1. Kamuela Price

1. Walter R. Schoettle, Honolulu, HI

1. Obayashi Hawaii Corporation
2. Obayashi Corporation
3. City of County of Honolulu

1. Lloyd S. Yoshioka, Honolulu, HI
2. Kevin S.C. Chang, Watanabe Ing & Kawashima, Honolulu, HI
3. Lyle Y. Harada, Watanabe Ing & Kawashima, Honolulu, HI

N/A

N/A

• Hawaii Revised Statutes (“H.R.S.”) §§ 343-1 et seq.

1. Appellant had sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the appellees challenging the sufficiency of the appellees’ Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for the appellees’ development project. Subsequent to the lower court’s orders, the appellant filed two appeals. The first appeal was a result of the lower court’s issue to the appellant a Notice of Proposed Dismissal. The second appeal arises from the lower court’s order granting the appellees summary judgment. The appellant appealed both court orders, which were consolidated into one appeal.
   
2. Obayashi Hawaii Corporation and Obayashi Corporation (collectively “Obayashi”) had proposed to develop land in Paumalu and Pupukea on the North Shore of Oahu for its Lihi Lani recreational development project. In December 1990, Obayashi submitted a draft EIS for its proposed project. Notice of the draft EIS was published in the Office of Environmental Quality Control (“OEQC”) Bulletin. On April 23, 1991, the notice of the final EIS was published in the OEQC Bulletin. On May 15, 1991, the Department of General Planning notified Obayashi and the OEQC that the final EIS was accepted.
   
3. In June 1991, the appellant filed an action against Obayashi, which the City and County of Honolulu (“the city”) later joined, claiming that Obayashi’s EIS did not comply with H.R.S. Chapter 343, and the development project would destroy sacred archeological sites. On April 23, 1992, the lower court granted the appellees’ motion for summary judgment and ordered the appellee to prepare an appropriate order. On June 27, 1992, the lower court issued and filed a notice of proposed dismissal for want of prosecution because the appellant failed to file a pre-trial statement within one year of filing its complaint. On June 30, 1992, the appellant received the notice stating that the case would be dismissed without prejudice if no objections were filed within ten days of receiving the notice. On July 2, 1992, appellant’s counsel submitted objections to the notice of proposed dismissal claiming that the court had orally granted summary judgment and he was awaiting entry of the order and judgment, however, the lower court clerk refused to file the objections because the appellant failed to submit an affidavit. The lower court clerk based its authority from Judge Chun’s 1983 memorandum, who at that time was the acting administrative judge of the first circuit court’s civil division. Appellant’s counsel pleaded with the law clerk to file his objections because he was leaving shortly to go to Washington, D.C. and he did not have time to write an affidavit, the Rules of the Circuit Courts of the State of Hawaii (“RCCH”) 12(q) did not require the submission of an affidavit, and the grounds for his objections was public record, therefore, an affidavit was not necessary even if it was required. The clerk indicated that if appellant’s counsel could obtain approval from Judge Yim, who was the present administrative judge, the clerk would file his objections. When appellant’s counsel tried to seek approval from Judge Yim, he was told that Judge Yim as not in his chambers and Judge Yim would soon return. Appellant’s counsel left his objections with Judge Yim’s chambers and departed for Washington, D.C. On July 13, 1992, appellant’s counsel returned to Judge Yim’s chambers. Appellant’s counsel found that his objections were not approved and Judge Chun’s memorandum was attached to it. The case was dismissed because the ten-day time period had lapsed and the court entered its order granting summary judgment to the appellees.
   
4. The appellants asserted that summary judgment was inappropriate because there was a the parties experts’ opinions conflicted, therefore, there was a genuine issue of material fact. The court held that the sufficiency of an EIS is a question of law because the only issue presented is whether the EIS complies with statutory mandates.
   
5. The court considered whether the lower court’s order granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment was appropriate as a matter of law. The court used the “rule of reason” to determine whether the EIS was legally sufficient for a decision-making agency to make an informed decision after fully considering the environmental risks and benefits rendered by the proposed action. The court found that the EIS adequately discussed each issue the appellant claimed was insufficiently discussed in the EIS. Accordingly, the court held that the appellees’ EIS was in compliance with H.R.S. 343 mandates.
   
6. The court vacated the dismissal following the notice of proposed dismissal and ffirmed the orders granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees.