In the light of history it is interesting to observe the quarrel between President Truman and ex-Secretary of State James Byrnes over the matter of who was responsible for the "get tough with Russia" policy. At a time when men like these try to take credit for such a policy, we find that on the world scene our country is losing prestige.
Arm-twisting diplomacy, dollar bribes, warmongering, use of force to crush independence movements of colonial and semi-colonial peoples, thought control and the striking of fear into people at home to silence criticism; large profits for a handful of industrialists and financiers at the expense of the ordinary people—these are the results of such a policy.
We have drifted far from the policies and thinking of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harold Ickes, who blasted the Truman administration when he resigned, Wendell Willkie and men of such qualities.
Willkie spoke of One World at a time when our leaders followed a policy of live and let live, and propounded the ideas of the Four Freedoms for the benefit of humanity.
The policy of Truman and Wall Street has brought a dilemma and thus the voice of big interests, Business Week, April 19 said:
"The fact remains that as a political
weapon Moscow's wooing of business will be troublesome to the west . . . We believe that Communists and non-Communists must learn to live together, yet we urge that these trade offers be turned down."
I Saw U. S. Policy Shift In China
I saw the shift of U. S. policy in China during the last war, and I was able to observe this closely because it affected our war activities.
After Chiang Kai-shek finally permitted foreign correspondents to enter Chinese-led areas in the late spring of 1944, and the subsequent establishment in Yenan of the U. S. Army Observer Section, relations between U. S. army headquarters in Chungking and the Yenan government were cordial. This relationship naturally resulted in cooperation between American personnel and the Chinese in liberated and guerrilla areas.
Rescued American pilots who were shot down behind Japanese lines were led to safety by people's militiamen, guerrillas or regular army units. The Chinese Communists did not charge the Americans for rescue work, while Nationalist units were always dickering for higher payment from us whenever they were turning over downed pilots.
GIs Termed the Relationship a "Honeymoon"
In the field of military intelligence we were getting valuable information about the Japanese army. But the basis of this relationship which GIs termed "honeymoon," was a common interest in defeating the enemy and the fact that in North China the Chinese were fighting an all-out war, which was not the case with Chiang's outfit.
Chiang hated General Stilwell who constantly pressed him to use his troops against the Japanese, and through his machination had Stilwell, a truly great American, removed. Chiang wanted to save his U. S.armed and trained troops to fight the Communists after the defeat of the Japanese.
Hurley Unexpectedly Flies Into Yenan.
A few days after the Stilwell recall we heard over the radio in Yenan that Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss had resigned from his Chungking post. Both Stilwell and Gauss, had wanted a united China, with Chungking and Yenan brought together to fight the Japanese. They saw that steps to bring unity must include sweeping reforms to democratize the Nationalists.
Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer succeeded Stilwell and he said, when he assumed command of the U. S. forces in the China Theater, that he would not meddle in Chinese politics. He also said: "After the war, the people of China can determine by whom they will be governed."
At this crucial moment when Chiang seemed to have won a victory in forcing President Roosevelt to recall Stilwell, the focus of interest in China and abroad was not oh Wedemeyer but on Presidential Envoy Major General Patrick J. Hurley. And Hurley unexpectedly arrived in Yenan, drawing the interest of the world to the pastoral, hinterland capital of the Chinese Communists.
"Get Mao Tse-tung Down To the Airfield"
On November 7, 1944, we expected a transport from the 10th Weather Squadron stationed in Chengtu, but not from our headquarters in Chungking. No sooner had the weather plane set down its wheels on the Yenan airstrip, than four fighters suddenly came roaring out of the south, circled over our valley and buzzed low over the runway to give it the once over. Then from the west a C-47 came droning over the airfield at a more leisurely pace.
Colonel David Barrett, our Observer Section commander, began giving orders in great excitement: "Get Mao Tse-tung down to the airfield right away! Tell him General Hurley is here!"
The airfield was quite a distance from the Date Garden where Mao and General Chu Teh lived. In the meantime, General Hurley, tall, trim and strikingly colorful, stepped down from his plane, his every move seemingly calculated to produce the best poses in the cameras which were already clicking.
