those involved that “unless you boys change your ways” he would have them “blackballed” from jobs in the Japanese enclave. The ethnic press applied additional pressure. After the street dance incident, the Rafu Shimpo did something it had rarely done: it named the individuals and groups involved in the fracas. The newspaper stood firmly behind its action, insisting that “the good name of the Japanese Americans must be preserved.”⁷²

American Front

The economic motives that began Nisei Week and the concerns about Little Tokyo’s Americanization were inexplicably tied to the demonstration of the second generation’s civic virtue and political allegiance. “Through the medium of this festival,” John Maeno declared in 1936, “the JACL hopes to present, acquaint, and contact you directly with the young Japanese American citizen, his life and environment.” Maeno, the organization’s second president, was one of the few Nisei lawyers in Little Tokyo. A graduate of the University of Southern

California, he used his college ties to make inroads into Los Angeles political circles. He explained that as a “new American” the Nisei was a “true and loyal citizen of the United States” who sought to take “part in civic development and community progress.”⁷³

The JACLers used the Nisei’s citizenship to gain advantages in the political arena. They, like the leaders of African Americans and many urban immigrant groups, attempted to gain electoral power by combining Japanese American votes into one large ethnic bloc. This way, as the number of Nisei came of age, they could expand their impact on local elections. A flock of white office-seekers took the Nisei vote seriously and showed up at the festival’s inauguration in 1934, their large numbers even raising concerns in Little Tokyo that the festivities would turn into a “political rally.”⁷⁴ Nisei Week also had always been an occasion to pay respects to the highest elected official in Los Angeles. In the opening ceremony in 1936 a colorful procession moved through the streets of Little Tokyo on its way to Los Angeles’s City Hall two blocks away. The ethnic community’s “leading citizens” accompanied the Nisei Week Queen and “her pretty and charming attendants” as they were carried along in Japanese rickshaws. The ceremony concluded with these “kimono-clad, dark-eyed beauties” presenting the mayor of Los Angeles “with an official invitation to attend this gala event in Lil’ Tokyo.”⁷⁵

Such a visible display of goodwill towards the Los Angeles community illustrated the type of citizenship that the JACLers espoused. Being American, to them, meant not just possessing legal entitlements, but performing a wide range of civic duties. The winner of the JACL’s oratorical contest in 1938 placed the responsibility of improving “our race problem” squarely on the Nisei’s shoulders. He encouraged the Nisei to engage in “active citizenship” by voting and involving themselves in public affairs. Civic involvement, he asserted, would prove that the Nisei are a “racial group worthy of being accepted on an equal plane” because “it will show to the white citizenry that we are not a culturally or mentally inferior race..., that we are beneficial to America’s social and economic welfare, and that we desire to cooperate with the white race in solving our community and national problems.” The ultimate significance of active citizenship, the orator explained, was that eventually it would compel “the white race, themselves, to take down the racial barriers that have been erected against us.”⁷⁶

But the JACLers did not equate proving loyalty to the United States with severing ties to Japan. Despite America’s opposition to Japanese imperialism, they sided with their parents, who, like most expatriates, reveled in the military victories of their homeland. The formal declaration of the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937 heightened these ties to the motherland, as both generations sent money, supplies, and well wishes to Japanese soldiers. Issei leaders called upon the JACLers to counteract the American public’s overwhelming support for the Chinese (President Franklin Roosevelt, in fact, disobeyed his own policy of neutrality in foreign wars by sending American arms to Chinese troops). The older generation, with assistance from the Japanese Consulate, briefed the young leaders on the necessity and righteousness of Japan’s foreign policies and helped to establish a Nisei “speakers bureau” to inform Americans about Japan’s side of the story. Togo Tanaka confirmed that the English section of his newspaper, Rafu Shimpo, based its editorials and coverage of the Sino-Japanese War on information provided by Issei who blamed Japan’s negative image on Chinese propaganda. The staff of the paper’s Japanese section prepared pamphlets for their Nisei colleagues about Japan’s plight in the West—the subtitle of one of these read, “How About Giving Japan a Break?”⁷⁷ Thus Tanaka concluded that the JACLers, despite their strong commitment to American political institutions, were mindful “not to disparage the cultural values of Japan, nor to antagonize Issei feelings in the latter’s sympathies for Japan. JACL leaders even rationalized their Americanism as being rooted in Japanese culture.”⁷⁸

