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**Reframing the Meaning of Democracy:
The Globalization of Democratic Development, Viewed through the
Paradigms of Political Science, Political Practice and Political
Philosophy¹**

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Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War and rise of the USA to *de facto* preeminence, “framing” or contextualizing democratization has become exceedingly important to global politics and culture as governments seek to adjust strategies to reshape and stabilize new relations. Practitioners of politics, political scientists, and political philosophers, however, continue to speak past one another, not substantively engaging each other in dialogs connecting the theory, historical data, and normative or cultural contexts through which democratic development is presented. I suggest three interrelated reasons for this conundrum: (1) there are three major and three minor paradigms operative in this global “multilog,” each of which serves different functions in society, (2) the three major paradigms (political science, political practice, and political philosophy) each implicitly assume and are grounded in information

categories that the other two normally address as objects of critical inquiry; and (3) those adopting a given paradigm generally put their faith in it and its products, creating an implicit distrust of the others. Specifically, scientists are grounded in their research subculture; practitioners implicitly assume theories to produce models of what is possible, likely and changeable; and philosophers take their data as given. Thus unrecognized in the debates are different purposes, modalities of reasoning, and faith-based disagreements. By uncovering the paradigmatic bases for miscommunication surrounding discussions of globalization and democratic development, a basis for more meaningful dialog can be laid, dialogs through which practical, philosophical, and scientific issues can be addressed in a more useful manner.

Introduction

Current discussions of the nature of democracy, democratic development, forced democratization, and related implications for international conflict, competition, cooperation, and globalization in a unipolar system, constitute quite hotly contested territory. Political scientists, political practitioners, and political philosophers differ widely among each other regarding the theories, the data, and the subcultures to which they relate. Beyond those dimensions of diversity, however, the way in which issues are framed suggests that a much needed meta discourse is needed, one that acknowledges deeper awareness of fundamental assumptions about the motivations and worldviews of the participants. Political practitioners, for instance, are deeply concerned with political stability security and survival of their domain of responsibility, evaluating their alternative strategies, and not on the basis of logical

consistency and conformity to other values unless those factors affect the core values of stability, security and survival. Political philosophers may hold similar core values but also embrace many other values, including skepticism about the motives, strategies and worldviews of practitioners. Political scientists are much more concerned about understanding how politics works, and divide their research between the applied in service of policy analysis and the theoretical to understand not only what exists but what might be possible. Thus in the realm of discourse about democratization, the core problem may indeed require addressing at two levels. To sort out the cacophony of competing voices regarding democracy, not only may the “democratization problematique” require a raising to conscious attention the nature of the paradigms through which the dialogs are framed, but the nature of what “democracy” means may itself require reframing across all paradigms as a result of clarifying relations between those paradigms.

Consider the following sample of issues employing “democracy,” “democratic,” “democratization” or some cognate term:

1. Does democratic development provide a comparatively sure, safe, and inspiring path for its participants to move from their current situations to a global, democratic civilization that is sustainable and inspirational?
2. What actually is meant by "democratic development?" Is there a consensus around some multidimensional facets of "democracy" in political philosophy and grounded political theory, and if not, why not,

given the several millennia of experience that humanity has had with the term in one form or another?

3. Are the enemies of democratic development simply serving their own interests in survival for themselves and their supporters, or is there something more to be said in terms of the survival of their people and culture?

4. Can democracy be forced? Is forced democratization a form of institutional entrapment, intended or not, to aid the stabilization of a system of dominance? Is it primarily a normative framework for a new form of dominance, replacing the older ones of colonization, empire, religious hierarchies, feudal systems, tribalism or "headship," and so on?²

Now, note the underlying assumptions and motivations implicit in these questions. The first question implies a complex, empirical theory inquiry requiring that judgments be grounded in inferences disciplined by empirical observation; yet the selection of evaluative criteria (low risk of failure, low threat to other values, inspirational quality, and sustainability) implies roots in a questionable political philosophy emphasizing Enlightenment rationalism's sense of progress as well as and democratic values. The second question has two parts. The first part is about the meaning of the term "democracy," and implies that there may be important unresolved if not unexplored philosophical issues concerning its meaning. The second part asks for any definition of the term to be judged historically and implies a line of inquiry that might entangle us in the debate between classical rationalism and "historicity"

(cultural relativism). The third question is transparently about political practice, implicitly offering two views of the motivations and interests of those opposing democratic development; but it takes for granted the existence of a consensus on the meaning of "democracy." The fourth is a political practice³ question, suggesting questions about the motivations and likelihood of success of those who would force democratic practices on others, but also implies both empirically and philosophically grounded understanding.

One can see that in ordinary questions, extraordinary nuances may exist, which if uninspected may become themselves sources of misunderstanding, ensnaring us in endless debates whose significance may in the end be more in political advantage than in their scientific or philosophical merit. The first task in this paper is to disentangle the paradigms operative in field, uncover their relations, and illustrate the nature of the misperceptions that produce so much stumbling. The second task is to attempt to reconstruct the meaning of "democratization" from each paradigm's perspective, illustration relations between them, then lay out a program of inquiry that takes advantage of the natural synergies between them.

A key element that tends to go *sotto voce* if not entirely unspoken is the role that faith plays in these dialogs. The commitments to the paradigms of practical politics, political philosophy and political science run deep, not to mention their personal identifications. Participants believe in what they are doing and accomplishing for themselves and for others. If one were to characterize the participants as seeking in politics "a set of meanings ... that permits one to make sense out of much, if not most, of what happen in life....,"

"to feel that one has some control over the course of events," and "a sense of personal worth, dignity, and esteem," it seems to me we would be right on the mark; *but we would also be describing precisely what motivates people for religious action.* The quotations are from Spilka, Hood and Gorsuch's (1985: 326) conclusions reviewing roughly *a quarter century of professional psychological research on religion as an attributional phenomenon.*

In the political realm, applied political philosophy took on such characteristics of religion. For instance, this is precisely how Communism came to be characterized in the west, as "a secular religion" complete with its own ontology (Marx's materialism, standing "Hegel on his head") filling the theological void.⁴ But the secularization of the impulses that had previously been contained by religious institutions, such as in fascism, nazism and other nationalist-socialist movements, did not take place spontaneously at any arbitrary point in history. Melzer (2006) interpreting and integrating Leo Strauss's voluminous philosophical and historical works, points to the 18th century revolution of Enlightenment rationalism as a war against the "kingdom of darkness" (citing philosophers at the time), referring to religious establishments and doctrines of revelation. The revolt against religious authority was premised on the belief that religious thinking stultified and oppressed philosophical skepticism and hence progress. From Melzer's reading of Strauss and others, this was a fundamental error. Quite the contrary, the practice of esoteric writing common at least since Plato's day, was shed in the mistaken belief that all esoteric writing did was protect the writers from the Inquisition and similar political struggles for power in the name of various religious ideologies, and that once philosophers were free to

speak out, a new world of progress could be ushered in. Melzer points out that "a full blown esotericism, [was] moved by the fear that society not only would harm philosophers but also that philosophic rationalism would harm society" and that "it forces readers to think and discover for themselves" (Melzer, 2006: 280).

