- Bramble appealed his convictions of illegal possession of eagle feathers
and several migratory birds, in addition to drug and firearm charges.
The items were discovered when undercover federal agents responded to
Bramble’s advertisement for the sale of sea otter pelts and were
invited into Bramble’s home to negotiate a purchase. Bramble asked
the agents if they were police officers and they said they were not.
When the illegal items were discovered, the agents revealed their identity
and called for backup. Two more officers entered the home and Bramble
signed a form consenting to an unrestricted search of the house. On
appeal, Defendant-appellant contended that the warrantless search of
his house was unlawful, that the district court erred with regard to
one of the agent’s reports during the suppression hearing, and
that all the statutes under which he was convicted are beyond Congress’
power under the Commerce Clause.
- Bramble contended that the search of his house was unlawful for three
reasons. First, he claimed his consent to the officer’s entry
was conditioned on them not being police officers. Since they lied when
asked directly whether they were police officers, his consent was vitiated.
The Court stated that it was well settled that police officers may misrepresent
their identity to gain entry, and that undercover work would not be
possible if police officers were prohibited from lying about their identity.
Second, Bramble argued that the warrantless, uninvited entry of the
additional officers was unlawful, and also vitiated his consent to the
search. The Court joined Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals holdings in
declaring that where an undercover agent is invited into a home, establishes
probable cause to arrest or search, and immediately summons help from
other officers, the warrantless entry of other officers does not violate
the Fourth Amendment. Finally, Bramble argued that his consent was involuntary
because one of the officers told him that if he didn’t consent,
a warrant would be obtained anyway. The Court merely agreed with the
district court’s reasoning that Bramble’s consent was given
voluntarily.
- Defendant-appellant alleged two errors on the part of the district
court at the suppression hearing regarding a redacted copy of one of
the officer’s reports. The first was that the district court should
have compared the redacted and unredacted copies of the report to determine
if any of the redacted portions were relevant and required to be disclosed.
However, the record reflects that this is precisely what the district
court did. Second, Bramble argued that the district court should have
admitted the report as substantive evidence. However, Bramble himself
could have introduced the report into evidence by calling the agent
as a witness, which he did not do.
- Finally, Bramble challenged the validity pursuant to the Commerce
Clause of each of the statutes under which he was convicted. The Court
quickly disposed of the challenges under the Controlled Substances Act
and the Felon in Possession of a Firearm Act, relying on several cited
cases. As for the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the Court noted that the
district court misspoke when it said that the Supreme Court has upheld
the validity of this Act under the Commerce Clause. In Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
Act under Article I, section 8, the Necessary and Proper Clause and
under the Article II treaty making power, as necessary to protect migratory
birds from extinction. Since the law has been upheld on that basis,
consideration of the law’s validity under the Commerce Clause
was unnecessary.
- In upholding the validity of the Eagle Protection Act pursuant to
the Commerce Clause, the Court cited four U.S. Supreme Court cases that
upheld the constitutionality of congressional efforts at protecting
endangered and migratory species pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Still,
Defendant-appellant argued that the Act has nothing to do with commerce
or any economic enterprise that substantially affects commerce. The
Court concluded that endangered species are potential resources, as
explained in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources,
471 F.Supp. 985 (D.Haw.1979) and Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153 (1978). The Court said that extinction of the eagle, which
the Act was intended to prevent, would substantially affect: 1) future
commerce in eagles and their parts; 2) future interstate travel for
studying and observing eagles; and 3) future commerce in beneficial
products derived either from eagles or from analysis of their genetic
material. Thus, the Court found the Act to be valid pursuant to the
Commerce Clause.
- Defendant-appellant’s convictions were AFFIRMED.
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