But America's opposition only grew when Japanese troops captured Beijing and pressed on to victory. In 1939 FDR abrogated the treaty that had safeguarded US-Japan trade and, a year later, in response to Japan's Tripartite alliance with Germany and Italy, and its apparent movement into Southeast Asia, threatened to cut off the shipment of about eighty-percent of the island nation's war supplies. The growing opposition against Japan buoyed antagonism against Japanese Americans. By 1938 Lail Thomas Kane was in the habit of sharing his opinions with Rafu Shimpo editor Togo Tanaka, who duly noted them as an alarming indication of popular sentiment. "By this time," Tanaka later noted, "Kane's attitude toward the Nisei as 'Jap-stooges' appears to have crystallized." This was evident in Kane's telling Tanaka that "I'm rapidly being convinced that the JACL which represents the Nisei leadership is nothing more than an instrument of the Issei. You really take your orders from Japan." Thus Kane, still backed by the American Legion, continued to lobby for legislation against Japanese American fishermen. He told Tanaka that if the JACLers, whom he referred to as "jackals," were really loyal "you would support this fishing bill which is a national defense, patriotic proposal" and "you should know that the security of the United States is menaced by the presence of fishing boats manned by naval reserve officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy." These fears reached a national audience through Kane's various publications, including an article in the Saturday Evening Post, and spread beyond the issue of Japanese American fishermen. The immediate problem for Little Tokyo was that increasing anti-Japanese sentiment gave rise to boycotts against Japanese businesses that placed the Depression-weary enclave in even further jeopardy.⁷⁹

"A direct correlation exists," wrote Togo Tanaka, "between the growing intensity of America-Japan friction and the increasing frequency of Nisei and even Issei loyalty pledges."⁸⁰ The Issei old guard responded to anti-Japanese affronts as they had done before: they had the Nisei reassure Americans that their support for Japan was in no way at odds with their commitment to living, and raising their children, in the United States. But mounting US-Japan hostility forced Nisei Week's leaders to retreat from the idea of bi-culturalism. The Rafu Shimpo's English-language staff, for example, veered away from Japanese nationalism. Togo Tanaka claimed that the decision was based on both the fallout from the rescinding of the trade agreement and the results of a survey that revealed the impressive Nisei commitment to the United States. The English section split from the paper's Japanese staff to launch an editorial policy encouraging the Nisei to drop bi-culturalism in favor of a "single American political loyalty." The Nisei were urged to support the JACL's Americanism, buy US defense bonds, and forgo dual citizenship with Japan.⁸¹

It was during this pall in US-Japan relations that Nisei Week took on a decidedly patriotic appeal. The proclamations of loyalty and parade floats replete with symbols of Americana in the early 1940s were part of a larger endeavor to ensure that Japanese Americans would not be confused with their relatives overseas. At the time it was difficult to gauge the extent to which these patriotic activities paid off. In addition to mayor Bowren's assurances that Angelenos knew Japanese Americans were loyal, the Los Angeles Times encouraged its readers to attend Nisei Week, asserting that the ethnic community "had no part in and no responsibility for causing war clouds to gather in the Orient."⁸² The JACL's patriotism, also, made a favorable impression on the Naval intelligence agent assigned in 1940 to assess the loyalty of Japanese Americans in Los Angeles. Kenneth Ringle was no typical outsider who thought "all Orientals looked alike." He had studied Japanese language for three years when he was with the United States embassy in Tokyo and was familiar with the ethnic community in Hawaii before coming to Los Angeles. His ease among Japanese people was evident in the close contacts he forged with JACLers, who provided him with "valuable anti-subversive information" on suspicious elements

within Little Tokyo. Ringle's analysis concluded that "the entire 'Japanese Problem' has been magnified out of its true proportion, largely because of the physical characteristics of the people." The threat of espionage among Japanese Americans, he noted, "is no more serious than the problems of the German, Italian, and Communistic portions of the US population" and therefore "should be handled on the basis of the individual, regardless of citizenship, and not on a racial basis."⁸³