So, in a sense, this essay is indirectly also about recovering a sense of faith. It may be that there is an existing philosophy of religion that would suit a globalized human civilization, a post Renaissance humanism such as Erasmian humanism for instance. Certainly Christian, Islamic, Hindu (to name the largest in terms of adherents) and many other philosophers whose central focus is faith, need a platform on which to approach the secular world, if for no other reason than to balance the world's current focus on terrorism and the nature of its appeals. What follows, therefore, has only limited relevance when one sees issues in this larger context. Returning to this context, I will first provide an overview of the three major and three minor paradigms (political practice, science and philosophy; and theory, data and culture, respectively), then probe each more deeply, especially in terms of how they interconnect and influence one another. I will then touch on some of the literature in each both to illustrate the functioning of the paradigms and how their process and products are often misperceived and abused. I will then sum up noting that the absence of true understanding of the politically and socially constructive roles that can be played by each fail us at critical moments essentially because we employ them with a single minded pursuit found usually in those committed by faith to a cause, almost (but not quite) as committed as any of Hoffer's "true believers."

Overview of Three Major and Three Minor Paradigms in Political Studies

To disentangle the paradigms analytically, envision three feedback loops, one connecting *theory* with *data*, one *data* with *culture*, and one *culture* with *theory*.⁵ For our purposes, permit me to venture into the realm of definition in the hopes of making my argument clearer (and presuming we need no digression to less contested territory such as the meaning of "feedback loops"). Consider *theory* as a semantic space deployed for a purpose, viz., to construct and specify models of what one thinks could become possible under particular conditions. *Theory* in this delimited sense is shaped and modified by three kinds of information: information about data, information about culture,⁵ and self-referential information, i.e., information about its own semantic rules. *Data* for our purposes, is a product of observational processes aimed at constructing and specifying a model of what is real, that is, a recording in some form of what those who did the recording thought was real at the time by some medium of observation. Data are shaped and modified by three kinds of information: theory by which information putatively about the "real" is judged in some sense credible and hence may constitute data;⁶ second, by culture through which data is given meaning and value; and third, by the observer's own semantic space, the observer's habits of thought and action relative to the construction of data.⁷ Finally, *culture* may also be considered a semantic space within which models of the desirable are constructed, specified, remembered, modified, and forgotten. To borrow from programmers' and decision analysts' jargon, culture is a collections of if__do__ statements and rationales supporting them (expectations, goals),⁸

theory is a collection of if__then__ statements, supporting assumptions and rationales, and data are if__,__(to be) statements where "if" is followed by an observation, an observation term, and a declension of the verb to be to give the observation some temporal specificity; for example, if (perception of an object), (apperceptive term) is/was/will be, and so on.⁹ In sum, *theory*, *data*, and *culture* constitute three specialized semantic spaces, each serving a distinctly different *modeling* function, to model the possible, the real, and the desirable respectively.

Three Major Paradigms. With these conceptions of theory, culture and data, we can now identify three major paradigms:¹⁰ political science, political practice (*praxis*), and political philosophy, and three minor paradigms.

1. The *science* paradigm is focused on reducing dissonance¹¹ between theory and data, more precisely between models of the possible and the real, for instance between expectation and observation. Three general strategies exist to reduce dissonance: change the data, change the theory, and rethink the application. Data can be unreliable or invalid. Theory can mislead, producing models of what is possible (expectations) that are dissonant with data. The practical application of one to the other may be erroneous. Better theory, better data, or better execution of the paradigm, or some combination of these strategies, may be sought. But note that acquiring new data here does not imply a goal to change reality. The science paradigm is essentially passive and aimed at understanding through improving both theory and observation, not simply generating facts.¹²

2. The *practice (praxis)* paradigm is focused on reducing dissonance between data and culture, more precisely between models of the real and models of the desirable. Three general strategies exist to do this: change the data by influencing reality (the real world), change the culture (beliefs, values, situational orientations), or change the relations between the two by improving the quality of performance. In this case, changing data is not passive but active, with the aim of taking action in the world to bring about desirable results. The aim is not to understand reality but rather to establish a new reality more consistent with what is desired. Changing the culture, on the other hand, means changing what is considered desirable under the circumstances. This may be short term or long term, minor or major, depending on the tolerance for dissonance. To use Parsons' framework, we may change what is preferred, permitted, prescribed, and/or proscribed, as regards both means and ends. The third strategy, changing relations between data and culture, refers to improving strategy. Within the cultural framework, some goal attainment efforts may simply be inefficient due to lack of knowledge and/or skill.

3. The *philosophy* paradigm is focused on reducing dissonance between theory and culture, between models of what is or could be possible and models of what is or could be desirable. Its aim since Socratic (zetetic) method, is to inquire into the framework of a person's or a society's self-understanding or apperception as regards its beliefs, attitudes and values, to ferret out and resolve inconsistencies and to pose hypothetical alternative frameworks that appear promising, or to think about why such

dissonance should be considered important or unimportant. As with the other paradigms, the strategies consist of considering changes in culture, in theory, or in the relations between the two. Traditionally (prior to Enlightenment rationalism¹³), philosophy was aimed neither at passively understanding politics nor actively changing political practice, but rather transcending existing political reality—inquiring about it, evaluating it, constructing alternatives to it, and passing on new understandings and emergent problems to the next generation of philosophers.

It remains to state briefly my understanding of the relations between these paradigms.

Each of these paradigms—science, practice, and philosophy--implicitly assumes a category of information that the others hold up to question as part of their normal functioning. Because each is grounded in a category of assumptions the others hold up for inquiry, conflict based on misunderstandings between them is almost inevitable unless all parties have a clear understanding of the limits to the roles each plays out on the political stage.

In particular, *political science as science does not question its own culture, that is, the norms and conditions under which it does its work*. Instead its subculture is its foundation, within which and by which investigation proceeds. At first this may appear to be a rather startling statement, but consider: volumes are written about how to do participant observation, content analysis, gathering and analyzing opinion data (from survey research to focus groups

studies to Delphi method and even formal decision strategies), communications analysis such as community power structure research and 2-step flow studies, aggregate data analysis, ecosocial and biosocial studies. Volumes are written on how to analyze collected data, ranging from grounded theory approaches (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) to hypothesis testing. Reviewing this field, it becomes clear that political science as such questions data with theory (assessing the validity of the data) and theory with data—assessing the validity of assumptions in terms of necessity and sufficiency for instance—but it does not question its practices in a philosophical, skeptical sense. Rather, it employs those practices and refines them as such employment suggests is necessary.

Political practice, unlike political science, generally does not question assumptions embedded in theory, neither in the empirical nor in the grounded theory manner of political and social science, nor in the zetetic manner of Socratic dialog in political philosophy. Theory, in the context of political practice, is belief, faith in a worldview, a constitution, an economic system. Political beliefs are something to take action on, something to be identified with. They are the ground on which data-culture dissonance is specified, becoming fact-value dissonance, which in turn is explained, managed, and reduced. Theory for the scientist is a potential source of explanation and prediction, for the philosopher a source of information about what could be possible or desirable, a basis for the construction and analysis of hypothetical value frameworks in cultures real or imagined. But for the political participant, theory constitutes the ground rules for decision making, justifying action or inaction, and is invested with commitment and one's social identity. When

they debate, for instance, politicians are engaged neither in zetetic inquiry nor scientific argument, but rather a verbal duel for the allegiance of their audience and intimidation of those whose allegiance is not swayed.

