Counselor Charles E. Bohlen, the State Department expert on Russian affairs, this week teed off on the Republicans for criticizing the Democratic administration for concluding the 1945 Yalta agreement with the Soviet Union.
Mr. Bohlen said that the Soviet Union violated the Yalta agreement when she failed to throw her "full support to the Chinese Nationalist Government" of Chiang Kai-shek.
I was in a key observation spot in China during that period and I would say that it would be more correct to state that despite all-out support given to Chiang's regime by the U. S., as against Yenan, because of corruption and oppression, the Chinese people rejected and finally routed the reactionary Nationalists.
As for the Yalta agreement, a re-examination of it will show that it was not concluded in a cold war atmosphere, which came many months after Franklin D. Roosevelt's death. It was made in a spirit of cooperation and co-existence—not to contain or to crush the opposition, as Chiang tried to do with the liberals and Communists who advocated a coalition government.
Bohlen Slights Big Role U. S. Played
Counselor Bohlen slights the big but unsuccessful role the U. S. played in China. Perhaps the State Department wants to forget it, or at least does not want to remind the American people about U. S. intervention in China which, at that time, caused loud protest both in the U. S. and in China.
And now I recall how interested high U. S. officers were in the behavior of Japanese troops in China at the moment of allied victory. American intelligence officers wondered whether Japanese troops would go over to the Chinese Communists in some areas, and thus worsen the civil war crisis. They tried to find out what the Chinese puppet troops who had served the Japanese would do. One great concern was whether the Japanese puppets would surrender to the Communist-led forces.
Chiang and Chu Issued Conflicting Orders
I Chiang was in a weak position, for his crack far from the anti-Japanese fronts, being forces. Unless they were transported into eas, which were surrounded by Communist-China and in vast areas of Central China, Chiang's forces could not accept enemy surrender.
How Chiang's forces had laid down in the anti-Japanese militarist war became more glaring by the commands of Chiang and General Chu Teh. Chu ordered his soldiers on all fronts to accept surrender of Japanese and puppet troops. Chiang ordered the Japanese and puppet troops to maintain order—meaning to fight off Yenan's forces. Through radio broadcasts Chiang appealed to puppets that this was their opportunity to "redeem" themselves as loyal patriots. On the other hand, Chiang, as the generalissimo, ordered Communist-led forces to remain in their positions until he himself, ordered them to move.
At that moment in the tense situation, General Douglas Mac-Arthur, as supreme allied commander, designated Chiang to receive surrender in China. General Albert Wedemeyer promised Chiang all-out aid to quickly transport his troops into coastal areas of Central China and into North China.
American Support Swung Japanese and Puppets
Overnight this American support swung hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops and an estimated 800,000 puppets, many undoubtedly wavering, to the Nationalist side or made them wait the arrival of Chiang's troops.
The Japanese began fighting for the Kuomintang in some areas and they were left in strategic spots as anti-Yenan buffers for nearly half a year. Local Japanese commanders and soldiers, tired of war. asked the Americans to come in and accept their surrender. The situation developed into a mess and I remember that Gen. Wedemeyer once protested to Chiang that the Nationalists were paying the Japanese much more than their own troops.
Hurley Puts His Foot In the Door
On the diplomatic front, during this time, Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley wanted to step into Chungking-Yenan negotiations, which were to resume as Mao Tse-tung decided to go to Chungking for discussions with Chiang. The ambassador had been repudiated as a biased negotiator by Yenan.
Through Gen. Wedemeyer, the ambassador wanted to know if Yenan would accept his services of escorting Mao to Chungking. I was sent to find out and Yenan said Hurley's services would be welcome, although Yenan had reservations about the ambassador's previous conduct which it felt was unfriendly and insulting.
The Ambassador Did Not Yahoo
We carefully prepared an impressive reception for the ambassador. Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton, commander of our Yenan mission, briefed Yenan's liaison officers with protocol procedure. Mao, for instance, was supposed to meet Hurley first at the airfield and then return to his headquarters. Mao wanted this arrangement. It was planned that Hurley would go to our compound, where he would receive Chu Teh and other Communist officials. In the evening, Mao would receive Hurley at his headquarters.
At the end of August, when Hurley flew in, he was extremely quiet. He was in no mood to exploit his photogenic qualities as he had done about 10 months before. Yahooing was out of the question. After he shook hands with Mao he put his arm around Mao's shoulder like an old friend.