But no amount of flag-waving or volunteer intelligence work could convince Lail Thomas Kane and other die-hard racists that the Nisei were trustworthy. Ringle viewed alarmists like Kane as "exceedingly dangerous" because their "half-truths" could arouse "violent anti-Japanese feeling among Caucasians of all classes" who do not distinguish between officers of the Japanese military and Japanese Americans.⁸⁴ The attack on Pearl Harbor proved him right. In the middle of January 1942, as the idea of internment was being considered, Kane believed correctly that "the Nisei who have been waving Old Glory around so long" would finally get what anti-Japanese foes long thought they had deserved.⁸⁵

During World War II the JACLers took control of the ethnic community precisely because they had failed to fulfill Nisei Week's twin goals of ameliorating anti-Japanese racism and securing the future of ethnic enclave. While neither bi-culturalism nor the switch to Americanism could prevent the internment, the latter identity proved more pragmatic amidst the extreme anti-Japanese sentiment that gripped the nation during World War II. The JACLers, pushed by government officials, adopted a new language of identity predicated on the eradication, not celebration, of ethnic difference. It was this politics of assimilation that increasingly would be scrutinized and vilified within Japanese American communities ever since.⁸⁶

The current multicultural moment behooves historians to revisit the period between the culmination of immigration restriction and the start of the Second World War, an era, like our own, marked by the acculturation of large, ethnically and racially diverse waves of immigrants. While it is tempting to romanticize their communities as places where Old World traditions were preserved, succumbing to this temptation ignores the heterogeneity indigenous to ethnic groups. The practice of the Nisei Week festival reveals that fault lines of gender, class, generation, and ideology operated within the boundaries of Japanese America, exposing ethnicity as a struggle not only for self-definition but for who defines the ethnic self. It is important to remember that this inner diversity of Little Tokyo and the facade of uniformity that concealed it were shaped significantly by external forces. The heightening of anti-Japanese prejudice compelled the leaders of Nisei Week not only to reinvent group identity but to discipline those who failed to embrace their new construction. Racial domination exacerbated internal conflicts, and thus diminished, rather than increased, the community's ethnic solidarity.

The lessons of Nisei Week also suggest that "insider" voices of ethnic identity need to be analyzed as orchestrations of power. As minorities like Japanese Americans have gained access and increasing success in mainstream society, fictions of identity, once powerful only within ethnic communities, have had an impact far beyond them. Whether it is about paying redress money to Japanese Americans interned during World War II, multicultural curriculum, or affirmative action, the self-definitions of ethnic and racial minorities have come to play an integral role in American life.

Notes

¹ Kashu Mainichi, Aug. 4, 1940. All citations for this and other vernacular periodicals, unless indicated, are from English-language sections. In the decade before World War II, the Kashu Mainichi and the Rafu Shimpo had the largest circulations in the Japanese American community. Each was bi-lingual and maintained separate staffs to report in Japanese and English. Studies suggest that the Japanese-language staff established the editorial policies for both sections until the late 1930s when English-language editors sided firmly with the United States, while the former retained attachments to Japan. See, Togo Tanaka, "The Vernacular Newspapers," unpublished manuscript, n.d., Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Records (JERR), W 1.95, BANC MSS 67/14 c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley and David Yoo, "'Read All About It': Race, Generation, and the Japanese American Ethnic Press, 1925-1941," Amerasia Journal 19 (1993), 69-92.

² Rafu Shimpo, Aug. 10, 1941. The "official attire" of the festival's parade in 1941 was made out of cotton, not the usual silk, to conform with concerns about national defense, see, Sangyo Nippo, July 30, 1941.