Political philosophy, unlike both science and practice, generally does not question data. Data simply are, were, or will be. From the time of Plato's cave allegory, it was the *meaning* of the data that was questioned, not the data *per se*. One questions the meaning of data as given, and may even question the grounds on which "meaning inquiry" stands, its *episteme*¹⁴ at it were. Data for the philosopher stands in the same relation to philosophy as culture does for the scientist and theory for the practitioner. Philosophers do not ask questions of data like "is Bush's approval rating 35% and falling, or 35% and rising?" but rather "why do some societies act as if approval ratings in their political discourse were important, and others not?" or "should approval ratings constitute criteria for judgment of the actions of a political leader?" The practitioner, on the other hand, would ask questions pertinent to the "authoritative allocation of values" (Easton, 1953) like "if that rating is true, what are the implications for the next election?"

Three Minor Paradigms. Theory, data, and culture are themselves paradigmatically shaped, so it makes sense to explicate their paradigmatic structures as well. The practices and beliefs related to the use of logic and mathematics constitute a paradigm for theory specification. The practices and beliefs related to the perception and recording of information from the "real world" and its related documentation and analysis constitute a paradigm for data specification. And the practices and beliefs related to maintaining a

society's culture—what Parsons (1962) referred to as the adaptive, goal-attainment, integrative and latent tension or pattern maintenance institutions, i.e., economic, political, educational, and medical and religious institutions—constitute in their normative structures the paradigm for culture specification. Thus there are systems of logic and mathematics for theory, systems of information collection and presentation for data, and systems for adapting and assisting people to live within a given culture. Each of these are "minor paradigms" in the sense that they are shaped by inputs from science, philosophy and practice into more or less ideal forms, without reference to each other. The minor paradigms attempt to contain or integrate the changes suggested by the major paradigms. Put another way, the "major paradigms" (science, practice, and philosophy) constitute methods for discovering and reducing dissonance between the products (theory, data, culture) constitutive of the "minor" ones.

Critical Paradigmatic Misperceptions

We now come to the heart of this essay. It is my contention that practitioners of each of the three major paradigms—science, practice, and philosophy—have great difficulty with each other *because each habitually assumes a category of information—theory, data, or culture—which the other sees as open to question, manipulation, and change*. Further, because they are utterly dependent upon each other, those difficulties are exacerbated by their need to work cooperatively. Philosophical criticism addressing practitioners, for instance, generally focuses on inconsistencies between practitioners' implicit theory and their actual practice, but the criticism is fundamentally

misplaced. The practitioner's mode of operation is to be responsive to constituencies' needs and to stay in office, for instance, while theory is used as a guide to pursue these purposes, not to be examined in itself, which would deflect them from their tasks. Similarly, philosophical criticism of scientists generally focuses either on the ethics of their data collection or their inability to derive normative meaning from empirical findings, when what the scientist is usually doing is to attempt to account for unexplained observations, or develop theory through interpreting observations, or test theory with observations, or assess the effectiveness (or potential effectiveness) of a policy, all the while taking for granted the culture within which science is taking place.

The practitioner, on the other hand, accuses the philosopher of pursuing dangerous or quixotic ideas, when the philosopher is simply pursuing an exercise in reason trying to flesh out new insights in an effort not to change the world but to transcend it, to as for example, "what if...?." Similarly, the practitioner will accuse the scientist of spending time and money frivolously in useless research when the scientist has no interest in limiting the focus of research to helping the practitioner pursue a particular objective. Indeed, scientists often retaliate against practitioners in the name of academic freedom, as have philosophers.

Misperception of the roles played by each paradigm leads to abuse.

Misunderstanding of each paradigm's requirements leads to unnecessary conflict, ridicule, critical misjudgments, and attacks of one sort or another,

which each finds unfair, illegitimate, irrational, and sometimes just plain preposterous if not stupid.¹⁵

I suspect that these misperceptions have had significant consequences for our political history in recent centuries, if not throughout history, since we know we have a general tendency to substitute consensus seeking for critical thinking (Janis, 1982) and to close ranks within our paradigmatic walls (Jervis, 1968). But the reason for this defensiveness isn't merely that we are psychologically predisposed to dissonance reduction (Festinger, 1957)—notwithstanding the validity of social psychological theory. An additional variable is involved. These pathologies may well be amplified by a deep misunderstanding if not ignorance, of the necessity of making assumptions to get anything done at all; and further, that granting such a necessity, we do not understand why operating within each paradigm makes us so vulnerable to attacks from within the other paradigms. Put another way, we need much more confidence in the necessity of operating within our paradigmatic limits, a much deeper appreciation of both the limits and the synergistic value of each other's paradigms as they pick up where we leave off. In short, we need greater faith in reason, in each other, and ourselves.

In an era so predisposed to rationality and inquiry, this may ring a bit hollow. After all, the Enlightenment fought against the view that sacred beliefs are beyond zetetic inquiry. Enlightenment rationalism fought more than an ideological struggle; it fought a political struggle, squarely within the *praxis* paradigm, and was as prone to overreach and misunderstanding as any other political campaign (Melzer, 2006). If my conclusion concerning how these

paradigms interlace is correct, then each in fact rests on faith that their contribution to progress is valuable because their only means of confirmation lies in the synergistic interactions they have with each of the other paradigms, interactions they neither fully understand nor trust. It is as if each should be bringing their products as gifts to the others, not in the spirit of establishing superior value or worth, but rather in the spirit of asking, how can this product of my work through this paradigm benefit you in your work through your paradigm? Unfortunately that is not often enough the case.

This completes the overview of the paradigmatic situation as I see it today. Let me now flesh the thesis out with illustrations from each of the paradigms and their interactions.

Political Science and Political Practice

Political science understands political practice today as usefully analyzed at three levels: the social system level focusing on the long term, large scale,¹⁶ the strategic dynamics of the state as the preeminent political institution,¹⁷ and the social psychological level, which explains the basics of human motivation and social behavior.¹⁸ At each level, goals and values are used to construct what Weiner named *cybernetic* or steering processes.¹⁹

Lasswell and Kaplan (1950, building on some earlier work by Lasswell, 1936), suggested that those values numbered eight, four attribute or "welfare" values: wealth, well-being, skill and enlightenment; and four relational or "deference" values: power, affection, respect and rectitude. They suggested

that these values could well be universal, that is, pursued by all societies for all known history.²⁰ Table 1 below, provides policy examples.

Table 1. Lasswell's Values and Domestic and International Politics

Individual values (Lasswell)	Domestic policies	International policies	International order
Wealth	Employment, progress	Worker migration policies, trade	WTO, UNDP, IMF, World Bank
Well-being	Health care	Aid	WHO
Skill	Technology, training	Technology transfer	Communications and travel regimes
Enlightenment	Education	Peace Corps	UNESCO
Power	Police, courts	Military preparedness	Alliances, UNSC
Affection	Marriage	Special relationships (US-UK, US-Israel)	International integration
Respect/Rectitude	Religious liberty, morality	Anti-genocide policies	UN actions against genocide

But to what ends? For what purposes? Maslow (1943) suggests that there are five basic human purposes and that these are also universally pursued when conditions for their pursuit exist. They are the familiar (in order of priority given a significant threat): survival, security, community (belongingness, identity), self-esteem, self-actualization. The goals are both individual and collective since human beings are social creatures. Table 2, below, provides policy examples.