He seemed to be trying extremely hard to win Mao's confidence. When we began moving toward our vehicles, Mao started for his old Chevrolet as planned in the program. Hurley kept his arm on Mao's shoulders and asked the latter to ride up with him in the jeep. Mao consented. In our mess hall, there was a short reception and tea was served.
"Until I Have Mao On My Plane . . ."
After the Communist leaders had gone back to Yang Family's Plain, I showed Col. Yeaton a letter which Gen. Wedemeyer had sent us to be forwarded to Chu Teh. This was the general's answer to Chu Teh who had requested President Truman to let his forces receive Japanese surrender in areas where they were in contact with the enemy. Gen. Wedemeyer wrote Chu that in accordance with the Potsdam agreement, the Generalissimo had been appointed allied representative to accept surrender in China.
Ambassador Hurley read this letter. As he handed it back to me, he said: "Young man, don't give that letter to Chu Teh until I have Mao on my plane!"
Pact Said a Terrible Blow To Mao
I was surprised by his statement, for I had understood that he had asked for the privilege of escorting Mao. The ambassador explained that the Sino-Soviet Pact which had been concluded, had ignored Yenan and this was a terrible blow to Mao.
If you give this letter to Chu Teh, he said, Mao would sulk in his corner and not go to Chungking with him. One blow is all that Mao can take right now, he warned me. He emphasized that Yenan was backed up against a wall.
''I came to get Mao and I am going to take him to Chung,king" with me. I don't want to drag him!" Hurley said.
I said this letter from Gen. Wedemeyer would not change Yenan's decision to send Mao to Chungking. The Communists add my thoughts most probably had not counted on President Truman's support.
The ambassador said: "Young man, you are mistaken."
I Was Told Chiang Had Bought Off Stalin
He then showed me his copy of the Sino-Soviet Pact and told me to read a paragraph which said:
"In accordance with the spirit of the above treaty and for the implementation of its general ideas and purposes the Soviet government is ready to render China moral support and assistance with military equipment and other material resources, this support and assistance given fully to the Nationalist Government as the Central Government of China."
I asked, after reading here and there in the Pact: "Isn't this pledge limited to the war against Japan, since the Pact is against Japanese aggression?"
"No," he said. He intimated that Chiang had bought off Stalin with concessions so that the Soviet Union would not aid Yenan.
"You see," Hurley said to me, "this is a hard blow to the Communists. Generalissimo Stalin has promised moral and military support to the Central Government in any event, even in a civil war. I must show this document to Mao tonight." He showed that he dreaded this task. Yenan Had Heard News Broadcasts On the Pact
I felt that the ambassador should know what we already knew. So I told him that the Pact had been announced a couple of days before and Mao was familiar with its contents. The ambassador argued that Yenan could not know the full content of the Pact. He said that he and Chiang's government had the only complete texts in China.
That night when Hurley saw Mao, he offered to leave his copy of the Pact in Yenan. Mao said their radio receiver had monitored the treaty that had come over the press wire.
Mao's Departure Likened To a Man Going To His Execution
An American correspondent who had flown to Yenan with Hurley, in his dispatch likened Mao's departure to that of a man going to his execution, for Chinese and Americans in Chungking and Yenan and elsewhere thought of the probability of Mao's assassination in Chungking.
Before Mao boarded the transport he shook hands with all his comrades. Then he went to his wife, who had their young daughter in her arms. He leaned forward and embraced them both as peasants, while white-turbaned nomads with camels, from the desert areas, soldiers, students and officials in the hinterland loess valley looked on quietly. An American officer standing by me said: "They like Mao . . . He's a great guy with them."
Where People On Foot Triumphed
I was standing near Hsiu Teh-li, who had been Mao's teacher long ago in a Hunan normal school. Old Hsiu had joined the Communist Party at the age of 50. His eyes were damp as he waved his hand at Mao, who stood by the transport's door with Hurley. The ambassador was smiling triumphantly. He was asking Mao to pose with him for photographs.
In the days that followed negotiations stalled in Chungking while Chiang's troops were rushed to the Japanese-occupied areas. But what Chiang and foreign officials never expected took place —by foot, Yenan's people, soldiers and civilians by the tens of thousands, raced the Nationalist soldiers who were riding modern planes and ships and vehicles into Manchuria. It was really a race between the tortoise and the hare.