International System Drift:
from Conflict to Cooperation

Richard W. Chadwick

Richardson's Arms Race Model as a Conflict-Cooperation Model

Recall Richardson's arms race equations? The "fear" term ("a" in the equation below) is actually something more complex that a constant or changeable parameter. It stood for conflict minus cooperation. Specifically,
                     dy = ax - by + c
should actually be
                     dy = (conf - coop)x - by + c
"Conf" or conflict, could be any indicator of conflict between nations or alliances with force capabilities x and y, diplomatic protests for instance; and "coop" or cooperation, could be any indicator of cooperation, for instance, trade. (Of course, any set of indicators should be chosen carefully and interpreted with with care in that none is probably an entirely valid and reliable indicator of overall conflict or cooperation, regarding intensity, quantity, durability or other dimensions).

Karl Deutsch's Model of Cooperation and Conflict

In most studies of international relations, cooperation has been seen as a consequence of fear, usually of anticipated conflict with some third party. "Win-win" strategies based on anticipated benefits to all are far less frequently discussed than "win-lose" (so-called "zero-sum" or "constant-sum" payoff) situations.

May years ago, Karl Deutsch proposed a relationship between conflict and cooperation, relative to the overall volume of transactions between pairs of nations. It looked essentially like this:









System Stability, Conflict, Cooperation, and Volume of Transactions

    high volume of |. modern war              modern peace .
    transactions   |
                   | . hostilities            integration .
                   |
                   |  .                                  .
                   |          system transformation
                   |    .                              .
                   |
                   |       .                         .
                   |           ordinary diplomacy
     low volume of |           .                  .
     transactions  |              .            .
                   |                  .    .
                   |_______________________________________
                    conflict     indifference   cooperation
 
Thus the more transactions the greater the likelihood that they will be disproportionally conflictful and coercive or harmonious and cooperative.

From Dominance to Cooperation Strategies

Think of the world situation today. Total volume of transactions is up between nations as compared with half a century ago. Trade as a percentage of gross national product has been on the rise for some time. The result has been a corresponding growth in international institutions to cope with the problems such transactions cause on the one hand, and to insure the stability of those transactions that are seen as mutually desirable. The previous discussion of the increase in international organization with the formation and growth in the use of IOs, NGOs, and transnational organizations such as corporations and voluntary associations, points in the direction of integration and peace rather than conflict and war as the dominant type of future international relationships.

When Lasswell first conceptualized power as coercive influence and the politicization of relations as introducing into them severe threats to important values, it was just after World War II and at the onset of the "Cold War." It was a world characterized by massive industrial development and the beginning of the atomic era. It was a time in which race, class, caste, ethnicity and religion were seen as both divisive and essential differences between human beings. To some extent we still see many of these themes echoed, for instance in the warfare in Bosnia, Somalia, Cambodia and Sri Lanka. But the dominant, world system trend is clearly towards non-industrial economic development characterized by much higher levels of mass education, communication, and functional interdependence than is characteristic of these conflicts.

We have also learned a great deal more about the nature of the human species in the last 50 years than was known before. Modern fields of genetics, cybernetics, humanistic psychology, the social sciences, and wholistic medicine have made significant inroads in how leaders of "the active society" understand themselves. There is growing respect for cultural, racial, and religious differences, based not on coercive balances of power, but on mutual understanding and acknowledged interdependence. While racism and other traditional 'isms still empower many leaders, these leaders tend to be of nation-states still dependent on coercive practices to maintain control of populations struggling with basic survival and security needs. Even there, mass media is having a far more penetrating effect than in the past on the awareness of these populations about their situation and the weakness of their leaders in a more global context. Examples of these trends are the Nobel Peace Prize being given to Arafat and Rabin for making peace in the Mideast, and the decline of Iraq under Saddam Hussein; the decline of Communism in Russia; the growth of Chinese capitalism, and the thaw in North Korean relations with both the US and South Korea following North Korea's voluntary freeze on nuclear weapons development and South Korea's lifting of the ban on trade with the North.