Table 2. Maslow's Hierarchy and Policies of States

Basic Needs	Domestic policies	International policies	International order
Physiological/ Survival	Welfare policy	Disaster aid	UN millennium goals
Safety/Security	Civil law	Border security, military preparedness	Security Council
Community/ Belongingness (love)	Patriotism	Democratic peace	Communitarianism
Responsibility/ Respect (Self-esteem)	Presidential decorum	Reputation for truth and fairness	UN decorum (reaction to oil for food scam)
Fulfillment Self- actualization	Vision for country, democratic faith	Collective security, social justice	Spread democracy

Common to all levels of political analysis and throughout history from Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* to the present, is the problem of human survival, and in particular the problem of physical violence, its use and abuse. In some ways, the study of politics is about studying the socialization of violence. The various discussions today of unipolarity, forced democratization, state and non-state terrorism, the use of the state to address disasters, potential or real, natural or man-made, aim at how to produce and/or distribute or redistribute values to meet threats (cf. Lasswell and Easton previously cited); all have at their core questions about how, when, where, to what degree, and to what purpose violence will be used or not to address a survival or security issue. Thus, politics is about controlling change in the social world, specifically controlling and if possible expanding the realm of resources available to societies and controlling the distribution of values generated from those resources to satisfy basic needs of survival and security.

Of course, politics can and does focus on higher purposes in Maslow's sense. Community building and defending, binding peoples together by common identity and purpose, for example. And within such a broadened framework, there are myriad studies about political competition among substate actors for the same values that mean survival and security in social system context (e.g., competition for jobs, recognition and so on). And for those few who manage to be top level political, economic, religious leaders and philosophers, top level researchers and advisors, politics is also about purpose at the

grandest level, organizing and influencing whole societies—or sabotaging them—for the sake of their own will and viewpoints.²¹

From ancient traditions to the present, the creation and management of political systems has been attributed variously to transhuman powers, usually nature or gods and their interventions in human history. Both eastern and western traditions have gradually changed the content of their beliefs, moving from beliefs about natural forces to more anthropomorphic forces and then to beliefs reflecting the empowerment of humans over their own destinies, and either over others or over themselves. *The function of such beliefs was and is to create reliable control relations between and within people through a wide variety of group identities and rationales.* As Easton (1953) put it, a political system's defining function is the "authoritative allocation of values," where authority refers to legitimate power and power to coercive influence.²²

Empirical Democratization Literature: Theory and Research, or Political Religion?

Now, democratization is currently the leading, global candidate for structuring global governance in our unipolar global system.²³ Many studies conducted cross nationally are essentially empirical efforts to evaluate the suitability of democratic structures for adoption worldwide, by examining the impact of democratic structures on such different dimensions of political and social life as economic development, state terrorism, and international conflict.

Recently for example, Drury et al. (2006) in a cross national, over time study find that democracy appears to dampen the effects of corruption on economic

development, essentially controlling political corruption to a level below which it could do significant economic damage. Rummel (1997) has amassed evidence that the more totalitarian a government, the more it kills its own population to survive (he estimates about a quarter billion people in the last century), and that democracies are least likely to kill their own people. Bennett (2006) argues from empirical evidence that the democratic peace hypothesis, when compared with the "similar government types" hypothesis, still accounts significantly for more peaceful relations between states than do autocratic states.

There is another facet to the democratic peace literature that should be mentioned at least in passing. Anderson (1997) questions the inference that if democracies don't make war on each other, they might also be likely to align their foreign policies similarly. After reviewing Mideast foreign policies during and after the first Gulf War, Anderson suggests that it was the less democratic countries that supported the US policies in the Gulf war, and that the more democratic countries supported Saddam Hussein.

In fact, the more democratic an Arab regime, the more likely it was to support Iraq. Only quasi-democratic Egypt took the predicted stand in supporting the coalition. For the rest, it was the authoritarian Gulf monarchies and Syria that were the stalwarts of the American-led coalition, while the recently liberalized regimes of Jordan, Yemen, Tunisia, and Algeria supported Iraq.

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For both policy makers and international relations theorists, the conclusion that domestic democratization complicates foreign policy making may be discomfoting. As Michael Hudson has suggested, "There is some plausibility in the realist view that American interests are better served by undemocratic Arab regimes, on the grounds that authoritarian rulers could pursue regime interests without the distraction of unruly and unfriendly public opinion."

. More recently, Epstein et al. (2006) find evidence that countries moving to relatively high levels of per capita income really do transition to more democratic forms of government.

These nuances aside, there is a more fundamental, paradigmatic question to raise. Are the examples of empirical political research just cited firmly embedded in the tradition of political science, or are they an arm of political practice? Ish-Shalom (2006), examining the influence of Rostow's empirical work on Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, suggests that because contemporary political research has policy value, it crosses over and thus commits the researcher to a moral, hence *praxis*, as well as to scientific discipline.²⁴ The same may also apply here to the research on democratization. But on what do answers hinge? Is it a question of motivation of the researcher, or the usefulness of the product (e.g., reasonably verified theory), both, or neither? Is it a question of "objectivity," reproducibility (are non-reproducible results not objective, and are reproducible results always objective), or something else, perhaps the mere fact that a result is useful to some faction and not to others, with the resulting

laudatory and accusatory propaganda? Scholars have chewed on this issue for some time and become embroiled in "fact-value" arguments, postmodernist and historicist debates with both the empiricist and theorist camps, with the hypothesis-testers versus the grounded theory folks—with retrenchment to exhaustion and very little if any resulting consensus. Listening to these debates over the past four decades of my academic career, I suspect this problem is actually a religious one, in the sense that it is a matter of faith, not reason. The arguments are there, all laid out, each starting with assumptions that are no more "provable" than the classic religious convictions held by their believers to be revelations. Yet this assessment also falls short because it implies that the effort to develop science is a flawed as the effort to impose religion. Yet any conceptual framework *can* be imposed with sufficient indoctrination and coercion, but this has to do with the management of insecurities—personal, political, philosophical, and experiential—not with the western basis, religion if you will, for consensus through reason. Let me approach this issue from a different angle of attack altogether.

For the leading power in a unipolar system, a requisite for a sustainable and successful foreign policy may well be a clear vision of means and ends, a vision that details the means and counts the costs of democratization, and also details the ends and counts the benefits of democratic development.²⁵ But that is not enough. It is just as vital that a complex idea be transformed into a belief that grips hearts and minds of followers and leaders alike, that elicits not only pragmatic acquiescence but inspires faith for the future. In a globalizing era, such a faith needs to be widely shared by opinion leaders

worldwide, if the system is to have some chance of being stabilized. Deneen (2005) argues that the US at least indeed does have a "democratic faith."

Now, Deneen argues that American democratic faith should be changed into a "democratic pragmatism" as an antidote for democratic faith, noting that illiberal excesses in democratic practice might reasonably be explained by the zealotry associated with faith that blinds one to realities. But in making this argument he shifts paradigms, from that of grounded science as an historian, to that of critical philosophy as a commentator on values and ethics. That is perfectly all right, *but it illustrates how a shift in paradigm can produce misinterpretation and confusion*. By drawing attention to his critical perspective, he substitutes philosophy (in this case, evaluation informed by theory) for political practice (existing culture) as a guide to policy making. Specifically, he has no empirical basis to demonstrate that the *absence of faith* would lead to, and only to, curbing "illiberal excesses in democratic practice," no empirical example of what has happened elsewhere. By contrast we might hypothesize that it is the faith associated with a belief, not its pragmatic justification or logical reconstruction, or its grounding in scientific research or its testing by experience, that gives people their courage to press on, to rally support, to sustain themselves against severe opposition.²⁶ I don't fault him for this thesis. First, he may be right. Second, such inferences are common practice in our profession. I'm simply pointing out that it's a good example of how easily we shift paradigms without even noticing.