³ Nisei Week Japanese festival, fiftieth anniversary souvenir booklet, 1990. This annual publication is hereafter "Nisei Week booklet."

⁴ Nisei Week Booklet, 1941; Los Angeles Times as quoted in Kashu Mainichi, Aug. 25, 1941; Rafu Shimpo, Aug. 25, 1941.

⁵ Hearing before Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Eighty-third Congress, Second Session, on H.R. 7435 (To amend the Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act 1948), 232.

⁶ Mayor Fletcher Bowron, radio address on KECA (Los Angeles), Feb. 5, 1942 (6:30 p.m.), Mayor Fletcher Bowron correspondence, JERR (A 15.14).

⁷ The distinction between "race" and "ethnicity" is the subject of much discussion but little agreement. By "race," I mean both a social condition and the nomenclature that justified and reinforced it. In this sense, Japanese Americans in the 1930s and early 1940s confronted meanings of race, often rooted in biological "fact," in a degree and kind different from European immigrants and ethnics. I use "ethnicity" or "ethnic identity" to denote the self-representations of persons who share an ancestral heritage, whether real or imagined. While the word "identity" is problematical because, as David Hollinger suggests, it implies "fixity and givenness," the wide-spread usage of the term calls for a redefinition rather than abandonment. The institutionalization of anti-Japanese racism before World War II is studied in Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion (New York, Atheneum, 1968) and for Los Angeles in John Modell, The Economics and Politics of Racial Accommodation: The Japanese of Los Angeles, 1900-1942 (Urbana, 1977), 28-66. Analysis of the meanings of race and ethnicity in American social theories can be found in Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s (New York, 1986), 14-24. The case for replacing "identity" with "affiliation" is made by Hollinger in his Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism (New York, 1995), 6-7, and for a historian's etymology of "identity" see, Philip Gleason, "Identifying Identity: A Semantic History," Journal of American History 69 (March 1983), 910-31.

⁸ Hearings on H.R. 7435, 231-32. For criticism of the internment order see, for example, Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson, Prejudice, War, and the Constitution: Causes and Consequences of the Evacuation of the Japanese Americans in World War II (Berkeley, 1954); Roger Daniels, The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans (Malabar, FL., 1986); Peter Irons, Justice at War: The Story of the Japanese American Internment Cases (New York, 1983); Michi Weglyn, Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps (New York, 1976); and Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (Washington, DC, 1982 and 1983). The vast literature on the internment is summarized in Roger Daniels, Prisoners Without a Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993) and analyzed in Brian Masaru Hayashi, The Governing of Men: ... (Princeton, forthcoming).

⁹ Studies of the move for reparations include William Minoru Hohri, Repairing America: An Account of the Movement for Japanese-American Redress (Pullman, WA, 1988) and Leslie T. Hatamiya, Righting a Wrong: Japanese Americans and the Passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988.

¹⁰ Pacific Citizen, June 21, 1968.

¹¹ Revisionist works that highlight the retention of bi-culturalism before World War II are Jere Takahashi, "Japanese American Responses to Race Relations: The Formation of Nisei Perspectives," Amerasia Journal 9 (Spring/Summer 1982), 29-57, see also his Nisei/Sansei: (Philadelphia, 1998); Yuji Ichioka, "A Study of Dualism: James Yoshinori Sakamoto and the Japanese American Courier, 1928-1942," Amerasia Journal 13 (1986-87), 49-81 and his "Japanese Immigrant Nationalism: The Issei and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1941," California History 69 (Fall 1990), 260-75, 310-11; and Brian Masaru Hayashi, 'For the Sake of Our Japanese Brethren': Assimilation, Nationalism, and Protestantism among the Japanese of Los Angeles, 1895-1942 (Stanford, 1995).

¹² My understanding of ethnic identity as an instrumental and inherently political process has benefited from the race theory presented in Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s (New York, 1986); David Theo Goldberg (ed.), The Anatomy of Racism (Minneapolis, 1990); Dominick La Capra (ed.), The Bounds of Race: Perspectives on Hegemony and Resistance (Ithaca, 1991). The ethnographic conception of identity employed in this essay has its roots broadly in what social scientists know as the "instrumentalist" perspective, in which ethnicity is marshaled for political and economic interests rather than governed by "primordial" instincts. For a critical review of the instrumentalist-primordialist debate see, G. Carter Bentley, "Ethnicity and Practice," Comparative Studies in Society and History 29 (Jan. 1987), 24-27.

¹³ Critical insights into the essentialist nature of "insider" rhetoric are found in Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, "African-American Women's History and the Metalanguage of Race," Signs 17 (Winter 1992), 251-74; Lisa Lowe, "Heterogeneity, Hybridity, Multiplicity: Marking Asian American Differences," Diaspora 1 (Spring 1991), 24-44 and her Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics (Durham, 1996); Kevin K. Gaines, Uplifting the Race: Black Leadership, Politics, and Culture in the Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill, 1996) and Cornel West, Race Matters (New York, 1993), 23-32

¹⁴ Rafu Shimpo, June 26 and 27, 1934; Kashu Mainichi, May 23, 1934. See also Meeting Minutes for May 22 and June 25, 1934, Japanese Association of Los Angeles, Box 238, Japanese American Research Project, Special Collections, University of California, Los Angeles.

¹⁵ Kashu Mainichi, July 3, 1934.

¹⁶ Rafu Shimpo, July 1, 1934.

¹⁷ Occupational data for Japanese Americans in Los Angeles was generated by Lon Yuki Kurashige from "WRA Form 26: Evacuee Summary Data ('Locator Index')," U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, 1942, electronic dataset, National Archives, Washington, DC, n.d. WRA Form 26 is a machine-readable dataset containing census-like records for the over 110,000 Japanese Americans who were interned in the Department of the Interior's concentration camps during World War II. The four most common occupations for Issei and Nisei in 1941 were respectively: (Issei) Gardener, Retail Manager, Truck Farmer, and Farm Hand; (Nisei) Sales Clerk, Farm Hand, Retail Manager, and Gardener.

¹⁸ Togo Tanaka, "History of the JACL," unpublished manuscript, n.d., JERR (T 6.25), chapter II, p. 1. For the early history of JACL see chapters 2-4. A more celebratory account is found in Bill Hosokawa, JACL in Quest of Justice: The History of the Japanese American Citizens League (New York, 1982).

¹⁹ WRA Form 26. This social profile of JACLers was derived by Lon Yuki Kurashige from a sample of 183 members of the organization in 1941. The sample was created by matching the JACL's membership list published in the Pacific Citizen, May, 1941 with records contained in WRA Form 26. The data show that 28% of JACLers had attended college and that 14% of them were "retail managers," while only 16% of the Nisei in their age cohort (those born before 1917) had gone to college and 7% worked in management.

