Lecture notes for 4/24, 4/25 and quiz on 4/25

This is a first draft and will be revised after the semester is over. Suggestions welcome!

1. Odd and Ends

   a. **Paradigms – critical differences between philosophy, science and application**

      A paradigm is the “generally accepted perspective of a particular discipline at a given time; ‘he framed the problem within the psychoanalytic paradigm’” (Webster’s Online Dictionary). Thomas Kuhn\(^1\) popularized the term in his book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, which (paraphrasing) referred to “the specialized subculture of norms, practices, beliefs and purposes of a community.”\(^2\) Other terms for the same referent are “subculture” and in a special sense, “exemplar”—a term Kuhn later used (Kuhn, 1996) that refers to a specific subculture that grows up around the development and application of an accepted theory, the details of which continue to be researched.

      Let me illustrate with an example of my own work. A few years ago I became interesting in applying global models to local problems. For instance, considering the global influences on Hawaii (tourism, migration, military spending, agriculture…), what might we expect Hawaii to look like say In 2025? I happened to be working with a global model used by the DNI, CIA, and Pentagon for many years; its designer, Barry Hughes, modified it to put Hawaii in just as any other region of the world. The results were reported in a paper I presented in 2005 in Istanbul and recently gave to folks in our Public Policy Center at UH. I examined the demographic “forecast” for Hawaii in 2025 and found a 14% decline in school age people, a 10% increase in working age folks, and a whooping 94% increasing in old folks (70 and over), then proceeded to infer policy implications, such as (a) no need for a new mass transit system since far fewer people will be taking it to go to school, (b) no pressure on wages since working age folks grew faster than the population (6%), and (c) plenty of new demand for HMOs and reconstruction of condos and homes for in-home care for the aged. By conducting this research I was hoping to establish a new paradigm for relating global trends to local public policy.\(^3\) The essential idea was to use global models developed for long term projections of alternative futures (especially related to national security and national interests more generally),

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More generally now, consider the table below. Applied politics, political theory, and political science may be viewed as paradigms in the larger sense of a subculture because each have their own fundamental questions and ways of addressing them. Science seeks greater understanding of how politics “works.” Applied researchers seek to develop policies and take actions that enable them to achieve political goals such as staying in office, defending the country, and so on. Political philosophers critique both the theories of scientists and the goals and policies of practitioners, by critically examining relations between them and developing new ways of thinking about them. A philosopher may produce a new way of thinking about “political man,” a practitioner a new policy, and a scientist a new theory of political behavior. Each of these “products” (the theory, the “new thought,” and the new policy) may then be subject to the scrutiny of each of the other paradigms, of course. The scientist may look for evidence that the “new thought” explains certain types of political behavior. The practitioner may look for policy implications of a new theory or “new thought.” For instance, Jefferson’s concern with politics being reduced to factionalism with no political party looking out for the common good might stimulate a political scientist to develop factionalism and “tragedy of the commons” scales and determine whether more factionalism leads to more tragedy or some such.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigms</th>
<th>Relationships of concern</th>
<th>Goal: reduce tensions between models of the</th>
<th>Products</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political science</td>
<td>Theory—Data</td>
<td>Possible vs. Real</td>
<td>Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political philosophy</td>
<td>Theory—Culture</td>
<td>Possible vs. Desirable</td>
<td>Critiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applied politics</td>
<td>Data—Culture</td>
<td>Real vs. Desirable</td>
<td>Policies</td>
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The way in which people who practice these paradigms cooperate best with each other is through their use of each others products. For instance, it is the knowledge generated by science that is most useful to political practitioners. It is the “new thought” or critiques produced by philosophy that is most useful to both scientists and practitioners. And it is the historical legacy produced by practitioners that becomes both the focus of further empirical research and philosophy.

b. **Necessary and sufficient conditions and implications for 2x2 tables**

One of the more powerful tools at the disposal of scientists and philosophers alike in constructing and critiquing theory is the logic of necessity and sufficiency in causal relations. In the social sciences, these tools of logic have not been particularly significant because it is believed that there are very few, if any, causal relations that are either necessary or sufficient to produce particular political behavior. However, this (if true) may be saying more about the difficulties of developing grounded political theory than about the structure and functioning of politics, or the value of logical analysis to political studies. Data is usually difficult to acquire about actual decision making, difficult to judge regarding validity and reliability, and difficult to abstract in the form of scales (indexes, Lickert or Guttman scales, factors, and so on) for quantitative analyses. Even with modern society with its computer networks and internet, data collection is difficult.