Deneen is not alone in characterizing American democracy as a faith. There is ample evidence that the American "founding fathers" were for the most part

themselves not only religious and viewed their new republic as a God-given opportunity, but saw to it that built into the American Constitution would be not merely grudging tolerance for religious practices, say in the tradition of compromise in democracies, but rather a positive liberty for every person to practice a religion, or to practice none at all, as each individual saw fit (Meacham, 2006). In the same vein, Schumpeter's (1950) assessed Communism as a religion, as did Lifton (1968, 1970). It wasn't the science behind Marx's arguments or logical construction that emboldened; it was the hope in the promise of Communism, coupled with a reasoned disparagement of Judeo-Christian religious traditions that explained and justified the Marxist alternative. Marx, and Lenin (1913) of course, viewed Marxism as an antidote to religion, all religion, seeing in their work a true scientific theory and antidote to the "opiate of the masses." Marx himself opined that the past "...tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living" (Marx, 1852), referring to religious traditions.

The current concern with terrorism makes this point all too well. Pitted against the seemingly inexorably coalescing trend towards global democracy is the seemingly immovably rigid vision of a religiously rationalized totalitarianism, exemplified by *al Qaida*. Have we proponents of democracy argued as forcefully as *al Qaida* does against the excesses and even depravity of the power elites upon whom we depend? What some realists see as flaws, for instance, unavoidable necessities and bitter truths, paradoxes and ironies, *al Qaida* sees as hypocrisy, oppression, and intentional domination. Unless the proponents of democratic development can fight as successfully on the battlefields of faith and social justice, a perpetual war between the

advantaged and disadvantaged in the world appears almost inevitable.

Huntington (1996) may turn out to be right, albeit for the wrong reasons.

There is an analogous lesson in the fate of Communism. What did it take to bring Communism down? Was it only strategic use of American economic and military power? Consider that a minority of American intellectuals who had adopted Marx and Marxism as their own following the 1917 revolution, did not give up on Marxism even in the face of uncovering the infamous gulags of torture and enslavement in the USSR. Those who "spoke truth to power," that formerly coalesced around yesteryear's Marxism-Leninism, today have only the shattered remains of Soviet power to look to, power that deformed into Mafia-like economic structures replacing regional Communist parties in the now defunct Soviets. What it seems to have taken to bring down the "evil empire" was a combination of sustained, widespread and deep official corruption in the USSR, complete economic failure, and a leader who was willing and able to fight corruption, establish policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, and was hopeful beyond hope that reform was possible.

Gorbachev saved Russia from a bloodbath but not his Communist Party from the "ash heap of history" (Reagan, 1982). As Gorbachev (2005) himself said, he didn't expect the inflexible habits of generations of bureaucrats and Soviet thinking to blind them to the necessity of making basic changes. What Gorbachev found was at its core, a bankrupt faith born of bitter experience, at all levels of Russian society.

One can extend the examples. China, for example, no longer vies for control of Communist ideology with Russian party theorists, but rather struggles with

the far more pragmatic problems attendant to capitalist competition and political self preservation, so far more successfully than did the USSR. North Korea, among the last bastions of independent Communism, is headed by a leader who self-admittedly has little knowledge of his father's *Juche* philosophy and who struggles to maintain some degree of autonomy from an international economy clearly threatening to overwhelm his Communist Party's stranglehold over its people.²⁷

More generally, political observers and analysts who sympathize with the masses of impoverished peoples worldwide have few credible alternative belief systems or worldviews to which to turn. For better or worse, democratic faith is seen as captured by the hegemon. Surprisingly, what remains influential as a competitor for democratic development philosophy are the traditional religions and some religious organizations, usually dismissed by their critics as not altogether unwilling dupes of authoritarian hierarchies.

Political Philosophy and Democratic Political Practice

Let me offer this definition as a starting point: let us consider philosophy as a cultural practice of constructing, examining and questioning our theories about (1) what is possible in "reality" (as conventionally understood), (2) what is desirable in cultural practice (political, social, religious, economic,...), and (3) discussing how and whether to transcend the inevitable dissonance between the resulting models of what is possible and the desirable. The practice of philosophy is not generally disciplined by the search for or the creation of data, nor by the problems faced by those who are so disciplined, the political

scientists and political practitioners of the world. For the philosopher, the data of the world are given, assumed, rooted in conventional wisdom.

To recognize, much less develop, a useful, grounded²⁸, well reasoned theory of democracy compatible with a globalized, humane society, one needs both a framework of ideas and a faith in the enterprise itself. I will rough out that theory here, but certainly not complete it. Historical experience interpreted by reason and existing social science theory gives us some, if not all, of the tools we need; but any effort to employ them for such a project implies a faith in the value of the project itself. Why else would one even try? Granted, political pundits, philosophers and political scientists all agree that the democracy *problematique*²⁹ is for multiple reasons a core problem area for our global civilization. But, should that problem be approached systematically, philosophically, empirically, and "constructively" (referring to creativity in political practice) in an effort to find a durable, if not permanent framework? Should we be searching for one that spans cultures and technologies, that transcends the limits of our historical context and gives us hope for a better future than we otherwise would have had if we did not make such an effort?

The judgment of much postmodern philosophy is no, the problem should not be approached in that way at all, but rather historically, in terms of contemporary, material existence, and realistically in terms of contemporary problems and possibilities. The focus on historical context frees us from such quixotic searches for eternal or transcendent truth. Further, the recognition that our ideas are intimately embedded in and grow out of our extant cultures is applauded as an antidote to the kind of cultural myopia that produces "false

consciousness" and lends itself to such abuses as legitimating racial, religious, gender, and other forms of discrimination and social injustice.

Against these assertions, Melzer (2006), interpreting Strauss, lays at the feet of historicist philosophy a kind of arrogance that is at once anti-religion and anti-science, yet paradoxically seeks transcendence—though they would eschew that term—in bridging the gap between theory and practice, between reason and history as sources of knowledge, a project that begins in the Age of Reason and takes off in Enlightenment rationalism. Integrating Leo Strauss's multifaceted works, Melzer analyzes the roots of historicism (cultural relativism) in excruciating detail and concludes that postmodernists subscribing to historicism have painted themselves into a corner, into a self-destructive, dead-end that only now is becoming obvious. It would seem that we are at the terminus of a trans-millennium dialectic spanning Plato, Socrates and Judaic religions on the one hand, representing reason and faith, and modern science and historicist philosophy—cultural relativism and postmodernism in all its flavors—at the other, contemporary end. Melzer offers an historical explanation for the causes of historicism, detailing Strauss's theory of esotericism. The reasoning is that philosophers intentionally obfuscated their philosophical writing for millennia, up through the Age of Enlightenment, for three reasons: to protect themselves from societies' wrath for entertaining politically dangerous thought; to protect societies themselves from the misapplication of their ideas, essentially to create a barrier between society and philosophy; and third, to preserve their ideas and philosophical methods for future generations by writing in such a way as to cultivate independence of thought in the reader.