- ²⁰ Interview with Kay Sugahara in Nisei Week booklet, 1983; WRA Form 26.
- ²¹ Togo Tanaka, "How To Survive Racism in America's Free Society" in Arthur A. Hansen and Betty E. Mitson (eds.), Voices Long Silent: An Oral Inquiry into the Japanese American Evacuation (California State University, Fullerton, Oral History Program, 1974), 83-109; Togo Tanaka, interview with author, Los Angeles, CA, October 20, 1992; WRA form 26.
- ²² Togo Tanaka, "Political Organizations," unpublished manuscript, n.d., JERR (W 1.94), 9.
- ²³ Kurt Lewin, "The Problem of Minority Leadership," in Alvin W. Gouldner (ed.), Studies in Leadership: Leadership and Democratic Action (1950; reprint, New York, 1965), 193; see also, John Higham's introduction to his edited collection Ethnic Leadership in America (Baltimore, 1978), 193.
- ²⁴ Roger Daniels, "The Japanese," in John Higham (ed.), Ethnic Leadership in America, 49.
- ²⁵ Togo Tanaka, Rafu Shimpo's English-language and JACL officer before World War II, observed key differences between the national JACL organization and the Los Angeles chapter. See, Tanaka, "Political Organizations," 13 and Tanaka, interviewed by Betty E. Mitson and David A. Hacker, May 19, 1973, oral history 1271a, California State University, Fullerton Oral History Program, 11.
- ²⁶ Nishimoto, "Japanese in Personal Services and Immigrant Trade," 4-34. For an opposing view see, Roger Daniels, "Japanese America, 1930-1941: An Ethnic Community in the Great Depression," Journal of the West 24 (1985), 35-49.
- ²⁷ For significance of Nisei purchasing power see, Kashu Mainichi (Jpn.), May 23, 1934 and its English section for July 12, 1935. Concerns about Nisei conspicuous consumption are found in Ibid, August 4, 1934 and Aug. 16, 1939.
- ²⁸ Ibid, Aug. 4, 1934.
- ²⁹ Ibid, July 20, 1934.
- ³⁰ Rafu Shimpo, Aug. 10, 1934 ; Kashu Mainichi, Aug. 5, 1934 ; Ibid, Aug. 18, 1939.
- ³¹ Rafu Shimpo, Aug. 19, 1934. Not much is known about this employment bureau, except that it was informally connected to the JACL and was criticized as being biased toward members of that organization. See, Ibid, Aug. 7, 1938. The broader context of Japanese American unemployment is addressed in Modell, 138-39. He claims that the low rate of unemployment for Japanese Americans in the retail and sales trade reported by the 1940 Census was deceptive. Only two-thirds of these workers were employed for the full year in 1939 and many unskilled Japanese Americans found no work at all. Yet the Japanese compared favorably to "other races" in the retail and sales trade, whose unemployment rate was more than twice theirs.
- ³² Kashu Mainichi, Aug. 5, 1934.
- ³³ Ibid, Aug. 28, 1938.
- ³⁴ Rafu Shimpo, Aug. 29, 1938; Kashu Mainichi, Aug. 28, 1938; Ibid, Aug. 5, 1934.
- ³⁵ Manzanar Free Press (internee newspaper at the Manzanar concentration camp for Japanese Americans during World War II), Nov. 30, 1942.
- ³⁶ Kashu Mainichi, Aug. 12, 1935; Ibid, Aug. 12, 1934.
- ³⁷ Kashu Mainichi, Aug. 12, 1935; Ibid, Aug. 15, 1937.
- ³⁸ Nisei Week Booklet, 1936; Kashu Mainichi, July 24, 1937.
- ³⁹ Ibid, July 11, 1940; Nisei Week Booklet, 1940.
- ⁴⁰ Rafu Shimpo, Aug. 27, 1939.