Chiang Offered $250,000 for Mao's Head; Mao Offered $1 for Chiang's
Finally the Chinese leaders arrived. Mao stepped out of his vehicle and casually threw one end of his knitted woollen scarf across his shoulder. He was tall and of medium build. A deep cotton cap covered his long, jet-black hair and partly hid his high forehead, features sharply characterized in his portraits etched on village walls and public buildings all over Red China. He was dressed simply, like his colleagues and he gave a surface appearance of an odd combination of an intellectual and a peasant.
A liaison officer spoke to Mao, who hurried to meet Hurley. As Mao smilingly approached Hurley with, extended hand, every eye turned on them. For in this pastoral setting, history was being made.
For 17 years the Chinese Communists had been called "bandits" and at one time high prices had been put on the heads of top leaders—dead or alive—by Chiang. Once Chiang offered $250,000 (Chinese) for Mao's head. Mao answered by offering $1 for Chiang's head. Repeated "bandit suppression campaigns" had dislodged the Reds from Southeast China and they marched 8,000 miles to Northwest China. They grew phenomenally in strength during the anti-Japanese war and now an American Presidential envoy had come to them in mediating Nationalist-Communist negotiations. Mao was then a leader of 90,000,000 Chinese.
Hurley and Chu Teh Were a Perfect Contrast
When the handshaking ceremony was over, Generals Hurley and Chu Teh led in reviewing tine guards of honor. Captain John Colling of OSS trained his motion picture camera on the colorful Hurley who within the busy next hour instructed the captain and all GIs with cameras that he wanted all the negatives of pictures taken of him.
The subject was worth a million; the contrast was perfect. Here were modern aircraft against a background of eroded hills, caves, white-turbanned, smiling peasants and ox carts, and sheepskin-clad nomads with camel caravan. A tall millionaire, decked in the best uniform money could buy, ornamented with brass and ribbons galore—marched beside stout General Chu Teh, plainly and simply "attired, like the guards in cotton-padded uniforms who were being reviewed.
Hurley, an Oklahoma orphan who had worked in coal mines, became a lawyer and an oil magnate, was a Horatio Alger character and the incarnation of American industrial capitalism; Chu Teh, who had given away his birthright of wealth and eminent military rank in the old feudal society, had broken away from the opium habit and concubines, for the simple and harsh life of a revolutionary, personified China's workers and peasants.
"A Peacock Couldn't Have Done Better"
Like a seasoned ham actor, Hurley played up to the cameras. Auspiciously he gripped the visor of his cap with a sweep of his hand, swung the cap over his head and there he vigorously waved it in short spiral motions as he pierced the North China stillness with a blood-curdling whooping "yahoo" of the Choctaw Indians.
Chu Teh was startled in the midst of this solemn military ceremony. For a few seconds he gaped at Hurley, who had regained his composure and was looking straight into the cameras as he continued to pass in review.
"Why, a peacock couldn't have done any better," someone commented.
When I met General Hurley, Sergeant Sho Nomura went with me. The general wore a good-sized white mustache, neatly trimmed and curled up at the ends with what seemed to me a generous application of wax. This was the most striking thing about him that I saw in a flash. As Colonel Barrett presented us Nisei to him, Hurley drew back his broad, square shoulders and stiffened his spine, shook our hands and remarked with a grin: "I see we have many Americans here . . ."
Chiang Turned Down Hurley's Jeffersonian Democracy
That evening we were all invited to the 18th Group Army headquarters with General Hurley to a banquet observing the anniversary of the Russian revolution. When the banquet began, toasts were given in rapid succession to the Russian revolution, Marshal Stalin, victory for President Roosevelt in the election against Thomas Dewey and the Defeat of the fascist nations. Then came a toast to welcome the Presidential envoy to Yenan.
In the next few days the Presidential envoy made his proposal for Chinese unity. He offered the now famous "Five Points" which he referred to as a genuine expression of Jeffersonian democracy. Mad signed this but Chiang later refused to sign it. In the weeks that followed, Hurley sided with Chiang and his attitude was regarded in China as not dissimilar to that of the Generalissimo. This developed into a "get tough with Yenan" policy and long before Japanese capitulation, Chiang boldly began attacking the guerrilla areas, using weapons supplied by the U. S. By then President Roosevelt had died and U. S. policy had changed.