Enlightenment Rationalism, Progress, and Faith

The loss of esotericism as a tradition with its emphasis on an unbridgeable gap between theory and practice, "the philosopher and the city," occurred during the Age of Enlightenment. Frustration with political and religious authority occasioned a break with the past by many philosophers who now saw gaps between theory and practice, reason and history, as both intolerable and bridgeable. In short, it was the dawn of hope for progress through applying the philosophers' culture of reason rather than religion's reliance on authority and revelation, to guide political and economic change in the world. The philosopher had come into the city. Political-economic reality could be approached with reason, with the hope of improving the quality of life for all. Philosophers should no longer be content to mask their truths, subservient to power, for the sake of their careers or for avoiding social upheaval, or for preserving philosophic method for the next generation. They could and should take on more politically active roles than merely acting as mouthpieces for their political, economic, religious or military elites. In the modern vernacular, they should "speak truth to power" and embrace and live in material reality rather than in their proverbial ivory towers. Historicism's flip side of "every mind" being a "prisoner of its times" is that you can define progress as improving the prison by approaching reality with reason and struggling for change.

What is particularly interesting to me about Melzer's analysis is that it lays bare the rifts between philosophical and religious thinking at many levels, one

of which is the idea of progress and its motivational companion, hope. He pits both Enlightenment rationalism and western science against both religious revelation and cultural relativism or historicism; and no less importantly, he analyzes the opposition of revelation (religion) and historicism.

[Strauss] traces the historicist *imperative*—the *need* to see reason as imbedded in history—largely to a reaction against the political dangers that resulted when philosophers abandoned esoteric restraint in favor of crusading Enlightenment rationalism. More ultimately, he traces it to the modern effort to combat "the kingdom of darkness" through the denial of all transcendence, including that of theory over practice.

This is not merely a philosophical debate but is at its core also a political one.

As Melzer concludes:

Modern thought is built on the...hope that by its success in transforming, enlightening, and disenchanting the world and by its continual progress in explaining the kinds of things that it can explain, all testimony to or experience of the kinds of things that it cannot explain will simply wither away. The world of traditional society, with its spirits, gods, and poets, will simply disappear, refuted by history. In short, modern thought hopes to legitimize itself precisely through the obliteration of pretheoretical experience.

Melzer, 2006, 293.

However, what appears to be somewhat peripheral to the debate—although he might disagree with me here—is the idea of precisely what constitutes progress. For Plato it was the predisposition or tropism of material and social reality to approach the ideal. For the postmodernist or historicist it would be a much more personal effort, less "theoretical" and more "committed," to actively influence social change to align reality with reason where reason is historically imbedded; all transcendent notions would just wither away. For (western) religions, progress would be to increasingly adapt one's culture to the creator god's revealed will. For science it would be furthering knowledge and understanding of the social and material world, presumably learning thereby to exercise greater control over human destiny. But what makes these notions of progress inherently antithetical? Why the acrimony in the diversity of views? And why, with philosophers "unleashed" as it were, is there such a struggle for intellectual and often material, political ascendance?

My basic conclusion regarding democracy is that at the core of democratically constructed politics is a profound respect for individuals—for their intellect, their needs, and their participation in community power structures. Details as to how such respect is manifested may vary considerably across cultures and over time, but the core empirical tests should be (1) the degree to which the threat and use of physical force is employed to obtain compliance with what Easton called the "authoritative allocation of values" (Easton,), and (2) the degree to which political communication structures encourage communication between individuals across all levels of society and employ the

communication content in decision making processes, with the end of both preserving society and the legitimacy of its decisions.

As briefly discussed earlier, Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) developed an empirical theory of values quite compatible with Parsons and other sociological structuralists, one which is compatible with a theory of democracy based not simply on abstract and hypothetical rights or transcendent ideals, but also on human satisfaction. The essential idea is that the stability of a political culture depends on the ability of a to satisfy the basic needs of their members. Increasing social justice means to reduce social stress, the gaps between the goals and aspirations of people on the one hand, and their material achievement of those goals and aspirations. A democratic society promises to deliver a satisfactory level of social justice, and does so. This is the fundamental expectation: respect for people, realized in the promise and practice of social justice.

By contrast, political systems traditionally organized into hierarchical deference structures are a social adaptation to environments that present individuals and social groups with a scarcity of means to attain ends (i.e., Maslow's checklist of universal basic needs), and hence are coercive and untrustworthy in practice. The specific reasons for the distrust are not hard to find. Anyone involved in hierarchical structures knows they characteristically employ coercion, fear of deprivation, to motivate both compliance and competition.

Democracy in this sense is anti-hierarchical at its core. Contrast this meaning of democracy with more traditional ideas such as Lenin's. Lenin (1905) remarked that "...the very word "democrat", both by its etymology and by virtue of the political significance it has acquired throughout the history of Europe, denotes an adherent of the sovereignty of the people." But what constituted "sovereignty" of the people for Lenin was a small elite, the vanguard of the proletariat, that would guide them into the ultimate ideal world of communism. Like many an ideology in the 19th and 20th centuries, the term democracy was used not to convey respect for people and the satisfaction of their needs in the here and now, but rather an ideal whose time would come eventually, but which would require obedience to authority and concomitant suffering in the here and now. Recall one of Marx's most famous quotations:

People make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.

Marx was of course referring to religious traditions, the "opiate of the masses," but he may as well have been referring to the Russian people's nightmare under communism.


This aspect of democracy creates problems for conventional democratic theory in the west, since hierarchy is embedded in all democratic legislative, executive and judicial institutions. So far in our institution building, the antidote to the negative side effects of hierarchical governance structures, and to hierarchically structured decision making in general, has been to

structure multiple hierarchies in limited, permanent competition for ascendancy—the "separation of powers" logic. As Ben Franklin quipped: democracy is a terrible form of government; I just don't know of any better. As with most theories, this one is a work in progress. Perhaps the solution may come, from all places, from corporate executive leadership theory along the lines of Wheatley (1992), one of the many new leadership authors who emphasize servant leadership, nonlinear thinking, and adapting to permanent change.

A Simple Model of Effective Democratic and Undemocratic Practice

The essence of this conception of democracy is diagrammed below and stated in the form of a series of interrelated hypotheses.

Diagram 1. Political Stability, Social Justice, Repression and Fear



where **pS** - political Stability, **SJ** - Social Justice, **R** – Repression, and **Fear** - fear of further repression. There are two feedback loops, the **pS-R-SJ** *democratic loop*, and the **pS-R-Fear** *undemocratic loop*.

The hypotheses are:

1. The more social justice, the greater political stability.
2. The more political stability, the less repression.
3. The more repression, the less social justice.
4. The more repression, the more fear.
5. The more fear, the more political stability.

"Social justice" was characterized earlier as low social stress. Take each and every one of Maslow's list of five basic needs. For each envision a goal state, an actual value, and a "drift" state, i.e., individuals' perceptions of where they and their society are headed unless some intervention occurs to change its speed and/or direction. The less the gap between the goal and actual states, the less likely people are to feel frustrated. The smaller the gap between expectations ("drift") and their goals, the less likely they are to feel alienated. Generally, the less frustrated and alienated people are, the greater their sense of social justice, for themselves and for each other. The same basic structure can be duplicated at each level of social organization or for each group with which people are identified.