- 41 Yoshiko Mori (pseudonym) interview with author, Los Angeles County, CA, May 20, 1993.
- 42 Chiye Nagano (pseudonym) interview with author, Los Angeles County, CA, April 19, 1993.
- 43 Kashu Mainichi, Aug. 4, 1934; Ibid (Jpn.), Aug. 19, 1934.
- 44 Rafu Shimpō, Aug. 19, 1934.
- 45 Ibid, Aug. 16, 1935; Kashu Mainichi, July 19, 1935.
- 46 Kashu Mainichi, July 9, 1935; Rafu Shimpō, June 17, 1934; Ibid, Aug. 3, 1941; Nisei Week booklet, 1940. See also Tsuyoshi Matsumoto, "History of the Resident Japanese in Southern California," unpublished manuscript (written in English and Japanese), 1941, "Togo Tanaka Journal," folder 3, JERR (A 17.06).
- 47 Doho, June 10, 1938; Sakoda, "Personal Adjustment," 11-12, 17-18. The quotes come from the analysis of the "unrespectable Issei" but are echoed in the following discussion of "nonconforming" Nisei.
- 48 Doho, July 1, 1939. For other criticisms of Nisei Week see, Kashu Mainichi, Aug. 8, 1937 and Rafu Shimpō, Aug. 18 and July 28, 1935.
- 49 Doho, June 10, 1938; Togo Tanaka, "Report on the Manzanar Riot," 1-5, JERR (O 10.12).
- 50 Kashu Mainichi, Aug. 18, 1936.
- 51 May Sakurai response to author's questionnaire, c. April 1993. In author's possession.
- 52 On women's consumption and the "feminization of public space" in post-World War II suburbia see, Lizabeth Cohen, "From Town Center to Shopping Center: The Reconfiguration of Community Marketplaces in Postwar America," American Historical Review 101 (October 1996), 1072-077.
- 53 Rafu Shimpō, June 26, 1938; Ibid, Aug. 17, 1941; Kashu Mainichi, Aug. 11, 1940.
- 54 Sandra Sekai (pseudonym) interview with author, Los Angeles County, CA, January 28, 1993.
- 55 Rafu Shimpō, Aug. 31, 1938.
- 56 WRA Form 26 data show occupations (other than homemaker) for sixty-three percent of Japanese American women age 16 and above. Yet their employment outside the home did not diminish gender differences; in the workplace Issei women clustered in domestic service and agricultural labor, while the Nisei, because of their English-language skills, became typists, secretaries, and general office clerks. Managerial jobs were the almost exclusive domain of Japanese American men. This "sexual division of labor" reflects the gender differences that Sylvia Yanagisako found in her interviews with Japanese Americans in Seattle. Yanagisako observed that women were responsible for "things inside the home" (uchi no koto), while men tended to "things outdoors" (soto no koto). See, Yanagisako, Transforming the Past, 98. The leftist newspaper Doho (March 15, 1941) was one of the few voices in Little Tokyo to raise awareness that such gender roles were unfair to women who were "relegated to the lowest and hardest work."
- 57 Nisei Week booklet, 1936. For the history of the flora-dora (as it is properly spelled) number see, Lois W. Banner, American Beauty (New York, 1983), 181-82
- 58 Patrick Kiyoshi Okura, phone interview with author, September 3, 1997. For biographical information on Okura also see, JACL Reporter 4, 9 (September 1948), The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
- 59 John J. MacAloon, "Introduction: Cultural Performances, Cultural Theory," in MacAloon (ed.) Rite, Drama, Festival, Spectacle: Rehearsal Toward a Theory of Cultural Performance (Philadelphia, 1984), 1. The scholarly literature on festivals is extensive, particularly within the disciplines of anthropology and folklore. For discussion of festivals (and rituals in general) as agents of cultural repro-

duction and transformation see, MacAloon (ed.), Rite, Drama, Festival, Spectacle; Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," in The Interpretation of Cultures, 112; Roger D. Abrahams, "Toward an Enactment-Centered Theory of Folklore," in William R. Bascom (ed.), Frontiers of Folklore (Boulder, 1977) and Abrahams, "Shouting Match at the Border: The Folklore of Display Events," in "And Other Neighborly Names," eds. Richard Bauman and Roger D. Abrahams (Austin, 1981), 319-20; Catherine Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (New York, 1992), 74, 197-223; M. M. Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. Helene Iswolsky (Cambridge, MA, 1968); and Victor Turner (ed.), Celebration: Studies in Festivity and Ritual (Washington DC, 1982).

Historical studies of American festivals include Robert Anthony Orsi, The Madonna on 115th Street : Faith and Community in Italian Harlem, 1880-1950 (New Haven, 1985); April Schultz, "'The Pride of the Race has been Touched': The 1925 Norse-American Immigration Centennial and Ethnic Identity," Journal of American History 77 (March 1991), 1265-295; Susan G. Davis, Parades and Power: Street Theatre in Nineteenth-Century Philadelphia (Berkeley, 1986). The significance of festivals in American history is also discussed in Matthew Frye Jacobson, Special Sorrows: The Diasporic Imagination of Irish, Polish, and Jewish Immigrants in the United States (Cambridge, MA, 1995); George Lipsitz, Time Passages: Collective Memory and American Popular Culture (Minneapolis, 1990); and John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1992).

⁶⁰ Modell, 174; Tanaka, "Pre-evacuation Pressure Group Activity in Southern California," 6-8.