The Paradigm Shift from Realism to Neoidealism

It is because of these system trends that I suggest that the traditional politics of "realism" is likely soon to give way to a "new idealism" or neoidealism. The old idealisms, e.,g., Truman's containment theory," presumed that a struggle must be fought for dearly held values to usher in a vision of the future which otherwise would be very improbable (in this case, a world safe from the Communist threat). The new idealism presumes something quite different, namely that system "drift" is itself manageable, that because of the revolutions in cybernetics, communication, and the humanistic revolution in the social and biological sciences, it is becoming possible and achievable to have significant impacts on system drift or "equilibria" across a broad spectrum of social system attributes, e.g., the distribution of and level of wealth in a population; similarly with health, respect, enlightenment, and other values (see Lasswell's checklist).

Such changes would have very profound effects on what types of control strategies would work in traditional political and military arenas. Japan, for instance, is probably the first major power to give up the threat and the use of military capability to secure its own survival and security (minor powers, e.g., Costa Rica, have preceded it), not to mention higher needs (cf. Maslow). This particular decision, as with the formation of the UN, the UN Security Council, and related institutions, has been interpreted almost exclusively in the light of the Cold War and US influence. Nevertheless, it is also a harbinger of things to come. Both major powers (USA and Russia) are in the process of "downsizing" their nuclear arsenals and have taken much of the rest out of a state of readiness to bring tensions to an all-time low. China has opened its doors once again to trade. All three (Russia, China, and India) now want tradeable currencies (the Indian rupee now is) and membership in GATT, which is surprising because (a) GATT decisions are binding, and (b) China is still communist, and India is still socialist. Conflict, as a traditional realist would say, is still expected to be with us forever; but the balance has tipped in favor of cooperative rather than conflictful or even competitive strategies.

W. Edwards Deming and World Peace

It is also important to note that Japan's success with its radical and permanent downsizing of its military capabilities was accompanied not only by a US "nuclear umbrella" and naval presence, but also by a conscious decision among its economic elite to put into practice the management theories of W. Edwards Deming. Japanese industrialists and engineers have given credit to these practices for making it possible for them to achieve their survival and security needs through the international mass marketing of high quality products. By doing this, they have gained the financial power they needed to insure a stable, worldwide web of resources and markets, of production and distribution, which neither they nor any world power has been able to accomplish by force of arms, colonial management styles, or brutal domination. And they did it without having to make their suppliers or customers speak Japanese, or having to learn most of their customers' customs (except in business practice)--something which the rest of the world's major powers have yet to learn. Deming, for demonstrating "The New Economics" with the Japanese example, surely deserves the Nobel Peace Prize (his name was placed in nomination for it before he died).

Conclusion

In sum, modern scientific breakthroughs in genetics, in the social and economic sciences, in humanistic psychology, in wholistic medicine, and in technological and communications revolutions, have created a profound shift in three of the "constants" of international relations. First, it is now possible and achievable to alter system tendencies or "drift," thus making the realist paradigm obsolescent. In the past, this was thought to be generally impractical if not impossible. Second, winning strategies for goal attainment have shifted from coercive to cooperative; and the tendency is for this trend to continue because of the depth, breadth and permanence of transnational economic, financial, and other forms of cooperation. This puts a premium on stabilizing international relations and on resolving conflicts through nonviolent means. In the past, the threat and use of violence was considered a tolerable if not normal part of international affairs. Third, mass communication and education is fundamentally altering how populations perceive one another; specifically, racial, ethnic, religious, caste and class hostilities are giving way to mutual understanding among peoples and distrust of traditional leadership styles and political decision making. This tendency puts a premium on leadership that can and does negotiate rather than fight, and thinks in terms of long term, large scale effects past the leadership's own lifetime, instead of reflexively trying to maximize power short term.

None of these tendencies are permanent, of course. The very same capabilities which result in these tendencies, could be systematically organized in an attempt to use them with the old realist decision tables or norms. This option is not likely to gain sustained, widespread support, because it is both costly and has a declining likelihood of success. Traditional "realists" are likely to find themselves to be chronic losers, as indeed modern history has shown (cf. John Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War).

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Last major revision November 16, 1994; last minor revisions December 4, 1998.
Copyright 1998 Richard W. Chadwick / email chadwick@hawaii.edu