One can envision two distinct processes, one driven by social justice, the other by repression and fear. The less political stability in any society, the more likely is some degree of repression. In societies where there is a strong reaction to repression as reducing social justice, repression strategies fail and political stability worsens. But in societies where the reaction is primarily to fear repression, repressive strategies work to stabilize the government. At the same time, however, when stability is achieved through repression, people's sense of social justice declines. At some point, the negative impact on social justice may override fear, resulting in riot, revolution and mayhem depending on circumstances. Democratically constructed societies are those with much stronger social justice loops or dynamics than fear dynamics.

This notion of democracy, focused not on institutions of representation as such, may seem relative to the latter, somewhat dangerous. Bearing in mind,

however, the composition of social justice, across all five of Maslow's basic needs theory, I submit it has the following advantages: (1) it is cross-culturally understandable and intuitively plausible; (2) in a normative sense, it holds political communities to a higher standard of performance in terms of meeting peoples' basic needs, than the standard structural approaches would, hence would seem more ethically grounded; and (3) ideologically, it is clearly the enemy of repression and fear in political life. On the negative side, considering Lasswell's definition of the politicization of social relations as the introduction of severe threats to important values. If democratization means the weakening of the fear factor in politics then its success in world politics would indeed imply the demise of politics and we'd be faced with a delicious irony, a true withering away of the state that is compatible with the aphorism that government that governs best, governs least, or as Lao Tzu said in the obverse: the more rules and regulations the more thieves and robbers.³⁰

Conclusions

We covered a great deal of ground in this short essay—fundamental paradigms of science, philosophy and political practice, the nature of theory, data, and culture, the evolving history of political philosophy's role in political practice, and implications for democratization. The confusion of paradigms, it was contended, results in considerable misunderstanding among researchers, analysts and practitioners, and a misuse of each of their products by each other. What democratization means in research, in philosophy and in practice are all quite different, and each field has its own problems and concerns that by and large are not shared by the others. Given this situation, I struck out on

a different path, one more futures oriented than concerned with contemporary debates, and proposed a conception of democratization that was value oriented rather than structural in nature. A simply four variable dynamic model of political stability consisting of two loops, one in which political stability is attained through meeting social justice expectations and reducing repression, and the other attaining political stability through increasing repression and fear. Both loops assume that governments' reaction to increasing instability is to increase repression. But those societies in which the pursuit of social justice is both more effective and have a stronger social justice response than a fear response to repression control their governments' repressive tendencies. Vice versa, those that respond primarily with fear do not, and actually reinforce that tendency rather than dampen it. Perhaps a focus on modeling such dynamics in terms of empirical research, philosophical implications, and practical consequences will serve to cut through the paradigmatic problems discussed. We shall see.

Notes

¹ This paper was prepared for the 2006 World Congress of the International Political Science Association in Fukuoka, Japan, July 9-14. It is a first draft, awaiting comments for revision prior to publication. I would appreciate correspondence at my email address, chadwick@hawaii.edu. Some very controversial subjects are addressed here: democratic theory, faith, philosophy of science and of politics, colonization, globalization and their interrelations. Constructivists, historicists, and postmodernists may react negatively from the first paragraph, on; and they'd have some justification since, as will become apparent, I consider myself (borrowing Melzer's term) a fledgling post-historicist (Melzer, 2006). Normally I simply "mind the store" doing my "conventional research" (Kuhn, 1962) on global modeling and foreign policy; but a philosophical concern I've kept in the background (except when teaching political science research methods classes¹) finally has burst my complacency, ripened by the "globalization *problematique*" as that *problematique* itself has ripened in the 21st century. The initial concern in my college days was framed by my perceptions of the science-religion gap and C.P. Snow's two cultures thesis (Snow, 1959, 1993). The postmodernists were coming into their own yet depressed as much by their own frameworks as the Cold War, the Vietnam War and Watergate. Cultural relativism, historicism, and poststructuralism in a postcolonial world were shorn up with the poetic applications of quantum uncertainty, the implications of a new cybernetics focused on action theory and the idea of self-referential systems

producing nonlinear, purposive, intelligent choice, and new mathematics for catastrophe, chaos, and constructivist theory. Rational choice theory took a new twist especially with Saaty's mathematical modeling of irrationality in analytic hierarchy (and later, analytic network) processes (Saaty, 1999, 2001). Absorbing all this while earning a reputation as a quantitative political analyst, created in me a massive intellectual indigestion, pushing me to search for or construct a new paradigm within which these competing "islands of theory" (as Guetzkow would say) could be bridged. My career—after brief research work with the Yale Political Data Program, Harvard's Center for International Affairs (now Weatherhead...), and an offshoot of RAND (System Development Corporation or SDC and later, Unisys)—took me to the University of Hawaii's Political Science Department, which earned a well deserved reputation in the 1970s and 1980s for extreme eclecticism as it gave academic shelter (tenure) to Marxists, gay rights activists, many DARPA supported researchers, constitutional constructionists for Pacific island countries, European integration theorists, as well as a core of postmodernists and so on; now it is almost single-handedly creating a new subfield in the profession, indigenous politics. I owe this cacophonous mix of academics and ephemeral pundits a great deal for celebrating rather than constraining diversity, and keeping me motivated to resolve the inner conflicts and confusions that for a time pushed me to salvage as many students as I could for mainstream international relations research. But to two dead colleagues—Karl W. Deutsch, my mentor from the Yale and Harvard days, and Philip E. Jacob, an integrationist and Quaker pursuing world peace—and to two colleagues abroad—Barry B. Hughes and Thomas L. Saaty—I own more than

I can say for inviting me to persist, and to our Department chair, Jon Goldberg-Hiller who gave me an intellectual version of the proverbial "hotfoot" which I needed to enter into this philosophical fray. Finally, to Arthur Melzer whom I have yet to meet in the flesh, but to his most recent work in the APSR, I owe a great deal for opening my eyes to Leo Strauss's theory of esotericism and the penumbra of ideas he weaved together, which gave me precisely the framework within which this essay could be completed—an essay I began in 1974 but could only be finished today.

² These core questions address values such as social justice and collective purpose, understanding, and the use and abuse of power by leadership groups. Any one of them—not to mention other questions addressing other values—have already occupied many books and articles, which by academic norms certainly deserve attention as these issues are raised here. Thus I must preface this essay with an apology to all those whose work I know but will not reference here, not for lack of respect or interest but simply because the task is overwhelming in its volume and complexity relative to the size and scope of this essay. What I have chosen to do here is simply to outline the key points of my argument concerning paradigms and core concepts of democracy, then illustrate them with a few examples.

³ The term *praxis* is sometimes used; *praxis* is a German word and refers to the practice of some art or skill, as we would use the word practice, such as in "a doctor's practice." Except where it is occasionally needed for clarity, I will use the more familiar term, practice.

⁴ See, for instance, Lifton's (1968, 1976) text on the Chinese Cultural Revolution.

⁵ Visually one can form a triangle with theory, data, and culture at the corners and the feedback loops forming the sides. We can also envision closed loops around each corner to indicate self-referential dynamics, i.e., or self-modification of theory, data, and culture, and finally construct a tetrahedron with a fourth point labeled transitions, to denote moving from one paradigm to another.