⁶¹ Nisei Week booklet, 1936; Kashu Mainichi, July 18, 1940.

⁶² James Sakoda, "Personal Adjustment" in "James Sakoda Reports on Tule Lake," January 12, 1943, unpublished manuscript, n.d., folder 11, JERR (R 20.86), 15-16.

⁶³ Rafu Shimpo, August 19, 1934.

⁶⁴ Ibid, July 25, 1940.

⁶⁵ Kashu Mainichi, August 18, 1940.

⁶⁶ Roger D. Abrahams, "Shouting Match at the Border," 319-20.

⁶⁷ Sakoda, "Personal Adjustment." For a description of the street fight in 1938 see, Isami Arifuku Waugh, "Hidden Crimes and Deviance in the Japanese-American Community," (Ph.d. Diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1978), 134-35.

⁶⁸ Waugh, 148, 135-143.

⁶⁹ Sangyo Nippo, July 18, 1940; Kashu Mainichi, Aug. 4, 1940; Ibid, Aug. 24, 1941; Waugh, "Hidden Crimes and Deviance in the Japanese-American Community," 152.

⁷⁰ H. K. Misaki, "Delinquency and Crime," in Edward K. Strong, Jr. (ed.), Vocational Attitudes of Second-Generation Japanese in the United States (Stanford, 1933), 160-61.

⁷¹ Rafu Shimpo, July 27, 1941; Louise Suski, interview with author, Cerritos, CA, October 5, 1992. For a biography of Suski's father see, Louise Suski, "Biography of Father," August 25, 1945, JERR (T 1.8682).

⁷² Waugh, 135.

⁷³ Nisei Week booklet, 1936; Kashu Mainichi, Aug. 10, 1936; John Maeno, interview with author, Los Angeles, CA, September 2, 1991.

⁷⁴ Rafu Shimpo, Aug. 20, 1934.

⁷⁵ Kashu Mainichi, Aug. 11, 1936; Nisei Week booklet, 1936.

⁷⁶ Kashu Mainichi, Sept. 11, 1938.

- ⁷⁷ Tanaka, "The Vernacular Newspapers," 18-19, 38. For discussion of Japanese nationalism in the ethnic community in the 1930s also see, Hayashi, 'For the Sake of our Japanese Brethren'; Ichioka, "Japanese Immigrant Nationalism," 260-75, 310-11; and James Sakoda, "Reports on Tule Lake," 11.
- ⁷⁸ Tanaka, "History of the JACL," III:5.
- ⁷⁹ Tanaka, "Pre-evacuation Pressure Group Activity in Southern California," 10-11; Nishimoto, "Personal Service and Urban Trade," 73-4, 38-9; Tanaka, "History of the JACL," III:12.
- ⁸⁰ Tanaka, "History of the JACL," III:17.
- ⁸¹ Tanaka, "Political Organizations," 6-7; Tanaka, "Vernacular Newspapers," 38-39; 8,9, 17; Minutes of Rafu Shimpo's Board of Editorial Counselors [sic.] Meeting.
- ⁸² Los Angeles Times as quoted in Kashu Mainichi, Aug. 25, 1941.
- ⁸³ Lieutenant Commander Ringle's Confidential Intelligence Report to Chief of Naval Operations, (most likely written between Jan. 20 and March 27, 1942), JERR (A 5.01). For analysis of Ringle's and other reports see, Bob Kumamoto, "The Search for Spies: American Counterintelligence and the Japanese American Community, 1931-1942," Amerasia Journal 6 (1979), 45-75; Michi Weglyn, Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps (New York, 1976), 33-53.
- ⁸⁴ Ringle Report to Chief of Naval Operations.
- ⁸⁵ Tanaka, "Pre-evacuation Pressure Group Activity in Southern California," 28.
- ⁸⁶ For early expression of this see, Amy Tachiki, Eddie Wong, Franklin Odo (eds.), Roots: An Asian American Reader (UCLA Asian American Studies Center, 1971).