The characterizations, interpretation and labelling of these hypotheses are my own.
(9) actors tend to see the behavior of others as more centralized, disciplined, and coordinated than they are. (480) (10) because a state gets most of its information about the other state's policies from the other's foreign office, it tends to take the foreign office's position for the stand of the government as a whole. (481) (11) actors tend to overestimate the degree to which others are acting in response to what they themselves do when the others behave in accordance with the actor's desires; but when the behavior of the other is undesired, it is usually seen as derived from internal forces. If the effect of another's action is to injure or threaten the first side, the first side is apt to believe that such was the other's purpose. (482) (12) when actors have intentions that they do not try to conceal from others, they tend to assume that others accurately perceive these intentions. Only rarely do they believe that others may be reacting to a much less favorable image of themselves than they think they are projecting. (482) (13) if it is hard for an actor to believe that the other can see him as a menace, it is often even harder for him to see that issues important to him are not important to others. While he may know that another actor is on an opposing team, it may be more difficult for him to realize that the other is playing an entirely different game. This is especially true when the game he is playing seems vital to him. (483) (14) actors tend to overlook the fact that evidence consistent with their theories may also be consistent with other views.(483)
For alternative ideas about misperception, see my excepts
from
Hughes, Rapoport, and
Richardson.
Beliefs, Facts and Values - note linkage to my TDC model: Beliefs=Theory, Facts=Data, Values=Culture.
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