An excellent example of this problem is the research surrounding the proposition that democracies do not make war on each other. What is a war? Researchers approaching this question as a simple dichotomy (war or no war) have had enormous difficulty coming to agreement. Is war any violent conflict between peoples of two countries? Must it be officially declared? Involve regular government military forces (what of clandestine
operations)? Duration? Numbers killed relevant? How long and/or well established must a democracy be to be counted as a democracy? What are the minimum features of a “democracy?” Can researchers be legitimately accused of defining these terms to maximize the likelihood of “proving” their theory (getting the strongest evidence for it)? Lately, Gartzke⁴ found that if you define democracy and war not as simple dichotomies but on scales of more or less (e.g., war becomes redefined as MIDS or militarized interstate disputes), and one also measures degree of capitalism, when you control for capitalism (partial correlation) you find the relationship between democracy and war disappears!

2. The Problem of Paradigm Overreach

Political scientists, philosophers, and practitioners have a serious problem relating to one another; they tend to overreach, to apply their newly acquired knowledge, critiques, or policies outside their paradigmatic context.⁵ A philosopher who has developed a new theory as a solution to a practical political problem often can’t wait to see it applied to solve the problem. The problem is, the “new thought” wasn’t developed through practical applications but rather through carefully crafted theory development and social criticism.

Melzer⁶ makes a detailed examination of this problem through a critique of post-Enlightenment trends in political philosophy. He notes that with the Enlightenment, political philosophers (including political, economic, and social criticism) abandoned the practice of “esotericism,” that is, the intentional obfuscation of their theories so only professional philosophers would be able to understand what was being said. There were three traditional reasons for such intentional obfuscation: (1) to protect philosophers from be accused of heresy or disloyalty to their governments and consequently suffering imprisonment, death or extradition, (2) to protect society from philosophers whose ideas might be prematurely applied or worse, abused, and (3) to create a training ground for the next generation of philosophers who would have to learn how to interpret their writings to earn acceptance.

Melzer, interpreting Strauss, suggests that Enlightenment philosophers dropped the practice of esotericism because they believed that religion and religious institutions were liabilities for not only science but social justice and social progress; they believed that real progress could be made across the social spectrum, and that scientific progress and technology, applied to production, were just the beginning. Politics and economics could be improved with better ideas, by applying the way of thinking in science to social issues. Social justice was possible. Progressive thinking meant applying new ideas. Sometimes, in fact, this worked for some, such as in the case of the American revolution and the American “experiment” with a new form of democracy. Sometimes, as with communism (Marxism/Leninism, Stalinism, and Maoism), and Hitler’s and Mussolini’s fascism founded loosely on Spencer’s “social Darwinism,” were


utter disasters for hundreds of millions of people. The result of such intrusions of philosophy into practical politics has been to create a whole generation of political philosophers that border on the suicidal, at least intellectually suicidal, according to Melzer. In a word they are very good at tearing other’s ideas down while not providing for new philosophies that are workable.

One can see similar effects when the science paradigm intrudes on the practitioners’ universe of action and discourse. Gartzke’s article cited earlier points to a failed judgment in policy, or at least a failed rationalization of policy, based on the falsified assumption underlying the observation that democratic “dyads” (pairs of countries) do not make war on each other. “Making the world safe for democracy” seemed to be feasible by making all countries democratic. The old argument of realism vs. idealism, the national interest vs. the human species interest, seemed for once to break down, as the ideal of a global democratic order, the “new world order” or world government ideal, seemed to be in the national interest if it meant peace, justice, and liberty. Gartzke’s finding that it is capitalist economic development, not democratization, that brings about peace, not only would seem to obliterate that hope (and policy) but also the Marxists and socialists, and for that matter, the welfare state.

Yet the point here is that neither the scientist nor the philosopher are disciplined by “politics on the ground” as it were. Political practice tends to throw both types of elegant argument into confusion if not chaos, in the detailed day to day world of political competition. Lasswell once quipped that all politics is about the redistribution of values; those who get the most are called “elite,” the rest “mass,” so politics in the end is about elite-mass relations.7

The same can be said when practitioners intrude into the realms of science and philosophy. Consider the current US President’s restriction of stem cell research to only stem cell lines in existence at the signing of the law—clearly a flawed policy both regarding science and philosophy. Consider the struggle for the control of Mideast oil, both prices and distribution, bring US troops to Iraq, but rationalized in national security terms (WMD presence or imminent further development), and philosophically rationalized as a war of liberation that would bring democracy to Iraqi people for the first time—a fairly clear example of public policy confabulation.

It would appear that paradigm overreach is ubiquitous and an ever present danger in the struggle for intellectual influence across disciplines. Perhaps the most appropriate form that cross paradigm fertilization can take is the use of each others products, with care, tentatively, especially when implying some remarkable change in policy, theory, or values.

Well, students, that’s all the time I have for these notes. See you Thursday.