Hawaiian Crow v. Lujan
906 F. Supp. 549 (D. Haw. 1991)
Plaintiffs: Plaintiffs' Attorneys:
  1. Hawaiian Crow
  2. Hawai‘i Audubon Society
  3. National Audubon Society
  1. Michael Sherwood, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund
  2. Paul Spaulding III
  3. Denise Antolini, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, Inc., Honolulu, HI
  4. Gallup & Van Pernis, Mark Van Pernis, Kailua Kona, HI
Defendants: Defendants Attorneys:
  1. Manuel Lujan, Jr.
  2. John Turner
  3. McCandless Properties
  4. McCandless Land & Cattle Co.
  5. Cynthia Salley
  6. Elizabeth Stack
  1. Paul Aoki, Ashford & Wriston, Honolulu, HI
  2. Shawna Soderston, Ashford & Wriston, Honolulu, HI
  3. Edwin Oyarzo, Kailua Kona, HI
  4. Daniel Bent
  5. Michael Chun
  6. James Kilbourne
  7. Charles Shockey, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Wildlife & Marine Resources Section, Environmental & Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C.
Court: United States District Court for the District of Hawai‘i
Opinion by: Judge Ezra
Other Jurists: Court Below:
  • N/A
 N/A
Key laws involved:
  • Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §1531, 1532(13), 1533(f), 1540(g)(1)
Summary:
  1. The defendants sought to remove the Hawaiian Crow (‘Alala) as a plaintiff, arguing that animals do not have the right to sue. The defendants also sought to dismiss the allegations that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) failed in their statutory duty to implement a recovery plan for the ‘Alala as required by the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f).
  2. The ‘Alala is a bird that only exists in Hawai‘i (about twenty-one still exist). Approximately nine of the twenty-one ‘Alala live on a property known as the McCandless Ranch on the island of Hawai‘i. Under the ESA, the federal defendants are obligated to prevent the species’ extinction through affirmative steps. Such steps include the capture and removal of the ‘Alala and their eggs from the wild, and using them in a captive breeding program. The McCandless defendants allegedly refused to give the USFWS access to the ranch, and the USFWS failed to take legal action to gain such access.
  3. Under 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) of the ESA, “any person” may bring an enforcement suit. However § 1532 defines a “person” as “an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any other private entity.” Based on the plain language of the ESA, and the fact that no previous case law allowed an animal to be a sole plaintiff, the court held that the ‘Alala could not be named a plaintiff because it is not authorized to sue as a “person,” (nor can an infant or incompetent person sue) under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 17(c). The motion to dismiss the ‘Alala as a plaintiff was GRANTED.
  4. The defendants also made a motion for a more definite statement regarding the granting of access to the McCandless Ranch. Since the ranch owners have a right to know what portion of their ranch will be affected, the court GRANTED their motion for a more definite statement. The court required the plaintiffs to specify which portions of the ranch they need access to in order to implement a recovery plan for the ‘Alala.