Under construction...

Jervis' Decision Making Hypotheses

The following fourteen hypotheses are taken from an article by Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," WORLD POLITICS, Vol. 20, No. 3 (April, 1968); reprinted in Falk and Kim, THE WAR SYSTEM (1980: Westview Press, Boulder, Col.), pp. 465-490 (page references are in parentheses).

The characterizations, interpretation and labelling of these hypotheses are my own.

Theory vs. Data (the belief-fact gap)
(1) Decisionmakers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images. A theory will have greater impact on an actor's interpretation of data (a) the greater the ambiguity of the data, and (b) the higher the degree of confidence with which the actor holds the theory. (466)
Theory vs. Theory (belief-new idea gap)
(2) Scholars and decisionmakers are apt to err by being too wedded to the established view and too closed to new information, as opposed to being too willing to alter their theories. (468)
Data vs. Data (spoon-feed new information)
(3) Actors can more easily assimilate into their established image of another actor information contradicting that image if the information is transmitted and considered bit by bit rather than all at once. (474)
Theory vs. No Theory (you need the concept to register the fact))
(4)Misperception is most difficult in the case of a missing concept and least difficult in the case of a recognized but presumably unfilled concept. (474f)
Goals vs. Data
(5) When messages are sent from a different background of concerns and information than is possessed by the receiver, misunderstanding is likely. (479)
(see also Anatol Rapoport's "The Blindness of Involvement")
(6) When people spend a great deal of time drawing up a plan or making a decision, they tend to think that the message about it they wish to convey will be clear to the receiver. (480)
(7) Actors often do not realize that actions intended to project a given image may not have the desired effect because the actions themselves do not turn out as planned.
(8) There is an overall tendency for decisionmakers to see other states as more hostile than they are. (480)

....................... work in progress...................



   (9) actors tend to see the behavior of others as more
centralized, disciplined, and coordinated than they are. (480)


   (10) because a state gets most of its information about the
other state's policies from the other's foreign office, it tends
to take the foreign office's position for the stand of the
government as a whole. (481)


   (11) actors tend to overestimate the degree to which others
are acting in response to what they themselves do when the others
behave in accordance with the actor's desires; but when the
behavior of the other is undesired, it is usually seen as derived
from internal forces. If the effect of another's action is to
injure or threaten the first side, the first side is apt to
believe that such was the other's purpose. (482)


   (12) when actors have intentions that they do not try to
conceal from others, they tend to assume that others accurately
perceive these intentions.  Only rarely do they believe that
others may be reacting to a much less favorable image of
themselves than they think they are projecting. (482)


   (13) if it is hard for an actor to believe that the other can
see him as a menace, it is often even harder for him to see that
issues important to him are not important to others.  While he may
know that another actor is on an opposing team, it may be more
difficult for him to realize that the other is playing an entirely
different game.  This is especially true when the game he is
playing seems vital to him. (483)


   (14) actors tend to overlook the fact that evidence consistent
with their theories may also be consistent with other views.(483)


 

For alternative ideas about misperception, see my excepts from
Hughes, Rapoport, and Richardson.

Beliefs, Facts and Values - note linkage to my TDC model: Beliefs=Theory, Facts=Data, Values=Culture.

References

Jervis, Robert, "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (April, 1968); reprinted in Falk and Kim, The War System. 1980: Westview Press, Boulder, Col., pp. 465-490.
Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. 1976: Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.
I created this page in 1994 and last revised it March 31, 1997.
Copyright TDC catagory framework © 1997 Richard W. Chadwick / email me at world@Hawaii.Edu
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