⁶ It should not be surprising to affirm that theory is required to validate data. As Dator would say, any technology sufficiently advanced would appear to be magic. We require interpretation of our sensory input in order to understand what we perceive. Thus we cannot confirm we have data in hand until we have made it a part of our cognitive map. For instance, building on Jervis (1968) given a conflict between theory (say an accepted theory of deterrence) and “data” (such as say, a report that a nuclear attack has been launched), theory will win out, at least at first.

⁷ This is not an ontological argument for what is real, but rather for what is considered real; what is considered real is data. Whether reality changes with the effort to generate data isn't important to this theoretical structure, hence I see no need for a digression into quantum mechanics or the classic debates

among those proffering various forms of idealist, realist or conceptualist ontologies.

⁸ For example, Parsons (1962) classified evaluations of behavior into four categories: prescribed, preferred, permitted, and proscribed, depending on the relationship between the behavior to expectations of sanctions in a social context.

⁹ It is quite difficult to avoid inferences about causality and time at this point, but I'll try. Some might disagree with including in the category of "data" something that has not yet transpired, "future data" as it were. While we trust ideas about *feedback*, we don't trust ideas about *feedforward*, labeling such putative dynamics as teleological explanation, or suggesting that theory about such future data is deterministic. This isn't the place for an extended discussion of the meaning of self-referential systems, quantum uncertainty, nonlocality and nonlocal awareness, and so on. But lest the reader's perplexity regarding this footnote remain unaddressed, I refer to the large body of literature from the occult to divination and soothsaying, practices that vary as widely as in the ancient *I Ching* to nonlocal awareness research (aka "remote viewing") conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency at Stanford Research Institute (see Targ and Katra, 1998, for a thorough introduction; for a quick reference see also Dr. Hal Puthoff's (1996) essay on the web at <http://www.biomindsuperpowers.com/Pages/CIA-InitiatedRV.html>).

¹⁰ I am using the term paradigm in Kuhn's (1962) sense, essentially to refer to the specialized subculture of norms, practices, beliefs and purposes of a community.

¹¹ My usage of dissonance here is intended to follow Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance.

¹² Some years ago one of my students, Joong-ho Kim (2002), did an excellent review of measurement theory of democracy and is available on request from me, with her permission. I understand from conversations with Peter Manicas that his framing of this relationship may be quite compatible with this statement (Manicas, 2006). I envision three levels of theorizing here, one on the "plane" of theory, one on the "plane" of observation, and a third connecting the two, classically referred to as "measurement modeling," a feedback process progressively identifying particular forms of observation with measurement instrumentation and with particular theoretical terms. For a recent study on measuring democracy with a theoretical focus see Munck et al. (2002).

¹³ I am indebted to Arthur Melzer for this historical observation (Melzer, 2006), and will be discussing it later in this essay.

¹⁴ See Foucault (1980:197) who coined the term.

¹⁵ See, for instance, the critique of postmodernism by Gross et al. (1998). For all the validity of the critique of postmodernism levied in the Gross reader, it has nevertheless been the postmodernists and their predecessors (notably Marxists and third world writers) who have been the major critics of colonization and decolonization, wars and proxy wars and the gross use of military power by states against their own people. A critique focused on their misguided theory of philosophy is itself somewhat misguided because their focus, like the “muckrakers” of the last century, is an appeal to social justice, not philosophical exegesis.

¹⁶ See Hughes and Hillebrand, 2006, for an excellent overview of the global system, including a large online database and global model used by various UN agencies and the US intel community.

¹⁷ See Tammen et al. (2000), for the preeminent theory of state strategy, Organski's power transitions theory, especially regarding the causes and conditions of war.

¹⁸ For the social psychological level, refer to discussion of Festinger, Lasswell, Maslow, and Parsons in various locations throughout this article. These theorists provide commonly accepted insights and frameworks for understanding human motivation, values, purposes, and social organizations of large numbers of people into systems such as the state.

¹⁹ I refer to Norbert Weiner's *Cybernetics*, and a non-technical companion book, *The Human Use of Human Beings*.

²⁰ Based on an extended series of weekly discussions for over a year about *I Ching* philosophy and global modeling with Chung-ying Cheng (a professor of philosophy at the University of Hawaii) and Everett Kleinjans (a past president of the East West Center and professor at Hawaii Pacific University), I was able to map Lasswell's value checklist onto the eight trigrams of *the I Ching*. See Chadwick (1991). That process has given me a certain confidence that these values are good candidates for being truly universal across cultures, if not exhaustive.

²¹ I refer to the huge literature on leadership that ranges from Socrates, Plato and Aristotle to Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and so on to the present, of course, with everything from rehashing the Wes Roberts' *Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun* to Napoleon Hill's *Think and Grow Rich*, Norman Vincent Peale's *The Power of Positive Thinking*, C. Wright Mills' *The Power Elite*, Lasswell's *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*, not to mention the reasearch literature exemplified by Paige (1977) and Burns (1978). An area I have not touched on here is the writing of leaders themselves, such as Lenin's *State and Revolution*, Hitler's *Mein Kampf* or the writings of great leaders' followers such as the Christian *New Testament*. This is another huge literature, one aimed at acquiring more followers for various types of social movements.

²² Whole books have been written about the nature of power, of course. I am using one found in Lasswell and Kaplan (1950). Power as "coercive influence" limits the discussion to the nature of the state. A broader range of power bases (such as Etzioni's class categories: coercive, remunerative and symbolic) from my viewpoint encompasses too many other, nonpolitical, social control processes.

²³ Suggestive of the aphorism that "all politics is local," the argument has been made recently that all international politics is regional, that systemic unipolarity does not confer power, much less legitimacy, on foreign policies which inevitably involve bilateral and regional multilateral interactions. While this caveat has some merit, in my view it is mostly by way of encouraging careful assessment of foreign policies in their details rather than as a reassessment of the objective condition of unipolarity and its implications.

²⁴ Firestone and Chadwick (1972) wrote in some detail on this subject many years ago in the context of American civil strife research following the Watts riots. After the Watts riots, overnight there was a whole new subfield, "civil strife" research—and millions of dollars chasing it.

²⁵ The assumption that leaders with clear visions and plans are a vital component to the survival and prosperity of a state and its peoples is very commonly detailed in the leadership literature.

²⁶ The literature of science is full of such examples of faith in technology iteratively informed by science and experiment, such as the 10,000 failures it took Edison to create a lightbulb that was practical, or the use of soap in the face of disbelief in the germ theory of disease, or for that matter the sheer belief in their convictions that propelled the American revolution to an ultimate success—centuries later (I'm thinking of the Martin Luther King's faith in democracy here).

²⁷ Cuba, no less threatened by democratic capitalism, has fared only marginally better and it long ago was forced to foreswear nuclear capabilities. Myanmar would appear to believe even less in its own Communist philosophy than North Korea does in *Juche*.

²⁸ "Grounded theory" has come to mean social theory developed intuitively and inferentially from careful recording of social data (Glaser and Anselm, 1967).

²⁹ This term was introduced by the Club of Rome in the context of its first global modeling effort to indicate that the problems they were addressing were multiple, complex, and interdependent. See Meadows et al. (1972).

³⁰ Lao Tzu, *Tao Te Ching*, no. 57. Translated by Gia-fu Feng and Jane English, 1997.

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