Aged Hawaiians v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n
78 Hawai‘i 192 (1995)
Plaintiffs: Plaintiffs' Attorneys:
  1. The Aged Hawaiians
  1. Paul Nahoa Lucas, Native Hawaiian Legal Corp.
  2. Alan T. Murakami, Native Hawaiian Legal Corp.
Defendants: Defendants Attorneys:
  1. Hawaiian Homes Commission
  2. Kali Watson, Chairman of the Hawaiian Home Commission
  3. Andrew Apana
  4. Nani Brandt
  5. Rockne Freitas
  6. Dennis Kauahi
  7. Llewellyn Kumalae
  8. Ann Nathaniel
  9. Patricia Sheehan
  10. Department of Hawaiian Home Lands
  1. Steven S. Michaels, Asst. Atty. Gen., Honolulu
  2. Girard D. Lau, Asst. Asst. Atty. Gen., Honolulu
  3. Clayton Lee Crowell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Honolulu
  4. Sonia Faust, Asst. Atty. Gen., Honolulu
  5. George K.K. Kaeo, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Honolulu
Court: Supreme Court of Hawai‘i
Opinion by: Justice Klein
Other Jurists: Court Below:
  • Moon, C.J.
  • Levinson
  • Nakayama
  • Ramil, JJ
 Third Circuit Court, County of Hawai‘i
Key laws involved:
  • Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA), 1920, § 1 et seq., 42 State. 108
  • Hawai‘i Administrative Procedure Act, H.R.S. Chapter 91
  • Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Summary:
  1. The appellants appealed the Third Circuit Court’s order granting in part and denying in part the appellees’ motion to dismiss appellant’s Second Amended Complaint. Appellants were native Hawaiian beneficiaries under the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA), which gave control of 200,000 acres of land to the Hawaiian Homes Commission (Commission). The land was categorized into three sections, which were agricultural, pastoral, and residential. In 1952, the Commission withdrew 18,000 acres of pastoral land for homesteads and awarded 48 pastoral homestead lots to applicants. The remaining land was used for general leasing.
  2. In 1987, the Commission adopted a policy, which granted pastoral land of no more than 100 acres as part of the 1987 Raw Lands Acceleration Program. The program promoted subsistence ranching. In 1988, James Akiona petitioned for a case hearing to demonstrate his abilities to commercial ranch and to contest the subsistence policy because it conflicted with the HHCA. While Akiona’s petition was pending, the Commission adopted a 10-premise guideline for the allocation of pastoral land. Akiona’s petition was denied. Akiona and the Aged Hawaiians filed a claim in the third circuit court and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Third Circuit Court granted Akiona and Aged Hawaiian’s motion to enjoin further issuance of pastoral lands until the Commission’s 10-premise guidelines complied with the official notice-and-comment provision as established in HRS Chapter 91. The Commission complied with the Third Circuit Court’s order by formally adopting a rule, which included the 10-premise guidelines (HAR § 10-3-29).
  3. In 1990, the Commission adopted the 1990 pastoral lot size plan, which withdrew additional land at Pu‘ukapu, Ka‘u, and Humu‘ula. Akiona and Aged Hawaiians filed two additional motions that sought to enjoin the Commission from granting lots under the 1990 plan and to amend their complaint. The Third Circuit Court denied Akiona and Aged Hawaiians’ motion to enjoin the Commission and granted Akiona and Aged Hawaiians’ motion to amend their complaint. Akiona withdrew from the lawsuit after the Commission’s Chairperson wrote a letter to the awardees notifying that the pending litigation sought to prevent the Commission from administering the pastoral leases. The two remaining parties unsuccessfully attempted to settle the case through mediation.
  4. The Aged Hawaiians filed another motion requesting permanent injunctive relief because the Commission violated due process rights. The Third Circuit Court granted the appellees’ motion to dismiss the appellant’s claims except for the appellant’s claim that appellees had failed to properly adopt formal procedures for contested case hearings. Additionally, the Third Circuit Court issued an order declaring HAR § 10-3-29 void for vagueness. The appellant filed a motion, seeking to reconsider the Third Circuit Court’s order. The Third Circuit Court issued an amended order, which added the primary jurisdiction doctrine as a bar to appellant’s claims. Subsequently, the appellant filed for certification of the Third Circuit Court’s amended order. The Third Circuit Court granted the appellant’s motion and the petitioner served a notice of appeal.
  5. The appellees contested the motion granting certification because the order on appeal did not dismiss any claims. The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i found the motion for certification appropriate because the circuit court had set forth specific reasons for its order and the appellant’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was severable from its unadjudicated claims.
  6. The appellant argued that the Third Circuit Court erred when it dismissed its claim that the appellees failed to provide a reasonable opportunity for the appellant to receive a sufficient amount of land for commercial ranching under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Third Circuit Court had found the claim to be barred by primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that the primary jurisdiction doctrine was an improper bar to the appellant’s claim because the issues in the case involved questions about the constitutionality of the agency’s rules and procedures, and whether the agency had overstepped its power of authority. Therefore, the agency was not authorized to answer those questions of law.
  7. The appellees argued that the appellant could not make a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the HHCA was not a federal law. The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that the HHCA was a federal law because it was enacted by Congress as a federal public trust, which was handed over to the State.
  8. The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i found that HHCA and Admission Act created a binding obligation on the State because the HHCA and the Admission Act created federal public trust. Therefore, the State, as a trustee, was bound to the common law of trusts.
  9. The appellees argued that they had made efforts to allocate land to improve conditions for Native Hawaiians pursuant to the Admission Act. However, the appellant had sought to exercise the right to a hearing as trust beneficiary of the federal public trust. The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that the appellant had the right to a hearing to demonstrate the appropriateness of a land award because the appellant’s claim was based on a valid property interest, the Commission was precluded from arbitrarily awarding land, and there were no reasonable alternatives to receive relief. The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i REVERSED the Third Circuit Court’s order dismissing the appellant’s claim under Section 1983, and VACATED and REMANDED the appellant’s breach of trust claim.